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BOLICK, ERNEST BERNARD, JR. A Historical Account of the 
Controversy over State Support of Church-Related Higher 
Education in the Fifty States. (1978) Directed by: 
Dr. Joseph E. Bryson. Pp. 408. 
The historical account of a long-standing controversy 
between church and state has lately emerged in the constitu­
tional question of statQ support of church-related higher 
education. A historical-legal study was made of the cen-
turies-long, struggle between church and state. The American 
Constitution provided a solution through the First Amendment, 
which forbids both interference with and establishment of 
religion by government. 
American higher education began as private, church-
related education, which accepted financial aid from any 
source. Public higher education grew slowly until the twen­
tieth century provided the impetus for rapid growth. 
The phenomenon of federal and state aid was not per­
mitted on a large scale until America found herself in a 
space race with Russia. Tables and other statistical evi­
dence provide a picture of the growth and magnitude of state 
and federal aid. 
A review of the constitutions of the fifty states 
revealed provisions which forbid religious establishment 
or aid to private, sectarian institutions from taxation of 
private citizens. Porty-two states have provided direct or 
indirect financial aid to private church-related colleges 
despite constitutional prohibitions. The study revealed 
that educators are divided over the question of the effects 
of financial aid by the states such as: whether aid fosters 
excessive entanglement of government in religion; whether 
institutions can separate secular from sectarian use of 
funds: whether educational diversity is threatened by aid; 
whether such aid is constitutional; and whether state aid 
to students constitutes constitutionally permissive aid to 
the institution. 
Participants in the controversy were found to be 
state and federal governments, private college groupst consti­
tutionalist groups, and concerned individuals who became 
parties in court action during the 1970's. 
In Tilton v. Richardson, the Supreme Court drew a 
line of demarcation between higher and Lower religious edu­
cation, in that colleges do not necessarily aim at indoctrina­
tion. In Hunt v. McNair, indirect assistance of a religious 
college was constitutional so long as use of facilities pur­
chased through a bond program was identifiably secular. 
In Roemer v. Maryland, the Supreme Court concluded 
students attending church-related colleges in Maryland could 
receive state aid so long as funds were not used to train 
ministers or religion teachers. The Court appLied the lemon 
precedent and made provision to identify and to account for 
secular use of funds accepted by the schooLs. 
In Smith v. Board of Governors, the United States 
Supreme Court decided a student attending a sectarian college 
may receive aid if the school's primary educational effort 
is for a secular purpose and no excessive entanglement ensues 
in the reporting process. 
The tread of state and federal court decisions sug­
gests that more itiight be forthcoming. Colleges are already 
divesting themselves, in some cases, of their religious 
mission in order to obtain the secular status which qualifies 
them for assistance. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The writers of the American Constitution stood in 
an enviable position. Timing was such that at its founding, 
the constitutional architects perceived two directions. 
Looking backward into history, they chose principles most 
consistent with freedom and rejected ideas restrictive and 
harmful to the dignity of the individual. As an infant 
democracy took form, constitutional deliberators sought to 
forestall tyranny for all time. Out of much hard-fought 
debate and careful compromise emerged the Bill of Rights 
which spelled out freedoms implicit in the Constitution. 
Admittedly, the political philosophy expressed was untried. 
But the governmental form which emerged was free from his­
torical encumbrances, and was heavy with promise of a new 
departure. 
As the nation matured, the United States Supreme 
Court kept constitutional principles intact, while inter­
preting laws to meet changing needs and conditions. The 
early seventies witnessed a frontal attack on a number of 
safeguards built into the Constitution. Those who would 
preserve the rights of mankind have successfully drawn upon 
principles expressed by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison 
in the main. The constitutional system works. A mass of 
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litigation in the area of human rights and education has 
characterized the period. Education has also been the cen­
ter of a constitutional controversy over financial aid for 
elementary and secondary church-related schools. In recent 
years the furor has continued as unanswered questions and 
unresolved issues continue to plague legislators, educators, 
churchmen, judges, and parents. 
To further complicate matters, the United States 
Supreme Court has been presented with a variety of litiga­
tion regarding state aid to church-related colleges and 
universities. Decisions resulting from court action have 
encouraged others to continue legislative pressure designed 
to increase the flow of government financial support. 
Efforts are controversial both from the constitutional view 
and from the effect of institutional competition. 
To some, private, church-related schools comprise 
an element of unneeded competition in the marketplace of 
prospective students: to others the competition takes the 
form of one more demand upon the overtaxed pulolic treasury. 
To others, the financial particulars are secondary to the 
threats implicit in the schemes that appear to violate the 
"no establishment" clause in the First Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
THE PROBLEM 
The purpose of this dissertation is to render a 
historical account of the current controversy concerning 
3 
state support of church—related higher education in the 
fifty states. This study attempts to answer the question: 
What issues divide educators with respect to the public 
support of church—related colleges and universities; who 
are the participants and what arguments are used to support 
their respective positions? 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM 
The issue of state support in church-related higher 
education in the United States is a persistent and recurring 
controversy. Higher education is continually in transition. 
During the past decade, tie transition involved, among other 
perplexities, an alarmiag threat of economic disaster. The 
threat of impending insolvency of great numbers of institu­
tions, coupled -with the constitutional controversy, produced 
a spate of nev/s articles, journal articles, books, commen­
taries, statistical reports, official government studies, 
conference reports, and legal studies. The period also gen­
erated an unprecedented stimulation of legislation and legal 
action. 
The economic picture, though brighter, still per­
sists. The constitutional question clutches tightly to the 
content of all speculations involving state-derived funding 
as a solution to a very "sticTty" problem. Although present 
economic fluctuations tend to exacerbate fundamental consti­
tutional issues, the controversy arose out of a long and 
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violent "history that involves legal and philosophical issues 
of deep and lasting consequence. 
As of the date of this research, there is no recent 
historical compilation of the controversy. Material and 
literature applicable to the controversy exist in great 
quantity and in diverse locations. One may be reading some 
of the material, reach one conclusion, while if one digs 
deeper into the background, one may come to a different, if 
not contradictory opinion. It is possible to construct a 
narrative, following a period of research, sifting and anal­
ysis. It would serve little purpose, therefore, to report 
one facet of the controversy, thereby providing a distorted 
view of its history. This work is an attempt to arrange into 
narrative form a concise and usable timely picture of the 
emergence of the problem as it appears in records, ancient 
modern, and contemporary. 
The literature concerning the controversy pre­
sents problems. Accurate appraisal of higher education's 
vitality has been complicated recently by the publica­
tion of information that has been labeled "erroneous and 
contradictory." Russell I. Thackery, an educational author­
ity, indicated that the findings and recommendations of a 
variety of public and private groups have provided the subject 
matter for the controversy. Thackery is concerned that the 
confusion in the national debate is complicated because 
"much of it is the result of misuse, mishandling, and 
5 
misinterpretation of the statistics.""1' The groups in ques­
tion are highly reputable private and government-sponsored 
commissions. 
Chester E. Finn and Terry Hartle joined Thackery in 
criticizing information coming out of these studies as con­
tradictory and advocating that no source supplies data that 
is consistent or reliable enough to be used for appraisal 
2 or decision-making. Robert Wood in Daedalus adds the 
opinion that there is a "persistent bias" within the Carnegie 
Commission in favor of private institutions. Wood said: 
Who Benefits, Who Pays? said that the actual 197 3 
percentage of educational costs of public institutions 
met by tuition was 17%. It is recommended an increase 
to 33% by the mid 1980's . . . the March, 1974 supple­
ment acknowledged that more precise information is not 
that 17%, but 24-27% is paid by tuition.̂  
Wood expressed concern that a correction would never 
overtake such fallacious perceptions created by the original 
error. It is misstatements which tend to distort decisions 
and to complicate legislation or bias court decisions. 
One such critical statistic is a much-discussed 
report on the attrition rate of private colleges to which 
"'"Russell I. Thackery, "If You're Confused About Higher 
Education Statistics, Remember: So Are the People Who Produce 
Them," Phi Delta Kappan, 61 (February. 1975), 415-419. 
2 Chester E. Finn, Jr. and Terry W. Hartle, '"The 
Chancy Health of Higher Education," The New Republic, 
June 12, 1976, pp. 12-14. 
3 Robert Wood, "Academe Sings the Blues," Daedalus, 
104, No. 1 (Winter 1975), 51. 
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Thackery attributed a false conclusion to a statistical 
error. The national Commission on Financing Post Secondary 
Education predicted a forthcoming loss of 120 private col­
leges in the next decade. The reasoning behind closings is 
based upon projections of fiscal failure. Thackery noted 
that statements reported closings, but made no note of 
openings, nor of variables that account for the unusual rate 
of closings. In sum, Thackery observed that fiscal problems 
of many private institutions may be real, but statistical 
trends based on erroneous information produce faulty predic-
4 taons. 
This research notes that such erroneous statistical 
data adversely affect the quality of decisions which must 
rely upon accuracy of data for positive results. All ele­
ments of the educational community share in the consequences 
generated by such controversies which continue to dominate 
public attention. Beyond constitutional issues, fiscal 
consequences touch every taxpayer. The quality of planning 
and decision-making depends upon accuracy of data available. 
The research underlying this dissertation is undertaken in 
that interest. 
SCOPE AND METHOD OF RESEARCH 
This study is an investigation of the controversy 
over state support of church-related higher education at 
4 Thackery, "Statistics," Kappan, p. 418. 
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the state and national levels. Emphasis is placed upon the 
historical evolution of the controversy. Chapter two pro­
vides that background. It is a narration of the development 
of intellectual positions within the controversy/ including 
ancient historical origins of the legal, educational, and 
religious institutions. The writer exercised selectivity 
in the choice of content of the narrative, and emphasized 
events which had the most influence on emergence of institu­
tions under consideration. 
The scope will involve theoretical foundations of 
church-state relationship? the university; and the phil­
osophical development of political individualism and reli­
gious toleration. The entire history of Western civilization 
has been examined with an eye toward the changing modes of 
religion and the state and effect of such changes upon the 
present controversy. 
Chapter three commences the narrative where the 
controversy has its beginnings, in the formulation of the 
federal Constitution and the state constitutions. In this 
chapter, issues and participants are defined and charac­
terized, as to respective roles in the controversy. 
Chapter four provides a view of the fifty states 
and portrays each state's respective attempted solutions to 
the controversy. The constitutional question has proved to 
be serious enough to warrant a geometric increase in legis­
lation and litigation. State constitutions have usually 
8 
shaped the kind of legislation that has emerged from legis­
latures. Constitutional limits within the states have also 
provided the occasion for attempts to change the constitu­
tion or to by-pass it through court decisions. Thus, a 
variety of situations prevails, and the scene is constantly 
changing. In Chapter five a careful study of the statutes 
that apply in each state, as well as the current status of 
litigation in progress has been undertaken. The analysis has 
been conducted in view of the state constitutional provisions, 
as well as appropriate federal amendments and court decisions 
in each case. Legal references were searched including: 
American Digest System, The College Law Digest, The National 
Reporter System, American Law Reports, and Corpus Juris 
Secundum. 
In addition to the analyses and the historical nar­
rative , this chapter features a thoroughgoing discourse on 
the latest Supreme Court decisions and attempts to discern 
clues which point toward a developing educational policy 
among the justices. 
The final sixth chapter draws the total narrative 
together through a summary and a conclusion. The research 
has produced a number of possible directions for future 
research and for future understanding of this and other sim­
ilar controversies. 
9 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
1. Church-related: The term usually refers to the 
source from which an institution receives its primary support 
through funding, enrollments, and structure. Most sources 
suggest that there are different and varying degrees of 
church-relatedness. At this point courts have not been suffi­
ciently specific that a narrow definition can be produced. 
For the purposes of this study, therefore, those institutions 
which define themselves as "church-related" in The Educational 
Directory, 1975-76 ed. (published by the Office of Education, 
U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare) , v/ill be 
considered church-related. Others, who consider themselves 
"independent," will be so considered. 
2. The Private Sector: In the context of this 
study, the term includes both sectarian and non-sectarian 
higher education. Legislatures and courts often fail to 
isolate the church-related institution in their literature. 
It is often use of the general term that jeopardizes state 
aid plans under constitutional provisions forbidding such 
aid as "establishment of religion." Because of ambiguity in 
legislative language, church-related institutions often 
qualify for funds as "independent," or "private" colleges. 
In other cases, sectarian institutions frequently divest 
themselves of the religious aspects which would negate 
eligibility for funds because of constitutional prohibitions. 
10 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Students of history are familiar with the successive 
and alternating roles of enmity and alliance which, through 
the centuries, have been assumed by the institutions of 
government and religion. Although the term did not receive 
verbalization until the middle ages, cuious reqio eius reliqio 
(who rules, his the religion) was a practice derived from 
antiquity- Church and state have never been structured in 
such a way that one could ignore the other. The usual 
arrangement that existed in ancient and some later societies, 
is the feature of civil and political institutions working 
in tandem with the religious. This chapter concerns itself 
with the investigation of how that relationship evolved and 
functioned in the West until the eve of the American Consti­
tutional Convention in 1787. 
ANCIENT INSTITUTIONS 
As various civilizations expressed themselves relig­
iously, there appears to have been a literal life and death 
dependency upon religious leaders. Disputes and wars, cov­
enants and treaties, commerce and agriculture were all 
expressed in religious terms. The language used was in 
11 
recognition of a benevolent deity who was the benefactor of 
society. Among many, intolerance, narrowness, and dogmatism 
characterized the logical outcome of such close dependence 
upon religion in the trivial affairs of men. The earliest 
records of man's pristine ancestry reveal incipient institu­
tions emerging from functions of god, priest, and king. 
Historian W. H. McNeill explains the probable reasons for 
social leadership being centered in the priesthood. Agri­
cultural communities depended upon uncertain fertility of 
the soil and therefore looked to the priest as mediator 
between the god of nature and helpless man. Among nomadic 
peoples a warrior chieftain usually made daily decisions 
concerning grazing, hunting, and war. The duties of such 
headmen or patriarchs who are described in early Hebrew 
literature were priestly, judicial, and military.''" 
Law Historian Palmer D. Edmunds describes the slow 
process of evolution whereby religion and law were separated 
in function. Using the Egyptian civilization as a point of 
departure, Professor Edmunds states that: "Religion was 
2 their law." The continuity with modern times has been 
retained almost completely with some societies, and in all 
legal systems there remain traces of early association with 
Ŵilliam H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: A His­
tory of the Human Community (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1963)/pp. 37-38. 
2 Palmer D. Edmunds, Law and Civilization (Washing­
ton, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959), pp. 21-22. 
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religion. The Bible describes the breakup of the patri­
archal role of Moses into the functional divisions of a 
primitive form of public administration. Although the sit­
uation required" a period of nomadic wandering, it was under­
taken in an organized manner. Joshua became the military 
commander, while the priestly function was performed by 
Aaron, Moses' brother. Moses performed the judicial func­
tion and even broke that down into divisions. 
When Moses1 father-in-law saw all that he was doing 
for the people, he said, "What is this that you are do­
ing for the people? Why do you sit alone, and all the 
people stand about you from morning till evening? And 
Moses said to his father-in-law, "Because the people 
come to me . . . when they have a dispute . . . and I 
decide between a man and his neighbor, and I make them 
know the statutes of God and his decisions." Moses' 
father-in-law said to him, "What you are doing is not 
good . . . you will wear yourselves out . . . you are not 
able to perform it alone .... So Moses gave heed to 
his father-in-law . . . and chose able men out of all 
Israel, and made them heads over the people .... 
And they judged the people at all times. Hard cases they 
brought to Moses, but any small matter they decided them­
selves. ̂ 
Basic to advanced civilizations are fundamental laws 
such as the Decaloque or Ten Commandments, that appear to 
be common to all cultures. The Decalogue, however, proved 
to be more than a universal fundamental civil code. It was 
a summary of the acceptable relationships between a covenant 
people and God. Religion was the law. In the case of the 
Hebrews, the Law had within it the characteristic of exclu-
4 sxveness, because it only applied to the covenant people. 
Êxodus, 18:14-26. 
4 McNeill, Rise of the West, p. 177. 
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Once the Hebrews unified and developed into an 
effective military power, nomadic wanderings culminated in 
subjugation of canaanite villages and towns. Nomadic tribes­
men adopted agrarian customs, settled into walled cities, and 
under their Icing built a magnificent temple for YaHwH, God 
of Israel.̂  
Professor Edmunds suggests a decline in the level of 
freedom once nomadic existence was abandoned for civiliza­
tion. Edmunds observes that prior to the conquering of 
Canaan, Israel was a "divinely established, perfect repub-
lie." He agrees with the idea in which the commonwealth had 
a prior claim as proper government for people of God, but 
wanting to be like other nations/ the Hebrews pestered God 
7 for a king. The prophet Samuel anointed Saul king. The 
move from a theocratic democracy eventuated in the dissolu­
tion of Hebrew unity under Solomon, from which Israel never 
recovered.® 
Ancestors of the Israelites (Hebrews) had originally 
lived in the Mesopotamian delta. Some of the earliest tra­
dition of the Hebrews resembles that of the Babylonian epics. 
The Babylonians were not sophisticated to the point of 
accepting monotheism, such as led the tribe of Abraham 
Ĵoshua? i Kings, 6:1-38. 
g 
Edmunds, Law and Civilization, p. 109. 
7I Samuel 8:19-22; 10:1. 8I Kings 11:9-12. 
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9 of Ur. The Sumerian cities along the delta were ruled by 
godpriests. Every function of the agrarian life was performed 
for the support of god. The god ruled the city, owned the 
land, cared for the seasons, and created and preserved the 
tradition in written and oral language. McNeill writes that 
the Sumerian temple was literally the house of a god."*"̂  
Priests and other attendants constituted the god's household. 
Kish, one of the cities on the delta, produced the first 
separate king. Intercity quarrels and wars necessitated 
development of military specialists. Walled cities were 
easily overcome by invaders from the northern mountains. 
Wave after wave of fierce tribesmen conquered and occupied 
12 cities on the fertile plain. The flat, rich land was an 
open invitation to plundering of wandering warrior bands, 
whose repeated successes produced a civilization of mixed 
lineage and custom. The Akkadians in the city of Kish devel­
oped a system of property management which combined tribal, 
royal, individual and religious ownership. McNeill notes 
also, that land reform provided for a divided administration 
13 between king and priests. 
The most famous king of Babylon, Hammurabi, even­
tually became ruler over the entire valley. Not only was 
9 McNeill, Rise of the West, p. 51. 
10Ibid., pi 51„ 11Ibid. 
12Ibid. 13Ibid., p. 63. 
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the realm to revere Hammurabi as king, but the local god in 
14 each city was to give preference to Marduk. McNeill attests 
that the Code of Hammurabi presented a new concept of author­
ity. It was based on the fundamental Mesopotamian belief 
that rulership derived from the gods. The successful con­
queror was one chosen of the gods. In terms of the legal 
code, Hammurabi produced the basis for law in religion that 
15 endured for centuries, thus ending local rule forever. 
Hammurabi proclaimed: 
Hammurabi is ruler, who is father to his subjects, 
who holds the words of Marduk in reverence, who has 
achieved conquest for Marduk over the north and south, 
who rejoices the heart of Marduk, his lord, who has 
bestowed benefits forever and ever on his subjects, 
and has established order in the land.16 
Earliest civilizations drew no distinctions between 
government and religion. Higher learning was a function of 
the priestly aspects of tribal and city leadership. Educa­
tional historian James Bowen provides insight into Baby­
lonian transmission of knowledge as related to religion and 
government. Dr. Bowen describes two levels of higher learn­
ing maintained by the Babylonians. Information considered 
most important and secret was transmitted orally, and informa-
17 txon of less value by writing. 
14 McNeill, Rise of the West, p. 67. 
"̂ Ibid. , p. 66. 
16 James Bowen, History of Western Education (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1972), I, 10. 
"̂ Ibid., p. 11. 
16 
Esoteric Tcnowledge and taboos characterized all 
ancient religions. Holy places, relics, names, words, sym­
bols, and numbers abetted the priestly class in its control 
18 of the people. 
In addition, the Babylonian period was one of consid­
erable educational advance. Commerce and communication re­
quired that accounts be Tcept. Therefore, writing and mathe­
matics were developed considerably. Much of this progress 
was the product of the House of Wisdom, which was the Baby-
19 Ionian model of higher education. Although there is no 
record indicating a development of abstract theory or philos­
ophy, the period 2000 to 1500 B.C. was filled with intense 
literary activity. The oral tradition of earlier days was 
transmitted to stone tablets. The epic of Gilqamesh and 
20 other ancient traditions were recorded from oral tradition. 
Antiquity, therefore, had the same human and insti­
tutional material, in embryo, that emerged, finally as wes­
tern civilization. Man's needs have remained basically the 
same throughout man's history. Psychologists suggest that 
one's needs move from survival level up an increasingly com-
21 plex scale to a level called "self-actualization." That 
scale can be applied to institutions that man has developed 
18 Bowen, History of Western Education, p. 22. 
19Ibid. 20Ibid. 
21 Abraham H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," 
Psychological Review, 50 (July 1943), 370-396, rpt. in 
Abraham Mas low, Motivation and Personality (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1954), pp. 
17 
including religious, governmental, legal and educational. 
Such institutions have served man as needs and times re­
quired. Institutional history focuses on a broader view 
2 2  than episodes and personalities. Such a view discusses 
forms, interrelationships, and notes how such modifications 
are largely results from response to man's needs. How such 
institutions developed in the face of challenge and response 
is part and parcel to the history of any controversy involv­
ing institutional relationships. 
It was the Greek mind that first began to record in 
logical form man's speculation about himself and the universe. 
23 The Greeks invented philosophy. The early philosophers 
maintained that man lived in a universe governed by natural 
laws, and not subject to fate or to capricious divine 
24 will. Although not all questions concerning human exis­
tence confronted by Greek philosophy have been solved, 
speculation concerning nature's laws gave birth to modern 
25 science. 
Political philosophers still express ideas in 
terms and categories laid down by Plato and Aristotle as 
they analyzed life in those tiny fifth century Aegean 
22 Harry Elmer Barnes, A History of Historical Writing, 
Second Revised Edition (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 
1962), p. 305. 
M̂cNeill, Rise of the West, p. 232. 
24Ibid., p. 233. 25Ibid., pp. 234-35. 
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26 towns. Religion and political life in Greece were tied 
together as closely as in other early civilizations. The 
noted legal and political historian, C. H. Mcllwain, declared 
that to the Greek, his whole life was involved in politics 
27 and religion. The two institutions were inseparable. 
According to Professor Mcllwain, the Greeks viewed civiliza­
tion as the entire collective act of its citizens. Therefore, 
religion tied the Greek citizen to citizenship through gods 
2 8 who watched over both city and fireside. No Greek could 
conceive of Athens without Athena, or vice versa. Almost 
every activity of life was tied to some form of religious 
expression. Greeks portrayed gods through art, architecture, 
and literature: moreover, theater and sports were intimately 
tied to political thought and religion. Kings and aristo­
crats were said to have descended from the gods. No one 
ventured to imagine or express a political structure that 
separated government from religion. Aristotle, concerned 
that there be provision for public religion, proposed that 
29 priests be paid from the public treasury. 
Congregating in the market place, all citizens par­
ticipated in selection of officials and discussion of public 
business. Political philosophers were exposed to a rich his­
tory of political experience as: 
26 
C. H. Mcllwain, The Growth of Political Thought in 
the West from the Greeks to the Middle Ages (New York: The 
MacMillan Co., 1932), p. 3. 
27Ibid., pp. 5-8. 28Ibid., p. 8. 29Ibid. 
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Democracy alternated with aristocracy, oligarchy, 
despotism, and tyranny. From this rich fund of exper­
ience was born systematic political science as set 
forth in the unwritten speculations of Socrates . . . 
the Republic of Plato and the Politics of Aristotle 
• • • • 
Plato's speculative city the Republic describes a 
static society governed by intellectual elite, whose hier­
archical structure is topped by a philosopher king. Lower 
levels of society are occupied by workers and soldiers, who 
must follow the lead of their intellectual superiors. In 
the governance of their city, they have no voice. More impor­
tant to subsequent political thought than the structure, was 
31 Plato's concept of justice. Constitutional historians 
Alfred Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison advance the suggestion 
that Plato's Republic tied justice with natural law. They 
write: 
. . .  c e r t a i n  e t e r n a l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  l a w  w e r e  i n h e r e n t  
in the universe, manmade law being a mere affirmation 
of natural law .... Plato advanced the conception 
of an absolute justice which existed whether or not it 
found expression in any human enactment.̂ 2 
Aristotle saw Greece as the society that should be 
imitated by the remainder of civilization. The philosopher 
envisioned a community of man, united in brotherhood under 
30 R. R. Palmer and Joel Coulton, A History of the Mod­
ern World, 2nd ed., rev. (Mew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), 
p. 5. 
31 Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, The Amer­
ican Constitution: Its Origins and Development, 3rd ed. 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Cbmpany, 1963), p. 36. 
32Ibid., p. 36. 
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one law. The flavor of the age required that total society 
be uniform and conform to the controlling governmental 
33 power. Aristotle taught the concept of universality to the 
great Macedonian, Alexander III. Although influence and 
example would be the method used for implementation in a 
free society, Alexander's program to Hellenize the world was 
34 begun through military means. Although Aristotle, and 
later the Stoics shared an ideal worthy of the highest 
aspirations of a free civilization, the implementation of 
the concept of universal law began with intolerance, which 
35 gave rise to coercion through violence and bloodshed. 
Alexander began his move to change the world in 334 B.C. by 
surprising the world with brilliant military strategy and 
success. The Macedonian's motivation was deeper than a 
shallow manifest destiny to conquer. Alexander took pains 
to consolidate his territory by organizing it with Greek and 
Macedonian administrators, along Greek patterns of control. 
Upper levels of the newly-formed governments were filled with 
immigrants from Greece and Macedonia to oversee the Helleni-
zation process. One part of the process involved education, 
and teachers and physicians were imported to implement the 
37 new ways. 
33 Sir Samuel Dill, Roman Society from Nero to Marcus 
Aurelius (London: MacMillan & Co., 1904), pp. xii, 639. 
Îbid. "̂ Ibid. 
McNeill, Rise of the West, p. 305. Ibid., p. 307, 
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Despite the concerted effort, Greek culture took 
38 centuries to coalesce with the host cultures. Alexander 
founded cities, naming them after himself, and afforded cit­
izens special privileges as they became Hellenized. By the 
time he died at age 33, Alexander had extended his empire and 
39 influence as far east as India. w. W. Tarn proposes that 
a subsequent Hellenization process left traces that are 
present in today's cultures of India, China, and other east-
. . . 40 ern socxetxes. 
Following the death of the emperor, there was a 
brief period of struggle for control of the newly-conquered 
empire. The solution that finally resulted was an arbitrary 
division of the territory among the strongest of Alexander's 
Macedonian generals. Selecus became king in western Asia; 
Ptolemy, ruler over Egypt; and Antigonus consolidated Mace-
41 donxa and Greece. The Hellenization process was continued 
but never fully completed in non-Aegean portions of the 
Empire. In some areas the process permeated the culture, 
but the Seleucid area generated internal disorders that indi­
cated successful resistance to Hellenization. Among the 
42 rebels were the Palestinians. 
OQ 
McNeill, Rise of the West, p. 308. 
39 W. W. Tarn, The Greeks in Bactria and India (Cam­
bridge: Clarendon Press, 1959), pp. 53-57. 
40_, . , Ibxd. 
41 42 McNeill, Rise of the West, p. 309. Ibid., p. 369. 
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Past wars and occupations had uprooted the flower of 
the Hebrew peoplê  causing them to live in servitude far from 
43 their homeland. Those who remained in Palestine still 
clung tenaciously to their religion and treasured jealously 
the enduring symbol of their past, the Temple. Previous 
conquerors had tolerated their religion without protest and 
under Alexander's original terms, the Temple in Jerusalem was 
duly constituted. Hellenization took time, especially in 
Jerusalem. The Seleucids, in their haste to make Greeks of 
the Jews, blundered badly when Antiochus, the Seleucid king, 
appointed a pro-Hellenist high priest to the Temple at 
Jerusalem. The Jews rebelled against the Greeks and a per-
44 lod of persecution followed: 
(1) The walls of the city were torn down; (2) the Tem­
ple Treasury was emptied and its constitution abolished; 
(3) the Temple was desecrated and the statue of Zeus was 
placed in the Holy of Holies; (4) priority and privilege were 
given to those Jews who accepted the "honor" of full Helleni-
zation. The measures were met with armed resistance and many 
Jews died as a result of the persecutions that followed. 
A leader of the Jews, Judas Maccabaeus, was a genius as a 
guerilla leader, and he finally forced Antiochus to come to 
terms. The ban on the Jewish religion was rescinded and 
43 McNeill, Rise of the West, p. 369. 
44 II Maccabees 4:7-15. 
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rights of the Temple restored. However, the Maccabees con­
tinued military struggles until national independence was 
won in 143 B.C. and a line of Jewish kings was founded. 
Later Jewish kings were generally unprincipled and ambitious. 
Ultimately, in 63 B.C. they were forced by Rome to become one 
45 of their provinces thereby losing their independence. 
In 146 B.C. Corinth and a number of Greek and Mace­
donian cities were defeated and sacked by powerful Roman 
46 armies. Expansionist elements xn Rome began expanding the 
perimeter of a growing empire at the expense of the Hellenist 
47 world. Roman legionnaires returned home from the wars 
bearing a wealth of Greek treasures. McNeill contends that 
Roman annexation of overseas provinces made Rome an empire 
at the expense of a receding Hellenist civilization. He 
further observes: 
As Roman society . . . underwent an extremely 
rapid economic differentiation .... To the horror of 
old-style Romans like Cato, Hellenistic urban styles 
began to seep into the city on the Tiber .... The 
seepage became a flood .... Thus Rome, having won 
her first political successes as champion of a rude 
peasant reaction against the alien corruptions of civi­
lization, was herself finally ensnared .... Profound 
irony lay in the fact that Rome's military success 
against the more civilized . . . peoples of the eastern 
Mediterranean resulted in the rapid assimilation of the 
Roman social structure to that of the effete and abject 
East they so despised.̂  
45 K. S. Latourette, A History of Christianity (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), pp. 10-11, II Maccabees, 
Passim. 
46 47 
McNeill, Rise of the West, p. 344. Ibid. 
48Ibid. 49lbid. 
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Theodor Mommsen placed much emphasis upon the Roman 
50 respect for tradition. In the second century B.C. Romans 
consistently stood for respect of authority, the state relig­
ion and public morality. Tacitus is quoted by Mommsen as 
51 saying, "I cannot bear a Greek Rome. 
Clearly, after 146 B.C. Rome was the most powerful 
military force of the day. The Roman Republic, for all prac­
tical purposes, ceased to exist. The Roman Constitution 
provided the occasion for capricious change, as powerful men 
manipulated the state for the purpose of fulfilling private 
ambitions. Julius Caesar emerged from the smoke and debris 
of the internal struggle and triumph from abroad and became 
sole ruler of the Empire. Caesar retained the outward form 
of the Constitution: the Senate, the Assembly, and the 
hierarchy of offices that had been developed in the Constitu-
52 tion. Caesar did not, however, maxntain the power of the 
republican checks and balances. Julius was already Pontifex 
Maximus, the high priest, and had been elected consul. The 
final step toward totalitarian rulership was to obtain the 
title of dictator for life. However, Caesar's ambitions 
were foreshortened by a group of senators who murdered him 
5 on the Ides of March, 44 B.C. 
50 
Theodor Mommsen, The History of Rome (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895), II, 97. 
51Ibid. 52Ibid. 53Ibid., p. 97ff. 
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Some senators attempted to turn the direction of the 
state away from its path toward centralization. The effort 
54 failed. Internal strife continued until Octavian, Caesar's 
nephew, was named Augustus and became the first Roman Emperor 
in 27 B.C. Although Caesar had designed the empire's struc­
ture, Augustus succeeded brilliantly in consolidating it and 
creating a system conducive to peace within the territory 
55 controlled by Rome: the Pax Romana. In addition, Pro­
fessor Latourette sees the achievement as providing the con­
ditions favorable for the spread of religion.̂  Political 
unity was facilitated by implementation of an effective 
hierarchical administration which allowed management of the 
provinces at long distances. Placed at the top,the emperor 
57 ruled downward through various levels and offices. He 
presided over the state religious rites, maintained and 
directed a standing army, and maintained a constant communi-
58 cation with the provincial governors of the empire. 
Rome was the hub of the empire. The character of 
Roman law, the ability of Roman engineers, seas safe from 
pirates, rapid transportation and communication made a better 
quality of life for everyone, especially Roman citizens. 
54 M. I. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History 
of the Roman Empire (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1930), 
pp. xxv, 695. 
55 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 21. 
56Ibid. 57Ibid. 58Ibid. 
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Communication was simplified by use of only two official 
59 languages in commerce and administration. Roman law could 
be used to emphasize protection of the interests of the 
state rather than protection of the rights and privileges 
of the individual. Equity and natural law survived occasional 
capricious and barbarous usage (in the Middle Ages), and until 
today is influential in providing justice in legal systems 
6 0 everywhere. Stoic philosophy had influence upon the law 
toward a concept of a universal or natural law applicable to 
61 all people. Thus, the source of Rome's pride, "the law," 
had influence from Greek culture. 
The policy of centralization established by Augustus 
had effect upon political and legal control. But the prac­
tical character of the Roman mind invited an accommodation to 
62 cultural and religious diversity. Into this cordial milieu 
were introduced numerous Eastern cults: I sis, Osiris, and 
6 3 Mithra, in addition to a variety of mystery religions. 
Although the emperors tried to resurrect old Roman religions 
requiring emperor worship, eastern cults were permitted by 
a policy of accommodation. Mcllwain, however, sees in this 
policy a contribution to eventual emergence of absolutism. 
59 Crane Brinton, John Christopher, and Robert Lee 
Wolff, A History of Civilization, Third ed. (New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc . , 1967), T~, 112. 
60 . 61_, . , Ibid. Ibid. 
M̂cllwain, Political Thought, p. 143. Îbid. 
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In the absolutism of the empire, the religious spirit tri-
64 umphed over the republican spirit of Rome. 
Religious absolutism was in conflict with the 
exclusive character of both the Jews and Christians, whose 
religion required that: "Thou shalt have no other gods 
before me." Such a principle was foreign to the Graeco-Roman 
intellect. Claiming to be a nation in exile, Jews were lim­
ited in their attraction to the people of the empire. How­
ever, conditions favored the sect-type Christians who were 
universal in their religious appeal. Paul, a native of Tarsus, 
translated the Christian message into Greek terms and thereby 
65 created access to the pagan mind. The sect was thus free 
to proselytize from other religions and to wage war against 
so-called "false gods." Because of missionary zeal Chris­
tians were recognized as a threat to established empirical 
religions. The Christians, thereby, ran afoul of Roman law, 
often falling victim to persecutions at the hands of the 
66 emperors who ruled subsequent to Augustus. Roman law 
defined failure to worship the emperor as treason. Tiberius 
made the offense a capital crime and as a consequence, many 
Christians were executed and their property confiscated by the 
state.̂  
64 Mcllwain, Political Thought, p. 143. 
65 Edmunds, The Law and Civilization, p. 164. 
66Ibid. 67rbid., p. 164-165. 
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To the Roman emperors, Christians appeared to be a 
subversive organization because of constant refusal to 
declare allegiance to the pagan religion and to bow to the 
image of the emperor, or to his person,and confess him as 
68 god. The Roman law was supreme, and as a result, Chris-
69 tians faced severe persecution on account of faith. Nero, 
Vespasian and Domition, first century emperors, persecuted 
70 Christians as a matter of imperial policy. Diocletion, 
in 303, set about the task of a methodical extermination of 
71 the Christians. The emperor issued a decree to destroy 
church buildings, burn sacred books, demote high-placed 
72 Christians, and the enslavement of others. The persecution 
included the entire Roman empire from the British Isles in 
73 the West to Asia Minor, Palestine, Syria, Egypt, and Rome. 
The persecutions had their greatest concentration in the East, 
where there were more Christians. The campaign lasted no 
more than a decade, but the effects were felt throughout the 
centuries of church history that followed. The persecution 
of Diocletian was the last great persecution against the 
Christians by the Roman Empire. The tables soon turned in 
74 the opposite direction. 
6 8 Edmunds, The Law and Civilization, p. 165. 
69_, . , 70_, . , Ibid. Ibid. 
71 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 90. 
72 73 74 Ibid. Ibid. '*Ibid. 
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Instead of the extermination of Christianity, the 
effect of persecutions was to spread Christianity until the 
religion triumphed over all persecutors. Authorities gen­
erally agree that Christianity would have eventually emerged 
the victor. But through the person of the emperor, Constan­
tine, the great Roman Empire gave in to the influence of a 
movement that had only the non-violent weapons of persuasion. 
But once Christianity was established, all power in the 
empire was used to assure preeminence. In 313 A.D. Constan-
tine and Licinius issued a joint agreement to grant religious 
75 freedom for Christians in the whole empire. Constantine, 
however, did not capitulate in the personal sense, for as 
emperor, he continued to support and endorse formal paganism 
as well as Christianity until death ended that allegiance. 
Fulfilling the role of both priest and emperor, he retained 
the office of Pontifex Maximus, as well as that of emperor 
throughout the remainder of life. Constantine did not per­
secute the pagan religions. At his death the Senate declared 
him a god to take an honored place among imperial predeces-
76 sors. 
Ultimately, through a series of imperial edicts, Con­
stantine' s sons made Christianity the state religion and 
77 outlawed historic pagan religions in the empire. The former 
75 Latourette, History of Christianity, pp. 92-93. 
76Ibid., p. 93. 
77 Edmunds, The Law and Civilization, p. 169. 
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intolerance of Christians was reversed and turned upon non-
78 Christians and unorthodox Christians. Latourette calls 
the victory of Christianity over the imperial leadership and 
the subsequent establishment something of a defeat. "The 
victory had been accompanied by compromise ... with the 
79 world ... a serious peril to the Gospel." From the point 
of view of political history, Mcllwain sees the reversal as 
unique in the history of mankind: 
For the first time we have established by the 
state a religion whose claims are exclusive, maintained 
by an association or society hitherto not only separate 
in origin and development from the state, but in some 
ways hostile to it, and forbidden by it, and one whose 
internal organization had reached a high point of inde­
pendent development before its recognition and establish­
ment by law .... The peculiar problem of church and 
state had definitely emerged for the first time in his­
tory .... For a thousand years after the establishment 
of Christianity in Rome, political writing of every sort 
was affected directly or indirectly by this great ques­
tion . . . the great controversy between the spiritual 
and secular authority. TEmphasis, the writer' s] 
The collapse of the Graeco-Roman world climaxed in the 
early fifth century with the military failure of Rome. The 
"fall" issued in a period of social turbulence, unrest, and 
social disintegration. There remains widespread disagreement 
81 as to the cause of the breakup of the Roman Empire. 
78 Edmunds, The Law and Civilization, p. 169. 
79 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 108. 
80 Mcllwain, Political Thought, pp. 147f. 
81 Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought from St. Augustine to 
Ockham (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1958), p. 24. 
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The secular empire collapsed, the church did not, 
which indicates something of the unusual nature of the struc­
ture of the church. Diocletian (284-305 A.D.) sought to save 
the empire by reorganization, but succeeded only in creating 
82 a poor imitation of eastern despotism. Reorganization 
delayed the western collapse and created two divisions of 
the empire. The result was to further divide the spheres of 
influence. One contribution, however, was a reorganization 
of imperial administration which separated the military 
from the civilian hierarchy, resulting in the concept of 
distinctly professional military and civilian administration. 
The Pax Romana was no more. Gordon Leff laments the 
fact that Roman law lost out to feudal custom. The Roman 
church did not collapse, but retained its structure and appeal 
8 3 to "all people." In the same vein, the church had the 
right to inherit property. Because of this, a great portion 
of the rich and powerful of Europe bequeathed lands and prop­
erty to the church. Eventually, "the church became the 
84 holder of a large portion of the wealth of Europe." Leff 
further suggests that the church hierarchy facilitated com­
munication throughout the Latin West. Despite apparent imi­
tation of the defunct empire, the structure held. "With its 
82 Brinton, Christopher, and Wolff, History of Civ­
ilization, I, 133-134. 
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Leff, Medieval Thought, pp. 25f. 
84 Edmunds, Law and Civilization, p. 22. 
32 
organization it was all that was left, but it was better 
85 than no continuity of civilization at all." 
EARLY CHRISTIAN MIDDLE AGES 
There was no longer an emperor in Rome, and bishops 
took over the government and public affairs of the city. 
No bishop reported to any secular power, yet claimed power 
over all kinds of and degrees of citizens. The research of 
Mcllwain reveals the principle enunciated by Pope Gelasius 
which expressed the medieval relationship between church 
and state: 
There are two authorities by which principally 
this world is ruled, the sacred authority of the 
bishops, and the royal power, and the obligation of 
the bishops is the heavier of the two in proportion 
as they shall render account to God for the kings 
of men themselves.86 
The same bishop discounted the concept of both powers 
residing in the same person. They were separated in scrip­
ture , but made dependent upon one another for their respec-
87 tive benefits. Conditions in. Rome during the early middle 
ages required the principle be violated to a degree, which 
allowed Pope Gregory to govern Rome and Italy as a secular 
ruler, as well as a religious prelate. Pope Gregory I was a 
powerful force that provided support to allies who proved 
85 Leff, Medieval Thought, pp. 25-26. 
Q/T Q*7 
Mcllwain, Political Thought, p. 165. Ibid. 
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their loyalty toward his policies. Pope Gregory aided 
Charles Martel, who stopped the invasions of the Mohammedans 
88 at the battle of Tours in 732. He crowned Pippin, Martel*s 
89 son, King of the Franks. The coronation was also a feudal 
covenant to uphold Pippin1s rule with both spiritual and 
temporal power. The act was a precedent that was continued 
90 during the early middle ages in varying degrees. A fur­
ther step toward the establishment of a strong relationship 
between the temporal and religious power was taken by Pope 
Leo III who crowned Charlemagne while celebrating Christmas, 
in Rome, 800. The coronation of the Frankish king as "Emperor 
of the Romans" was accepted in the East and West by the respec­
tive heads of the church. Latourette speculates that Char­
lemagne may not have received the coronation with open plea-
91 sure. The significance of the act was that of establish­
ment of a precedent requiring papal coronation to be adminis­
tered upon Charlemagne's successors. The post-Carolingian 
period was witness to further decline as the Roman Empire 
92 moved toward further disintegration and decentralization. 
The church, through so-called "dark ages," held on 
to the monopoly of learning and literacy, and maintained the 
88 Edmunds, The Law and Civilization, p. 223. 
89t, . , 90_, . , Ibid. Ibid. 
91 Latourette, History of Christianity, pp. 357f. 
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thin thread of civilization that threatened to be lost in the 
dimly-remembered past. Leff credits the church as the insti­
tution that provided stability of sorts: 
Thus in an age which had so few resources of its 
own the church offered comfort, protection, and lead­
ership. It was indispensable to any ordered state . . . . 
Its great wealth, constantly increasing through endow­
ment, was the first to suffer during a period of unrest. 
Hence, the most successful attempts at government were 
those in which king and church cooperated.̂ 3 
Mcllwain regards this period as critical to the long 
history of church-state relations, for in this period powers 
were assumed by the church and decisions taken whose effects 
are still felt today. Yet, the reaction of these great 
events upon political thought does not come into the open 
until the eleventh century. Nor do they become more clear 
until the fourteenth century. At that time the controversy 
required that the precedents be brought out for discussion, 
and the conflicting claims of institutional supremacy of Pope 
94 or Emperor were evaluated. 
Medieval political thought became distinguished from 
the Graeco-Roman world on two main points. The Latin writ­
ers viewed the state as a creation of God, universal and 
inclusive of the family of man. A second medieval idea 
expressed was that the state, along with its coercive author-
95 ity, was God's remedy for original sin. Bishop Augustine 
93 Leff, Medieval Thought, p. 29. 
94 Mcllwain, Political Thought, p. 178. 
95 Leff, Medieval Thought, p. 29. 
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of Hippo had expressed both concepts in The City of God 
96 (410-430). Although Augustinian concepts were accepted as 
an adequate expression of man's condition, for a time, such 
ideas did not solve the question of the later middle ages: 
What is the relationship between church and state? It was 
not until the fourteenth century that man began to look upon 
church and state as two separate entities. During the "dark 
ages11 the Christian Commonwealth (Respufrlica Christiana) was 
made up of two elements derived from the same origin, church 
and state. They were both of divine origin* The problem 
was to develop an order of priority between them. Leff's 
conclusion concerning the period states that partisans for 
papal primacy, such as Bishop Ambrose and Pope Gregory I, 
did not prevail over the dualistic Gelasian principle of the 
"Two Swords." The theory simply reflected the realities of 
the age, when neither pope nor king could effectively assert 
97 authority over the other. 
CHURCH REFORM 
By the eleventh century, historians observe that a 
98 return to unity of the Roman Empire was an impossibility. 
By that time the church had lost its ability to influence 
the fabric of society. Chaotic conditions prevailed throughout 
96 97 Leff, Medieval Thought, p. 29. Ibid. 
98 Latourette, History of Christianity, pp. 365-66. 
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Europe. The fragmented society reverted to a form of 
tribalism where order was maintained through a powerful 
99 local leader, king, count, or duke. The church is charac­
terized as a creature of its societal surroundings.'1'̂ 0 
Although the preservation of learning was assumed by the 
church, many priests were illiterate, and Christian belief 
•was colored with the old pagan magic and superstition.'1'0"1' 
National churches came into being supervised by provincials 
v/hose concern with secular matters far often outweighed their 
i • •, 102 ecclesiastical concerns. 
The moral character of the priests was largely indis­
tinguishable from the laymen. It was common practice among 
the clergy to keep mistresses, have children by them, and 
103 occasionally marry them. The children usually received 
the ecclesiastical position through inheritance from their 
104 father. Powerful laymen controlled the appointment and 
investiture of bishops and priests. The Pope had little 
influence or attention in the scattered parishes, and further, 
105 commanded little respect in Rome. During the tenth century 
the papacy reached its nadir as it fawned under the control 
of Rome's landed aristocracy. The most notorious example of 
the period was Marozia, daughter of Theophylact, a Roman 
99 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 79. 
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Senator. Marozia bore Pope Sergius III a son who became 
Pope John XI. However, John XI lost favor with his mother 
and was later imprisoned. A half-brother, Alberic II, 
106 succeeded John XI. 
It is obvious that with such examples of morality and 
religion characteristic of those surrounding the Curia, popes 
could no longer wield the influence established by earlier 
predecessors. Furthermore, popes were not inclined to reform 
the church so long as they owed allegiance to powerful 
sponsors. Unholy alliances produced by abandonment of the 
Gelasian principle of separation of functions within the 
Christian community was the primary contributing cause to the 
107 decay of church and state. 
Among the monasteries, there were still some pious 
souls such as Peter Damian of Ravenna, who became Cardinal 
108 Bishop of Ostia. Cardinal Damian's dream was to perform 
a cleansing reform of the papacy. The German monarch, 
Henry III, was successful against the Italians, militarily. 
His additional humiliation of the Romans was to call together 
109 a synod to install a new pope. The first two popes 
(Benedict IX and Damasus II) did not live long, and additional 
synods were necessary. However, Leo IX proved healthy and a 
reformer, as well."*""̂  The result of his papacy was the pro­
vision for positive reform of the church through the office 
106 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 367. 
107Ibid., p. 366. 108Ibid., p. 466. 109lbid. 
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of the papacy. A critical decision in the reform movement 
occurred when it was determined to elect the pope by the 
111 cardinals in Rome. The succeeding steps would involve 
the extension of reform over the clerics in the scattered 
parishes and others in positions of responsibility through­
out Christendom. 
THE INVESTITURE CONTROVERSY 
Edmunds describes a classic study in conflict 
escalation as he narrates the investiture controversy. 
Gregory VII became pope in 1073 over the loud protests of 
the German bishops. The Gregorian view of the papacy, among 
other things, involved a principle that the pope may depose, 
112 transfer, and reinstate bishops. The pope alone is 
entitled to the homage of all princes, and he alone may crown 
or depose an emperor. In addition, this principle of inves­
titure was based on the inerrancy of the church. The ideas 
113 were published in the document Dictatus Papae. Henry IV 
disregarded the pronouncement and ignored communications by 
Gregory to remove certain ecclesiastics who were excommuni­
cated in violation of papal injunctions against lay investi­
ture. The next level of escalation produced the appearance 
"̂ "'"Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 466. 
112 Edmunds, The Law and Civilization, p. 225. 
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of papal legates at Gregory's court bearing documents which 
charged Gregory with crimes against the pope unless he would 
114 recant. 
Henry then called a synod of German bishops at 
115 Worms. The Synod in 1076 deposed Gregory from the papal 
office. The Pope ignored the Council and published a bull 
116 of excommunication with Henry as the object. Henry 
marched out into the winter snows after the Pope to implore 
his forgiveness. A dramatic confrontation at the fortress 
of Canossa, with the Emperor in penitent's garb, produced 
117 an apparent victory for the Pope. 
At issue was more than the mere cleansing of eccles­
iastical decay. The new papal statements and actions were a 
challenge to the political constitution of the Germans. 
While Pope Gregory VII was reducing the credibility of the 
emperor, Henry, and challenging him on the battlefields in 
Italy, the German princes were gaining independence and 
freedom from their feudal ties with Gregory. The German 
princes eliminated the counts, agents of the empire, and soon 
there were no ties left with the emperor. 
The controversy was the first great struggle over 
church and state. Mcllwain sees the essence of the struggle 
as: 
114 Edmunds, The law and Civilization, p. 225. 
115 T, . , 116_, . , 117_, . , Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 
118 Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany: The 
Reformation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), p. 20. 
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What each party regarded as essential to their own 
independence was considered by the other party as fatal 
to theirs, and therefore, neither antagonist could feel 
really secure until the duel had resulted in his own 
supremacy. In such a contest the initial advantage lay 
with the papalist party for their opponents with very 
few exceptions were not ready to deny that the 
authority was in some sense higher than the tem̂ uiaj.. 
Popes and kings held center stage during this and 
following periods of medieval history. In the name of the 
unity of religion, coupled with internal selfish ambition, 
popes and kings initiated wars, with all the misery that fol­
lowed: blood flowed, men died in battle, or from torture or 
war-connected disease. Wars plagued the helpless, and 
neither young, old, male or female was beyond its pitiless 
scourge. Villages, cities, and countrysides were devastated 
in the path of war, and nations were decimated because of the 
single desire to unite all mankind under one faith, that was 
preached by "the Prince of Peace." 
became the basis of order, the influence of the church was 
lessened. Along with feudalism came the theology of vio­
lence. In 1095 Pope Urban II announced the first Christian 
Crusade. The crusade was the subject of a sermon by Pope 
Urban II, calling for Christians from Europe to unite in an 
attempt to drive the Seljuk Turks from Palestine and other 
THE CRUSADES 
As unity of the West disappeared, and feudalism 
119, Mcllwain, Political Thought, p. 206 
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120 areas sacred to Christians. The result was that for a 
period of over two hundred years a "warrior spirit" period­
ically overcame the Christian's "gentle spirit." 
It is ironic that during the year that Urban II 
preached the sermon that initiated the crusades, the Pope 
also introduced modifications in the practice of war to 
reduce its effects upon noncombatants. From the Council of 
Clermont came the concept of the "Truce of God" and the 
"Peace of God," when put into practice and observed by com­
batants in war, alleviated to a great degree the sufferings 
of innocent people and preserved a semblance of order in a 
harsh and thoughtless period of man's existence. Later, at 
the Second Lateran Council (1139) the church outlawed jousts 
and tournaments which were occasions for continuation of feuds 
121 and needless shedding of blood. Thus, the church, like 
all institutions that evolved from needs and desires of man­
kind, has in its effect, regardless of intent, provided a 
mixed blessing. 
122 In the meantime, reform of the church continued. 
In France and Germany, the hierarchy of Rome regained much 
lost influence and gradually the nobility gave in to stan­
dards established by the Pope and organizational representa­
tives. 
120 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 410. 
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THE ENGLISH, CHURCH AND STATE 
In 1066 the invasion of England by the Normans was 
carried out with knowledge and consent of the Pope. William 
carried the Pope's colors in battle. Following success, little 
time was lost in setting up a strong central government. The 
Monarch was supported by a powerful religious arm. The Arch­
bishop of Canterbury was to serve as the head of the church 
123 and second only to the king. 
Constitutional historian Felix Makower charac­
terizes the relationship as one similar to the king and his 
traditional counsel with an inner circle of nobles. Makower 
advances no consistent description of the king and the crown's 
relationship with the church in England because of the per­
sonal dominance of the sovereign over events in the country. 
Professor Makower affirms the Pope had some influence over 
affairs in England, but ability to bring secular powers to 
bear was seriously impaired because of the natural sea barrier 
124 between England and the mainland. Since William the 
Conqueror had enjoyed support of the Pope in his venture, 
the new king published an ordinance which allowed a limited 
jurisdiction of ecclesiastical law. Clergy were also admitted 
to the nobility, in turn for which they would be vassals of 
123 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 476. 
124 Felix Makower, Constitutional History of the Church 
of England (New York: Burt Franklin Publisher, 1895), p. 13. 
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the king. It is this precedent which ultimately placed 
clergy in the House of Lords, the chief lawmaking body of 
England for over eight centuries. Despite the outward 
cordiality of William to the Pope, William I kept a tight 
rein on the church of England. Free communication between 
the Pope and persons in England was not allowed without the 
125 cognizance of William. In addition, the Archbishop of 
126 Canterbury reported to William instead of the Pope. 
As time passed, English kings dealt variously with 
127 religion. A great struggle between church and state 
began in England over the investiture of Bishops, in the 
128 twelfth century. Control of the Lords was also a major 
129 problem, and the church complicated the constitution. 
In an attempt to restore royal authority over the Church of 
England, Henry II came into direct conflict with Thomas 
Becket "whom he himself had placed in the Archbishopric of 
130 Canterbury." At issue was the question of whether the 
state or church would ultimately control the great affairs 
of England. Mcllwain sees the conflict as a "trial between 
the champions of two rival institutional systems, each of 
131 which could expand only at the expense of the other." 
125 126 Makower, Constitutional History, p. 14. Ibid. 
127 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 476. 
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Six years of struggle was climaxed by the brutal 
murder of Becket in the Canterbury Cathedral in 1170. 
Although the king is exonerated by modern historians, the 
Crown's contemporaries placed blame directly at the feet of 
132 King Henry. Becket was slain by some of Henry's overzeal-
ous knights who took the king's ravings about the Archbishop 
literally. Becket's blood made the possibility of the Pope's 
presence in England more of a likelihood than the king had 
133 desired. Some policies toward papal representation in the 
realm were changed. The Curia was allowed to retain some 
legal jurisdiction. However, Henry refused to transfer prim­
acy of the English church to the Pope which the English 
claimed belonged to the secular sovereign. The dispute was 
summarized within the points set forth in "Constitutions of 
Clarendon." But strive as he might to advance sovereign 
claims, the Pope was isolated from England by geography, 
history, and Roman law. The constricting influence of Roman 
law made scant inroads against the proud freedoms of English 
134 Common Law. 
THE RESPUBLICA CHRISTIANA 
The medieval pretensions of the church climaxed in 
the person of Innocent III, who ruled from 1198 through 1216. 
132 Mcllwain, Political Thought, pp. 226-227. 
133 Makower, Constitutional History, pp. 482-486. 
134Ibid., pp. 486-487. 
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Latourette describes Innocent as one who had a high regard 
for the stature and work of the papacy. Innocent's views 
were not unique to holders of the office, but he implemented 
in a vigorous fashion what had been considered theoretically 
by his predecessors. The Pope's activism caused him to 
135 intervene constantly and aggressively in the secular realm. 
History contributed to Innocent's program of the prag­
matic application of views concerning the nature of the papacy. 
Monastic movements such as the Franciscans and the Dominicans 
emerged and asked to be of service to the Church; but move­
ments such as the Waldensians and Cathari, equally sincere, 
but unorthodox in some of their beliefs, were not only refused 
authorization, but were persecuted by Innocent and follow­
ers. Economic conditions were improving in Europe, while 
137 the actual power of the Holy Roman Empire was declining. 
The help of the pope was required in order to prop up a 
waning secular power. Pope Innocent was first the protector, 
138 then guardian of Frederick II of Sicily. In addition, he 
helped to forestall the rise of nationalism in Europe through 
keeping alive the concept of the mythical unity of the church 
139 and the artificial semblance of a unified western empire. 
In the East, his crusaders, diverted from their stated 
purpose, sacked Christian Constantinople. Innocent initially 
135 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 482. 
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had not intended that the crusade do violence against Chris­
tians while crusading against the Infidel."*"40 However, he 
did not retreat from Constantinople once it fell. Having 
succeeded in the establishment of an eastern beachhead, he 
proceeded to set up his administration and to extend his 
influence into Armenia and Lebanon. The economic principle 
that wealth brings power was not lost on Innocent III. The 
Pope required that in Christian dominions, tithes were to 
141 take precedence over all other manner of collection. 
Innocent III exerted influence in secular questions of legal­
ity and politics and claimed right to review important cases 
142 personally. 
Religious movements, such as the Franciscans, were 
included under the umbrella of Christian theology and con­
sidered useful to operation and extension of the church. 
Other ideas Pope Innocent resisted and persecuted as "heret­
ical." The Pope called together the Fourth Lateran Council 
in 1215. The Council solidified Catholic doctrine and prac­
tice more than had been done since The Council of Nicea in 
the fourth century, or until the Council of Trent in the 
sixteenth. During the Fourth Lateran Council, (1) Sacraments 
were defined; (2) required lay participation was clarified; 
(3) provisions for education were announced; (4) standards 
140 Latourette, Hxstory of Christianity, p. 484. 
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for clergy were prescribed; (5) requirements for theological 
education were standardized; (6) heresies were condemned and 
machinery was set up for persecution. In 1233, the Dominican 
friars became officially responsible for the operation of 
. . 143 the Inquisition. 
Much later concern with church and state relationships 
found beginnings with Innocent III. Church and state had 
never actually had such a close relationship, although much 
had been claimed. At the end of the twelfth century, Inno­
cent III appeared to be bringing heaven to earth—at least 
from position of church authority. The papal program was 
one that used the office to bring the Respublica Christiana 
into a reality defined by Innocent's standards. The Pope 
intervened in all the affairs of men. At papal word, kings 
were brought to their knees and many were required to perform 
as vassal to their lord and pope. Innocent designated polit-
144 ical choices over the objections of kings. Innocent III 
wielded the interdict wherever a ruler was reluctant to 
accept his terms, and it always proved effective. The Pope 
chose each emperor and supported the barons against King John 
145 of England, which resulted in the Magna Carta. Never again 
was the papacy so powerful or so potent. Innocent died in 
1216, and thereafter it became much more difficult to use 
143 Latourette, History of Christianity, pp. 484-85. 
144 145 Ibid., p. 485. Ibid., p. 486. 
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papal power politically, as influence of the office declined, 
146 despite pretensions to the contrary. Boniface VIII pro­
vides an example of the waning of the papal office in 1299. 
Boniface issued the most powerful claim for the papacy ever 
expressed in his Bull, Unam Sanctum. He asserted "that it 
is altogether necessary to salvation for every human creature 
to be subject to the Roman Pontiff." He attempted to put the 
147 claim into effect, but he was impotent to enforce it. 
Dr. Latourette notes that during the late middle ages, 
politics was affected by Christianity in the attempt to blunt 
148 its "ruthlessness." The period was one characterized by 
the strong, shrewd, and the powerful. In China and India the 
most prestigious classes were the scholars and the priests. 
The western world has traditionally favored the strong, the 
violent, and the victorious warrior. As clergy became more 
involved in secular affairs, priests were tempted to imitate 
149 military heroes. 
Political theory, however, was expressed most often 
in theological terminology. Christian scholars held that the 
warp and woof of society —church and state, papacy and emperor— 
were divinely founded. Thomas Aquinas tied divine trust held 
by a monarch to loyalty of his subjects. John of Paris, a 
Dominican, and Marsilus of Padua asserted that powers of both 
146 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 486. 
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sectors—church and state—are based upon the sovereignty of 
i 150 the people. 
RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION 
In the attempt to maintain unity and order conform­
ity to religious beliefs was considered crucial to civiliza­
tion's survival. Realizations that Christian territories 
were hemmed about and being pressured by the Mohammed ns, 
demanded radical measures to suppress unchristian ideas. In 
151 the Pope's view, heresy was a form of civil rebellion. 
In Roman Law terms, heresy was "treason." Beginning with 
Innocent III and continuing through a long line of his suc­
cessors, the church promoted active repression of heresy. 
An initial thrust was against occupants of Southern France. 
Simon De Montfort led the pope's forces against Albigenses 
heretics, but a primary effect was the attainment of addi-
152 tional territory for the papal cause. 
To most observers, the Albigensian crusade took on 
characteristics of a prolonged massacre. Few inhabitants 
were safe, not even Christians. There was no easy way to 
identify the "faithful" and it was considered the best policy 
150 Latourette, History of Christianity, pp. 555-56. 
151 H. C. Lea, The Inquisition of the Middle Ages: 
Its Organization and Operation (New York: Harper & Row Pub­
lishers , 1969), p. 39. 
152 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 456. 
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to Kill all the unfortunate inhabitants of territories 
reputed to be heretical. Latourette reports: 
It is said that when one of the first cities, 
Beziers, was entered, and the Papal Legate was asked 
whether the Catholics should be spared ... he com­
manded, "kill them all, for God knows his own!"153 
The slaughter continued until the Treaty of Paris in 
1229. But the treaty failed to stop other forms of persecu­
tion. A council was convened to eradicate heresy in the 
South. Bibles were forbidden to laity, and translations in 
154 vernacular also were forbidden. The Bible was a prolific 
source of new heresy. Military suppression of heresy had been 
insufficient. It was felt that secret heretics were 
still a threat to Christianity and the unity of the Respub-
155 lica Christianum. In order to meet this threat, the 
church resurrected an instrument from the ancient laws of 
Rome, the Inquisition. Dr. Latourette recalls that previous 
heresy trials and executions had been carried out by secular 
authorities. Until the Council of Toulouse, 1229, there 
had been no system for the application of sanctions within 
the church. The Dominicans provided manpower for the Inqui­
sition, though other religious orders provided the support 
and participation occasionally requested by papal and other 
157 church authorities. 
153 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 456. 
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THE INQUISITION 
Church-state controversies from 1215 to the present 
are better understood in outline against the dark curtains of 
the medieval Inquisition. The inquisitory process bore 
external trappings of court procedure. In the ecclesiastical 
courts, the accused had the burden of proof. One could be 
arrested on the thin basis of rumor and was thereafter con­
sidered guilty until he proved himself innocent. One had no 
way of producing evidence, questioning witnesses for his 
defense, or of cross-examining or confronting of the wit­
nesses against him."*"̂ ® Although coercion or torture may have 
produced the evidence against him, all was admissible. 
Although trial by ordeal had been ended by Innocent III at 
the Fourth Lateran Council, no such mercy extended to the 
159 souls accused of heresy. 
The edicts of Honorious III were based on the Lateran 
*1 £T/-\ 
Canons and published in a series from 1220-1239. Accord­
ing to the publications, suspected heretics were ordered to 
"purge themselves" within a year, or be considered a heretic 
, i 161 by law. 
Henry Charles Lea summarizes vividly the plight of 
those singled out for trial before the ecclesiastical tri­
bunal : 
"̂ ®Lea, The Inquisition, p. 28. 
159Ibid., p. 56. 160Ibid., p. 71. 161lbid. 
52 
Heretics of all sects were outlawed; and when con­
demned as such by the church they were to be delivered 
to the secular arm to be burned. If, through fear of 
death, they recanted, they were to be thrust in prison 
for life, there to perform penance. If they relapsed 
... they were put to death.162 
Property of a condemned heretic was confiscated. 
Heirs were disinherited and disqualified for high office 
for at least two generations succeeding. However, heirs 
could act as informants and regain their lost birthright. 
Similar pressures had been brought to bear by Romans against 
Christians in early centuries of Christianity. During the 
thirteenth century Christians were persecuted, by means of 
harsh Roman Law. The Edict of 1220 was placed in the corpus 
of practical law taught at the University of Bologna, embod­
ied in civil codes, and in the Corpus Jurus as canon Law. 
Lea suggests, "... technically speaking, they may be 
164 regarded as in force to the present day." 
Carryovers of the inquisitorial process persisted 
almost to the nineteenth century in continental criminal 
courts. The process: 
. . .  a s  d e v e l o p e d  f o r  t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  h e r e s y ,  b e c a m e  
the customary method of dealing with all who were under 
accusation (for any crime whatsoever); that the accused 
was treated as one having no rights, whose guilt was 
assumed in advance, and from whom confession was to be 
extorted by guile or force .... It would be impos­
sible to compute the amount of misery and wrong, inflic­
ted on the defenseless up to the present century, which 
162 Lea, The Inquisition, p. 71. 
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may be directly traced to the arbitrary and unrestricted 
methods introduced by the Inquisition and adopted by the 
jurists who fashioned criminal jurisprudence of the con­
tinent. 165 [Emphasis, the writer's] 
Sharp accents of Roman Law served to subsume the 
rights of the individual in favor of the great institutions, 
166 the church and state. Medievalists were not individua­
listic, but wholistic. They considered themselves servants, 
elements within a world that God made, which allowed them no 
place in making decisions that would change one's lot in 
life. Expressions of original thought that occurred occa­
sionally were regarded as heresy and quickly smothered by 
the Inquisition. R. R. Palmer and Joel Coulton state fur­
ther : 
No one thought that people should be free to believe 
individually as they chose. No one regarded religion 
as a mere opinion. For all parties the issue lay 
between God's true word and abominable misconceptions, 
and all saw in the church the supreme institution . . . . 
All maintained ... that in so vital a matter as relig­
ion, people who lived together must behave alike. 
In England, heresy trials were a rarity until the 
fourteenth century. Inquiry into heresy was the sheriff's 
responsibility, since heresy was considered a capital crime 
against temporal law. Increase in persecution occurred as 
controversy over Wycliffe and the Lollards persisted. The 
165 Lea, The Inquisition, p. 318. 
166 R. R. Palmer and Joel Coulton, A History of the 
Modern World , 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred hi Knopf, 1963), 
p. 10. 
167Ibid., pp. 10-12. 
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first execution for heresy in England was upon orders of 
168 the king in 1401. Under Henry IV in 1414, a number of 
repressive measures were enacted, including the Roman Law 
of forfeiture."*"̂  
During the English Reformation, King Henry VIII 
added requirements that ecclesiastical trials for heresy 
must be public, and the king1s writ would have to be obtained 
170 before condemned heretics could be executed. King 
Edward VI, in 1547, began to repeal all laws concerning 
"matters of belief." However, the king died before his 
reforms were completed, and Edward's orthodox Catholic sis­
ter, Mary Tudor, reversed Protestant reforms and began to 
reinstate Catholic laws against heresy and heretics. "Bloody 
Mary" as head of the Church of England pursued her own Inqui­
sition. Fires at Smithfield were fueled by seared, smoking 
flesh of the Protestant "faithful." Memory of those Prot­
estant martyrs was celebrated in crude verse: 
. . .  W h e n  A l e x a n d e r  G e c h e  w a s  b r e n t  
and with him Elizabeth Launson: 
When they with jow did consent, 
. . .  W h e n  t h e s e  a t  I p s w i c h ,  w e r e  p u t  
to death, 
We wished for Elizabeth. 
16 8 Makower, Constitutional History, pp. 183-192. 
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The wish was for more than Elizabeth. The wish was 
a desire for some semblance of religious stability in the 
land; Elizabeth would be equal to their dreams# and more. 
The Elizabethan age ushered in an opening of a New World 
172 with all its accompanying promise. 
DECLINING POWER OF THE CHURCH 
Following the apex of papal power vested in Inno­
cent III, control of church over secular world began to 
173 waver. Some literary evidence exists which indicates 
174 the church experienced periods of powerlessness. Occa­
sionally, heretical writings were allowed to stand, undis-
175 turbed and unchallenged. Such writers challenged the very 
foundations of papal power, yet were allowed to live and to 
die undisturbed. Other writers were not so fortunate; many 
were arrested, charged with heresy, tried, and burned along 
176 with their works. 
William of Ockham (c. 1349) and Marsilio of Padua 
(c. 1342) were two critics of the concept of papal absolut­
ism. The former was an English Franciscan from the Univer­
sity of Oxford. Stressing freedom for all Christian believ­
ers, William denied the Pope all power in spiritual matters. 
172 Palmer and Coulton, History, p. 78. 
173 Harold J. Grimm, The Reformation Era (New York: 
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Concerning the temporal power, Ockham expressed the opinion 
that the power of the emperor came from the electors who 
were representatives of the will, not of God, but of all the 
177 Germans. 
Marsilio and John of Jandun, Parisian scholars, com-
178 posed a two-volume work entitled The Defensor Pacis. 
The work was a complicated and unusually "radical" collection 
of concepts. The writings effectively reduced the papacy to 
a corner in Christendom which was ruled by secular government 
179 instead of the papacy. Defensor maintained that secular 
authority derived from a whole body of citizens and elected 
monarchs must function for the common good, subject to secular 
law. Professor Mcllwain notes that church-state theories 
held by each respective sector are considered mutually 
exclusive. The Defensor Pacis considered the Catholic 
Church's position as monistic? that of secular government as 
pluralistic. Marsilio asserted that the Council, composed 
of laity and clergy and called by the secular arm, was super-
180 ior to the pope. Furthermore, The Defensor indicated 
that even if the church confines itself to spiritual matters, 
the institution has limitations. Some limitations are: 
177 Grimm, The Reformation Era, p. 39. 
178Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
179 Mcllwain, Political Thought, pp. 312-314. 
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(1) All clergy are equal; (2) there is no proof of apostolic 
succession from Peter; (3) God alone forgives sins; (4) the 
Bible is sole source of revelation and law; (5) Canon law 
181 and traditions do not apply to everyone. 
Marsilio's ideas were to reappear within writings 
of reformers and humanists during the sixteenth century. 
There is evidence, also, that Wycliffe and Hus were influ-
182 enced by these writers, as was Savanarola. Bearers of 
such novel ideas in a later time were not well-received. 
Ideas must await their moment in time. An attempt to assert 
the preeminence of secular power over papal was made at the 
183 Council of Constance (1414-1417). However, the time was 
not yet ripe. Jan Hus was tried for heresy, after arriving 
at Constance under the protection of a safe-conduct of the 
emperor. Hus was found guilty of little more than agreeing 
with the ideas in the Defensor. Nevertheless, Hus was 
184 burned as a heretic. In addition, Constance sought to 
exterminate Lollardry. Interred bones of Wycliffe were dug 
up, and tried for heresy. Found guilty, Wycliffe's bones 
185 were burned and the ashes strewn over water. Followers of 
both Hus and of Wycliffe were hunted down and persecuted. 
181 
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In Germany, however, Hussites were militarily strong; 
the crusade produced a series of bloody wars. Edmunds' com­
ment on Hus's execution says: "History affords no more 
emphatic demonstration of the supreme power asserted by the 
church over life itself.""'"®® 
Historians generally designate the period 1350 to 
1450, which involved the hundred years war between England 
and France, as a period of emerging nationalism. Weakening 
of the papacy and emptiness of empirical power contributed 
to the fracture of the unity of Christendom. 
The Golden Bull of 1356 was a contract between the 
emperor and the German princes chosen to elect the emperor 
The parties to the political contract fulfilled the substance 
of the Defensor Pacis as representatives of public Germany. 
Another attempt to apply the conciliar concept was tried at 
a Council at Basel in 1431. The Pope was reluctant to appear 
in person, and sent representatives with instructions 
restricting activities of the Council. The pope's wishes 
188 were ignored. Latourette's judgment of Basel is harsh. 
He says: "The council of Basel failed, and failed conspic-
189 uously and lamentably." Although some reform decisions 
1.86 Edmunds, Law and Civilization, p. 228. 
187 Holborn, Germany: The Reformation, p. 28. 
188 , . , _ _ Ibid., p. 27. 
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were made such as (1) Simony was forbidden, (2) celibacy of 
clergy enforced, and (3) "churchyard theatricals" forbidden, 
Basel failed in its central attempt to reunite Latin and Greek 
wings of the church. There was a "falling-out" with Pope 
Eugene IV, and the council elected another pope, after depos­
ing Eugene. The new pope did not remain in office very long, 
and soon resigned. For all practical purposes, the conciliar 
190 movement was over. 
THE NEW LEARNING 
Behind new pressures toward more representative 
government within church and state were a host of Latin 
scholars. Scholastic ideas were characterized by their con­
sistency with revered Greek philosophers, and by a broaden­
ing view of man and his surroundings. Medieval scholars 
viewed education as primarily a process of preservation and 
transmission. But new learning provided a creative aspect 
191 that had not been previously allowed or considered. 
Church-craft and state-craft were not confined to 
the political or religious. Since the time of Charlemagne, 
192 the Cathedrals had been involved in some kind of education. 
The Fourth Lateran Council had made the cathedral school a 
190 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 634. 
191 Grimm, Reformation Era, pp. 60-61. 
192 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 3570 
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193 requirement. The source of the structure of early educa­
tion began in the craft guilds. The organization, once 
established, remains the structure of today's university 
system, especially in the professional sense. Notre-Dame 
School in Paris produced such great master teachers as 
William of Champeaux and Peter Abelard. The University of 
Paris was considered an exemplar of the thirteenth century 
university. Paris was known for its theology and philosophy 
194 all over the world. John Calvin received theological 
195 training at the University of Paris. 
The Universities of Paris and Bologna emerged as 
intellectual centers during the "Renaissance of the twelfth 
century." In Italy, Bologna provided a center for revival 
196 of the study of Roman Law. The University of Salerno 
emerged as the first medical university, but it failed to 
197 survive the fourteenth century. Control of the university 
had its relationship to church and state in medieval as well 
as current times. According to Hastings Rashdall, the pre­
eminence of the schools and their development into universities, 
193 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 484. 
194 Bowen, History of Western Education, I, 109-10. 
195 Latourette, History of Christianity, pp. 751-752. 
196 Hastings Rashdall, F. M. Powicke, and A. B. 
Emden, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages (Oxford: 
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to a great measure, depended upon their being licensed by 
the ecclesiastical authorities. He says: 
In the formative period the schools were fostered 
by the ecclesiastical authority and, like the univer­
sities into which some of them developed, depended upon 
this authority for the right to exercise their activ­
ity.198 
History records frequent intervention of secular 
control in the growth and development of universities. In 
other cases, the theological weight of the universities 
sometimes was felt in matters of secular and religious impor­
tance. Change in the power and understanding of the relation­
ship between church and state parallels change of patronage 
in the universities. Rashdall continues: 
As time went on, secular princes exercised author­
ity over universities in virtue of their position as 
founders, or in the public interest, is undoubted ... 
the university of Oxford was under the control as well 
as the patronage of the king of England, and the more 
so, because the Chancellor was invested with a measure 
of temporal jurisdiction.199 
Through the chancellor, universities had a powerful 
and influential figure at court. However, the chancellor's 
closeness to the king sometimes worked to the advantage of 
the universities and sometimes to their disadvantage. The 
rise of the universities, especially during the twelfth cen­
tury, was partially a result of eager appropriation of pagan 
learning by Europeans. The Christian West engaged in literary 
198 Rashdall, Universities, I, 20-2In. 
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communication with Arabian scholars in Sicily and Spain. 
The Arabs had translated Greek scientific principles into 
Arabic and had carried Aristotelian thought and deductive 
logic to the threshold of scientific thinking. The use of 
arabic numerals revolutionized mathematics and made scien­
tific computation infinitely simpler. Initial reaction of 
the clergy to the "New Aristotle" was fear, which invited 
repression in the universities. Students were required to 
approach such information with caution, lest they be accused 
of heresy. The Scholastics began their breakthrough into 
the study of nature with a step-by-step process. The door 
was opened by Albert the Great, followed and completed by 
201 
his pupil, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). 
The Summa Theologica of Aquinas was a mammoth under­
taking, in that he proposed to summarize all knowledge sys­
tematically in Aristotelian terms compounded within the 
acceptable theological categories. The book attempted to 
demonstrate that faith and reason do not conflict. The value 
of the work, aside from its specific contents, was that it 
accomplished the difficult task of fostering an intellectual 
climate favorable to the utilization of reason without sup-
202 pression. 
2 ̂Palmer and Coulton, History, p. 37. 
201Ibid. 202Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
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Basic to the concerns herein, is the Thomistic polit­
ical theory. Aquinas as a man of his time conceived the 
state primarily in terms of law, not law in terms of the 
203 state. The logic of the position is as follows: 
If this world is governed by God's providence, 
then it is manifest that the whole community of the 
universe is ruled by divine reason: and so the prin­
ciple of the governance of things, exist in God as 
the rationale of the universe, has the character of lex; 
and since divine reason is not of time, but of eternity, 
we must call this law eternal .... This is the source 
of all true law upon earth.204 
When finally the teachings of Aquinas were accepted 
by the Roman hierarchy, the step signalled medieval man's 
thought processes were giving way to the modern world. Sci­
entific thinking was made possible. By drawing upon Aris­
totle's principle of universal laws, Aquinas led men to 
205 discover their place in the world and in nature. 
THE RENAISSANCE AND REFORMATION 
Once the initial breach was made in the universi­
ties, the way was opened for the entry of such intellectual 
pioneers as Sir Francis Bacon, Spinoza, Copernicus, Galileo, 
and others. In terms of theology, the door was opened in 
Wittenburg in 1517. There, the Franciscan Monk, Martin Luther, 
raised the curtain on the modern age with his posting of the 
203 Mcllwain, Political Thought, p. 326, 
204Ibid. 205!bid. 
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206 Ninety-Five Theses. Questions posed in the document 
effectively collapsed the medieval structure so carefully 
207 designed by Augustine. The scholastic synthesis of faith 
and reason put forth by Aquinas had reached its peak; human-
208 ists were read with delight throughout Europe. The fusion 
between the Greek and the Judaeo-Christian elements of medie-
209 val society was split. Holborn credits Luther's preaching 
as the spark that made way for a massive European challenge 
to the secular power of the church, and created a social and 
religious revolution. "Following the Reformation, no longer 
did a common ecclesiastical roof cover western Christen­
dom."210 
The Peace of Augsburg in 1555 gave the German Prin­
ces a choice between Roman Catholic faith and the Augsburg 
211 Confession of the Lutherans. The Augsburg treaty was a 
document of "no return" in that the territorial prince could 
choose the religion for the inhabitants of his territory, 
but allowed for no dissent within the realm. Whole nations 
became Protestant, while others remained Roman Catholic. 
Initially, there had been no intent to fracture the unity 
2 06 Grimm, Reformation Era, p. 109. 
207 McNeill, Rise of the West, p. 641. 
208T, . , 209_, . , Ibid. Ibid. 
210 Holborn, Germany: The Reformation, p. 87. 
211 Edmunds, The Law and Civilization, pp. 228-229. 
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of Christendom, but results were much different than the 
212 reformers expected. 
Failure to provide a monolithic reformed church with 
everyone in complete agreement provided the door that opened 
213 Europe and the world to secularism and science. W. H. 
McNeill suggests that: 
The political diversity of Europe thwarted the 
hearts desire of nearly all of the intellectually 
sensitive men of the time by making impossible the con­
struction of a single, authoritative, definitive and 
enforceable codification of truth. Yet, ironically, 
the failure to construct a world-view commanding gen­
eral assent was the greatest achievement of the age. 
Europeans inherited ... a high seriousness in the 
pursuit of both knowledge and salvation. 
A sober tension was maintained as monarchies grad­
ually lost their absolute power in matters of state and in 
terms of individual choice of religion or intellectual pur­
suits. Residue of that tension remained as the medieval 
church-state struggle continued. 
Geographically, the German-based Reformation included 
northern Europe and moved to the east, while Geneva-based 
215 Calvinism moved west. Theology based on individualistic 
Biblical interpretation is, by nature, divisive. No con­
sensus, other than territorial, is possible within the 
212 Edmunds, The Law and Civilization, pp. 228-29. 
213 
McNeill, Rise of the West, p. 642. 
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Protestant world view. The Geneva of Calvin, tightly struc­
tured and ordered as a theocracy, gradually faded. Crom­
well's English Commonwealth was an experiment that failed to 
outlast its founder. Protestantism produced a multiplication 
of sects and proliferation of reformed leadership, which 
featured numerous and unique expressions of theological inter-
216 pretation. The leadership of Protestant countries allowed 
217 some degree of tolerance within their respective states. 
Roman Catholic states, because of severe limitations placed 
218 upon them by the popes, tended to be more narrowly tolerant. 
In a secular sense, beginnings of modern history 
tipped the balance away from a world view that emphasized 
the hereafter and toward a new emphasis upon the present 
dimension. Holborn does not accept the traditional historic 
view of a unified renaissance civilization. The German his­
torian sees secular culture interwoven with much of the old 
religion. Also complicating the civilization was residual 
feudalism, disease and rising nationalism, complicated by the 
219 phenomena of recurring strife and wars. 
The Protestant reformers set out to achieve a 
radical sanctification of all human endeavor before 
God, but in fact, after the lapse of a couple of 
generations, provoked in parts of Europe a disciplined 
application to the business of making money such as the 
world had never seen before; While the Jesuits, who set 
216 Holborn, Germany: The Reformation, p. 210. 
217Ibid., p. 245. 218Ibid., pp. 370-71. 219lbid., p. 104. 
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out to win souls for Christ and the pope, found in the 
Pagan learning of the humanists one of their most effec­
tive tools of education ... both religion and secu­
larism acquired a new energy from their mutual jost­
ling. 220 
THE ENGLISH REFORMATION 
In the British Isles, the Reformation ultimately 
affected the American settlements more directly than did 
German Lutheranism. Henry VIII obtained the title, "Defender 
of the Faith," as a result of a theological treatise he wrote 
against Luther. However, Henry found himself at odds with 
221 the policies and designs of Rome. The English king 
wished to father a male heir. The desire was such an obses­
sion to Henry that it affected England's foreign and domestic 
policy„ Henry's first wife had not been able to produce a 
son. A mixture of ego, lust, superstitition, and to some 
degree, theological training, overpowered Henry. The King 
appealed to Pope Clement VIII to annul the marriage on a theo­
logical pretext: Catherine had been his older brother's 
wife, and an annulment might have been in order because of 
an obscure Biblical reference to such a union. To complicate 
matters, Anne Boleyn was pregnant with whom he hoped was a 
son, and Henry wished to marry in order to legitimize the 
222 heir. The succeeding executions, marriages, and more 
220 McNeill, Rise of the West, p. 642. 
221 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 802. 
222Ibid., p. 800. 
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trials and executions are commonplace in history. England, 
through Henry, ultimately became a Protestant nation, but 
not without great struggles. The condition of the church 
following such secular successes is described briefly by 
McNeill: 
Protestant rulers confiscated much ecclesiastical 
property and often reduced the clergy to the status 
of salaried employees of the state. Even in Catholic 
countries where the church retained most of its posses­
sions, the papacy was forced to concede very extensive 
powers to local rulers in such matters as ecclesiasti­
cal appointments, taxing powers over church property, 
and the judicial authority over clergymen.̂ 23 
Three years after his successful defiance of the 
pope and takeover of the English church, Henry put Anne, 
his second wife, to death. In succession Henry VIII married 
four other wives to further his dynastic dreams. Henry's 
only success in producing a male heir was the frail Edward, 
who died after a short reign. 
The Henrican Reformation involved a successful 
defiance of the pope in personal matters, confiscation and 
dissolution of the monasteries, and confiscation and reten­
tion of much church wealth for the Crown. In 1534, Parlia­
ment declared Henry VIII Supreme Head of the Church of 
England, which included royal jurisdiction over ecclesias-
224 txcal courts of England. 
223 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 645. 
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Henry's and Edward's settlement with the church was 
overturned by Edward's older sister, Mary, who succeeded 
him. Mary's upbringing and marriage to a Catholic zealot, 
Philip of Spain, did not permit reform to continue in Eng­
land. Mary met strong resistance as she attempted a restora-
. . 225 tion of Catholicism. The Queen stubbornly escalated 
measures to suppress the Protestants. The repressive cam­
paign caused great numbers of people to flee to Europe. 
Among the Marian exiles were men who later effected the 
Protestant direction of English history. Such men were 
John Knox and John Ponet, whose ideas were radical concepts 
226 of resistance to rulers including regicide. 
227 Elizabeth became queen following Mary's death. 
The virgin queen's immediate task was that of returning the 
nation's Tudor reforms initiated by Henry and Edward. The 
young queen was blessed with good health, intelligence, and 
good advisors. Elizabeth's unusually long reign gave time 
to fulfill policies and to outlive early mistakes. Eliza­
beth as sovereign made England secure against Catholicism 
and foreign invasion. Furthermore, the queen united England's 
economic and political power behind a fleet of ships manned 
228 and captained by daring explorers and courageous seamen. 
225 Latourette, History of Christianity, pp. 808-09. 
226 Edmunds, The Law and Civilization, pp. 466-468. 
227 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 810. 
70 
Religious settlement accompanied two acts: (1) Suprem-
229 acy and (2) Uniformity in 1559. Elizabeth instituted a 
revival of Edward's Book of Common Prayer, and added a number 
230 of articles of belief, which then totaled thirty-nine. 
Worship was performed in the vernacular. Elizabethan reforms 
satisfied a majority of Englishmen, but could console neither 
rabid Catholics nor radical Protestants. Effective reforms 
231 were marred by the Admonition Controversy, in which the 
radical Puritans attacked the conservative Reformation. Many 
reminders of Catholicism remained in the church which were 
offensive to the Puritans. Most odious of Catholic residue 
were the outward trappings such as the surplice and the 
sign of the cross. Elizabeth chose a latitudinarian view of 
the church which could encompass a majority of contemporary 
Christian views. The course served Elizabeth well, and 
232 England prospered under the Elizabethan settlement. 
THE WARS OF RELIGION 
The Respublica Christiana concept died only after a 
protracted European struggle. For almost one hundred years 
between 1560 and 1648, the central most controversial issue 
was religion. The "wars of religion" involved in addition 
229 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 810. 
230Ibid., p. 812. 231Ibid., p. 815. 
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to others, France, England, Spain, and the Holy Roman Empire. 
During the Hundred Years War, religion emerged as the pri­
mary issue. Most wars were fought between Protestants and 
Catholics for control over territorial space, and from the 
conflicts emerged a new idea, nationalism. By 1648, thousands 
had been killed or maimed in the name of the "Prince of 
233 Peace." The Thirty Years War, which was included within 
the period, is regarded as a major catastrophe. Germany 
bore the brunt. Most of the war was fought on German terri­
tory. Germany was blackened with burned cities and devastated 
234 farmland. The population in some areas was decimated; 
in others, totally gone. Peace came, but not unity. The 
fabric of Europe was a torn patchwork of nations marked by 
fortifications along their frontiers. In the Treaty of West­
phalia, which marked the end of the struggles, the principle 
of cuis regio ejus reliqio still had validity. The date 1624, 
however, became the benchmark defining the concept of tolera­
tion between Protestant and Catholic factions. January 1, 
1624 was set as the date beyond which no church prop­
erty was to be appropriated by Protestants. The 
1648 treaty pointed to the earlier time as a determining 
cut-off point with regard to the major religion that would be 
tolerated within the territory. Although the religious 
233 Holborn,' The Reformation, pp. 246, 373. 
234Ibid., pp. 322-324. 
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settlement was condemned by the Pope, allowance for tolera­
tion within territories appeared to be the only workable 
235 compromise. 
In 1566, the Protestant Netherlands revolted against 
the Spanish king, Philip II, to prevent introduction of the 
2 36 Inquisition. Philip responded with the "Council of 
Blood," which sentenced thousands to death, levied oppressive 
taxes, and confiscated valuable property. Protestants united 
behind William the Silent, to attempt to drive out the hated 
237 Spanish. 
England had a stake in the outcome. Elizabeth was 
concerned that if Spain had success in the Netherlands, they 
next would attempt to invade England. Philip succeeded in 
his aggression on land. However, English and Dutch navies 
countered on the sea and against Spanish settlements in 
America. Attacks on treasure ships of the Spanish produced 
the effect of arousing Philip against the English. He pro­
duced a huge armada that included fighting ships as well as 
transports for the purpose of invading England. In 1588, 
the magnificent fleet set sail. It was comprised of an 
armada of 130 ships, 20,000 men, and armed with 2,400 can-
238 
nons. The fleet first headed for the Netherlands to pick 
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up the Spanish invasion force, but the English were waiting 
for the fleet in the Channel under the command of a daring 
commander, Sir Francis Drake. The English, utilizing fire 
ships and small vessels, put the armada in disarray. Decisive 
victory, however, came from the violent wind storm, which the 
English call "the Protestant wind." It blew the Spanish ships 
onto rocks, sank others, and effectively put an end to the 
Catholic threat. Ten years later, Philip was dead, and Spain 
was a weakened spectator which watched helplessly as the 
239 star of England's ascendancy moved toward its zenith. 
The sixteenth century set the stage for the modern 
era, during which Europe broke through the boundaries of the 
sea, opened up science, and was introduced to the beginnings 
of technology, and established new directions in political 
philosophy. The Respublica Christiana was left behind like 
discarded luggage. Some, like Philip II, clung to the anach­
ronism, and it remained a phantom threat to the Protestant 
cause. 
THE RENAISSANCE 
The Renaissance of the sixteenth century had been 
on its way since the twelfth. Even in the sixteenth century 
the search for knowledge divided attention between concern 
for truth and concern for one's safety. Both Protestants 
239 Palmer and Coulton, History of the Modern World, 
pp. 111-112. 
74 
and Catholics experienced difficulty with toleration for 
scientific learning. Humanists in the early part of the 
century had suggested secularism as a viable third alterna­
tive to the religious controversies: learning for learning's 
240 sake. At times, however, science was attacked by religion 
as if it were a heretical mystery religion which threatened 
the existence of theology. New ideas failed to coincide with 
stated Christian teachings, and often proponents of such 
"erroneous ideas" were made to face the dreaded Inquisition. 
The sixteenth century was nearly over, when in 1592, Giordano 
Bruno was tried by the Roman tribunal and finally burned in 
241 1600. Galileo's ideas had begun in the sixteenth century, 
but were carried over into the seventeenth, where they took 
242 form and force. Jacob Bronowski poignantly relates the 
series of circumstances that led the church to suppress 
Galileo's findings. Confident that reason would triumph 
over religion when he provided the indisputable proof, the 
naivete of the astronomer rendered him vulnerable in the 
243 face of the dreaded Inquisition. 
In 1616, Galileo was confronted with evidence of his 
support of the unorthodox Copernican system of the universe. 
240 Palmer and Coulton, History, pp. 49-56. 
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The facts, as revealed through the telescope, in addition 
to Galileo's calculations, should have been proof enough. 
Galileo misled himself into thinking he had made headway 
with the "liberal" Pope, Urban VIII. He maintained that the 
244 ultimate test of a theory must be in nature, not scripture. 
In 1632, Galileo published his book, The Dialogue on the 
Great World Systems, and the Pope was outraged. Galileo was 
ordered before the Inquisition. The astronomer was nearly 
seventy years of age, and not able to withstand torture. 
His interrogators skirted the substance of the book, where 
he would have been a match for his questioners. Questions 
were based on technicalities and matters of procedure and 
form regarding The Dialogue. Threatened twice with torture, 
245 he finally recanted on June 22, 1633. However, the 
"remorse" was short-lived. Galileo lived to write another 
book, The New Sciences, which he finished in 1636. Still 
forbidden to publish by the Pope, Protestants in the Nether­
lands printed it for him. That final scientific effort of 
246 
his life left him almost totally blind by 1638. Effects 
of papal oppression of Galileo forestalled further scientific 
work in Italy, thus forcing the center of science to the 
freer climate of northern Europe. In the year 1642 Sir 
244 Bronowski, The Ascent of Man, pp. 207-214. 
245Ibid. 
246Ibid. 
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Isaac Newton was born in England and Galileo, still under 
247 house arrest by the Inquisition, died. 
THE PURITANS 
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were witness 
to the growth of numerous Protestant splinter groups. Most 
influential to the development of western democracies were 
the Puritans. The dissenters were subjected to the English 
Star Chamber with its practice of compulsory oaths and self-
248 incrimination. Early m the seventeenth century the 
Puritans stood firm against James I and his claims of the 
249 divine right of kings. Their initial attempt under the 
250 new king was called "The Millenary Petition." The peti­
tion sought to modify those practices held odious to the 
Puritans that were still practiced by the Church of England. 
Also, since James was king of Presbyterian Scotland, the Pur 
itans hoped that he would install the Presbyterian system in 
the Church of England. The monarch chose to rule the church 
251 through his bishops. His concept of divine right, how­
ever , could not accommodate the removal of bishops who were 
247 Bronowski, The Ascent of Man, pp. 207-214. 
248 Palmer and Coulton, History of the Modern World, 
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trusted advisors to the king on matters of state as well 
as religion. At Hampton Court in 1604, the Puritans met 
him and presented the request. James is quoted as saying, 
"no bishop, no King." He further warned the Puritans that 
if they would not conform, he would "harry them out of Eng-
252 land." The Stuart conviction of divine right prompted 
James to take the occasion to lecture the Puritans about it, 
and to remind them that he was answerable only to God and he 
253 would make any law he chose. 
The above scene was important for the settlement of 
America and the development of its form of government. It 
was under the reign of James that the Marian exiles and other 
dissenters were given letters of patent through the London 
254 Company to set up a colony in America. In 1620, the first 
successful settlements occurred. In New England, a funda­
mental document was formulated which framed the basis for 
255 the New England form of government. 
The Puritans were angry at James because of his 
church-state stance. Retention of residual symbols of 
Catholicism was a constant reminder to Puritans of a strong 
incompatibility between them and the present government. 
Puritans were shut off from governmental patronage. Great 
252 253 Grimm, The Reformation Era, p. 545. Ibid. 
254 Edmunds, The Law and Civilization, p. 232. 
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lords of England controlled appointments of churchmen, almost 
in the manner of twentieth century franchise operations. 
Absentee clergy collected tithes from the parish while 
actual services were taken over by humble curates. Puritans 
were usually better educated than rural English clergy and 
therefore provided better service. Stuart England proved to 
be a very interesting and decisive period, deeply affecting 
both the English constitution, and ultimately the 
256 American formulation. The Puritan ethic had its effect 
on church-state relations, education, law, economics, and 
human relations. One cannot say too much concerning the im­
pact of the confrontation between James at Hampton Court upon 
the future of the western world. Whether good, or bad, or 
257 indifferent, it was a turning point in history. 
THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 
In the beginning, there were two major groups of 
Puritans: Presbyterians and Brownists. The Presbyterians 
adopted the Genevan concept of theocratic representative 
government. The Brownists, on the other hand, required 
that each congregation settle on its body of doctrine with 
each member judging the faith and works of every other. The 
256 Wallace Notestein, The English People on the Eve 
of Colonization, 1603-1630 (New York: Harper Brothers, 
1954), p. 62. 
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minister was not distinct from others in the congregation. 
English Puritanism was relatively short-lived, as from its 
original dissenting character emerged other dissenters, among 
258 whom were Methodists, Baptists, and Quakers. 
The thread of the church-state controversy leads 
directly from England to America. The seventeenth century 
English setting provided the launching pad for the American 
system of government that forbade the establishment of relig­
ion. James' ideas were anachronistic in the post Elizabethan 
age. Elizabeth's settlement seemed to be leading to more 
freedom than James was able to understand or appreciate. His 
was a reactionary government, and the attempt to rid the land 
of dissent and non-conformity belonged to a pre-Reformation 
era. When James died, the problems of church and state were 
259 in turmoil. 
Charles I, James' son, followed policies that were 
little better than his father's. By 1629, he was so out of 
favor with Parliament that he was required to dissolve the 
260 body and rule without it. In 1642, Parliament adopted the 
Solemn League and Covenant, under the leadership of the Puri­
tans, which established Presbyterianism as the legal religion 
261 of England, Ireland, and Scotland. In 1649, Charles I, who 
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had opposed compromise at every turn, was beheaded at the 
orders of the great praying Puritan revolutionist, Oliver 
n 262 Cromwell. 
Cromwell had led his new model army of "Bible pound­
ers" and "true believers" to victory over the king's defen-
p/r o 
ders. In Ireland, Oliver subdued the land. His soldiers 
killed and maimed thousands of priests, and defenseless women 
and children. The land, once subdued and in the hands of 
Protestants, was left in the hands of absentee landlords who 
264 lived off the rents of their Catholic serfs. The great 
poet and propagandist, John Milton, justified the Puritan 
265 cause through the tracts he wrote and published. 
TOLERATION UNDER THE STUART RESTORATION 
Cromwell's changes, however, were not etched into 
the British constitution. Following the Great Commoner's 
death, England shortly turned its back upon the Puritan 
constitution and the Parliament restored the monarchy, in the 
2 £.£. person of Charles II, in 1660. Not only was the king 
restored, but the Church of England was reinstated as well. 
262 Grimm, The Reformation Era, p. 564. 
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Charles was a Stuart true to the name. Charles and Parlia­
ment were found quickly to be at odds. All across Europe 
there had been a resurgence of Roman Catholicism, as Prot­
estants returned to the old religion. In England, the feel­
ing was strongly anti-Catholic. The most popular acts of 
2 7 
Parliament were those measures passed against "popery." 
Charles had spent much of his exile on the continent 
and had been influenced by the opulent court of Louis XIV. 
The French king had the power to exact money from his sub­
jects, but Charles was obliged to turn to Parliament, hat in 
hand. In one attempt to circumvent Parliament, Charles 
268 utilized his prerogative to conduct foreign policy. 
Charles and Louis made a secret treaty at Dover in 
1670, successfully circumventing the usual diplomatic chan-
269 nels. Although the treaty had been negotiated with the 
closest security, Charles shared some of the provisions with 
his inner group of ministers. It was completed on 22 May/ 
1 June, 1670. The treaty required that Louis pay Charles 
two million francs and furnish six thousand troops to Charles, 
once Charles announced a restoration of Catholic establishment 
in the Church of England. The English were also to be an 
ally of France in a new war against the Dutch. England 
would be in a financial position to supply a support fleet. 
267 Palmer and Coulton, History, p. 151. 
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What is appropriate to this research, is the degree of 
import still remaining with regard to church-state relation-
270 ships, so late in the seventeenth century. 
Charles went to war against the Dutch, as promised, 
and he received his money. Parliament became more hostile 
toward the policies of Charles. When James, the Duke of York, 
married, he wed a Catholic, and became one himself. Charles 
issued a declaration of indulgence, which suspended enforce­
ment of penal laws against dissenters, including Catholics. 
The response from Parliament was swift. They passed the 
Test Act which required all office holders in England to take 
Holy Communion in the Church of England at least once a 
271 year. The Test Act held until the early nineteenth cen-
272 tury. Under the Stuarts the English constitution skated 
on thin ice with regard toward retention of peace in the 
face of church-state intrigue. 
Effects of Stuart policies were felt in the English 
colonies. The Dutch war had given New York to the English, 
thus unifying the English colonies along the eastern sea­
board. On the surface, at least, the religious policy of 
270 Francois A. M. Mignet, Collection de Documents 
Inedites sur l'Histoire de France, Neqociations relatives a 
la Succession d'Espagne Sous Louis XIV (Paris; Imprimerie 
Royal 1835-42), III, 194. 
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Charles in the American colonies seemed to be consistent. 
In all the charters issued to the colonies, Charles pursued 
a policy of toleration. The king's pro-Catholic bias led 
273 him to retain a position of tolerance for all faiths. 
Regardless of his motives, the policy was clear: toleration 
274 for all faiths was the rule in the colonies. Pennsylvania 
was one extreme example. Charles had an outstanding debt 
owed to Penn's father. He extended the charter to William 
Penn in exchange for the debt's cancellation. The territory 
was to be a place of settlement for the Quakers who wished 
to leave England to practice their religion without fear of 
275 persecution. Grimm says: 
So far had religious toleration progressed by the 
end of the sixteenth century that punishment of heresy 
with death gradually disappeared. In England only two 
persons were compelled to die for their faith in the 
seventeenth century, and on the Continent the usual 
punishment was banishment or imprisonment.276 
Toleration was especially an issue in New England 
where certain persons were executed for heresy, and others 
imprisoned, or were awaiting execution. When the situation 
was reported to the king, he intervened with orders to the 
colonial authorities for the accused to be sent to England 
for trial under the laws of the Crown. That kind of 
27*5 274 
Palmer and Coulton, History, p. 151. Ibid. 
275 A. D. Innes, The Maritime and Colonial Expansion 
Under the Stuarts, 1603-1714 (London: Sampson Low Marston 
& Co., Ltd., 1931), p. 344. 
2 76 Grimm, The Reformation Era, p. 592. 
84 
intervention was unwelcome in the colonies, and as a result, 
Governor Endicott submitted the colonial position: 
We were at last constreyned for our own safetie 
to pass a sentence of banishment against them upon 
paine of death such was their dangerous and desper­
ate turbulence to religion and to the state civill 
and ecclesiastical ... they would not be restreined 
but by death.277 
Although toleration of dissenters was part of the 
question, another part of the problem lay with determination 
of legal jurisdiction. The policy of Charles II required 
that control of the king's courts remain under his central­
ized jurisdiction, while the colonies were eager to estab­
lish laws more appropriate to their ideas and circumstances. 
Charles remained a Stuart whose pride rested in the personal 
prerogative, whose power and law extended wherever his sub­
jects flew his flag. 
It is evident that Charles was eager to use religion 
as a means to further his foreign policy. Toleration on 
the domestic scene meant that Catholics would hold office 
and assume the dignities and privileges associated with posi­
tion. The Test Act was a warning to Charles, that he was 
moving into dangerous territory. The persistent question of 
religion and the abject fear of the imminent return of 
Catholicism created much unrest among members of Parliament. 
Parliament was made up of eyewitnesses to the brutality and 
277 Great Brxtam, Calendar of State Papers Colonial 
(London: Public Record Office, 1660), pp. 8-10. 
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bloodshed that comes from religious war and persecution. 
Any threat to the delicate balance of peace within England 
aroused the worst fears among the lawmakers. Roland Bainton 
aptly characterizes the state of mind that prevailed: 
Englishmen would not tolerate Catholics because 
they did not trust Catholics to be tolerant of Prot­
estants, however much a Catholic might aver his tol­
erance, the suspicion could not be allayed that if he 
were given power he would revert to the Inquisition 
. . . and the stake.2 
The revelation of a scheme to overthrow the Prot­
estant monarchy, called the "popish plot," served only to 
reinforce London's worst fears. The plot was a strange 
fabrication concocted by two "mountebanks" who drew up an 
authentic looking manuscript which contained details of a 
Catholic plot to bring down the monarchy of Charles II. 
The plan played on the worst imaginings of the English, 
including setting fire to London, an Irish Catholic upris­
ing, and a Protestant massacre. The plausibility of the 
plot stirred the public mind into a malevolent frenzy. The 
murder of Sir Edmund Bury Godfrey, who had been assigned to 
investigate the case, further substantiated the reality of 
the threatened terror. Catholics, Jesuits and others sus­
pected of Catholic conspiracy, were rounded up and tried. 
Thirty-five were executed. Titus Oates, the master-mind of 
278 Roland Bainton, The Travail of Religious Lib­
erty (Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1951), p. 30. 
86 
the plot, was rewarded with a lifelong pension for his 
279 patriotic performance. 
Parliament produced a resolution, which Charles was 
obliged to sign, outlawing any Catholics within ten miles of 
London or Westminster. He also stated to the Parliament: 
"It shall always be my study to preserve the Protestant 
religion and to advance and support the interest of my peo-
280 pie." Charles died in 1685 and James II became king. 
Although James II was a Catholic, he never had oppor­
tunity to enter into the intrigues of his elder brother. 
James1 pro-Catholic moves were immediately obvious to his 
enemies. Both his own personality and history betrayed him. 
James suspended the Test Act and appointed Catholics wherever 
he pleased. However, the king continued to tolerate dissen-
2 81 ters and encouraged their participation in public life. 
The king's program was offensive to the high Tories, and 
the anti-Catholic Whigs as well. The crisis came when James1 
Catholic wife gave birth to a son, and baptized him as a 
Catholic. The Whigs and Tories then deserted the king and 
offered his throne to James' Protestant daughter, Mary, 
and wife of the Dutch William of Orange. 
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The removal of James II from the throne is popularly 
known as the "Whig Revolution of 1688," although most of 
0 ftp 
Parliament, both Whig and Tory, took part. William was a 
popular and successful Protestant leader of the Dutch against 
Catholic forces on the Continent. He led an invasion force 
283 into England, and James fled the country. The signifi­
cance of the Whig Revolution of 1688 and the issuance of the 
Bill of Rights had direct bearing upon the American Revolution 
and the formulation of the written constitution of the United 
States of America. The new king, William III, was not con­
cerned with the Stuart obsession toward "divine right," but 
was more involved with halting French Catholic aggression in 
284 Europe. He willingly conceded many of the Crown's pre-
2 85 rogatives to the "Whig Revolution." 
The Toleration Act of 1689 along with the Bill of 
Rights comprise the current status of the English Monarchy 
? ftfi 
in terms of religious establishment. In addition, in the 
act of settlement of 1701, no Catholic could be king of Eng­
land. This unprecedented act effectively spelled the end to 
the House of Stuart and any possible return to Catholic rule. 
However, the fears within the populace were not entirely put 
to rest until the nineteenth century when the Test Act was 
repealed. Antagonism between Irish and English people, 
? 82 2 ft *3 
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however, continues to focus upon their respective religions. 
The current civil strife in Ireland had its beginnings in the 
seventeenth century under Cromwell. It has cost countless 
thousands of lives, and currently shows little hope of being 
solved. The Test Act and Irish problem were dealt with under 
Queen Victoria and the power of the world empire made the 
English less fearful of internal takeover by external powers, 
including the Pope. A strong nation can afford to be tol­
erant, so long as that toleration is extended to everyone. 
The bloodless revolution of 1688 proved that a nation could 
survive with both an established church and a policy of tol­
eration for all faiths, so long as church and state are not 
excessively entangled within one another's affairs. The 
example was a bold step toward the establishment of democracy 
in England, and an experience well-noted by the framers of 
the American government a century later. 
PHILOSOPHICAL BASE 
There is some dispute concerning what part John 
Locke played in the Whig Revolution. Later scholars say his 
writings were published to justify the act from a philosoph­
ical standpoint. At any rate, Locke had great influence 
upon later historical events, especially in the revolutions 
in America and Prance. Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration, 
which he published in 1667, is said to be his finest expres­
sion concerning the separation of church and state. He said: 
89 
Liberty of conscience is every man's natural 
right. ... Since only God Himself can determine 
which is the true faith, men must be guided by the 
light of their own reason and the dictates of their 
own consciences ...(... not the will of their 
rulers in the matters of religion.)287 
Men, he insists, must save their own souls. Locke 
held that nothing earthly can compare with the fate of his 
eternal soul. But Locke denies that fate is of any concern 
to the government, or that any church can stake a claim to 
the only route to salvation. Rather, Locke propounded the 
principle of voluntary association, whereby the religious 
person would be allowed to freely associate with whatever 
288 faith he feels will be most acceptable to God. In this 
Locke broke with the medieval concepts which had been founded 
on the close interdependence of church and state. From 
Locke's time forth, the only ruler over a man's allegiance 
. . 289 to religion would be reason and the human heart. 
Another work that came to have influence over the 
American and French view of the state, and as a consequence, 
the church, was Locke's Second Treatise of Government 
(1690).290 
Basing his concepts on the laws of nature, Locke 
concluded that there could be a strong justification for 
revolt against rulers. 
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By providing a rational basis for revolt, without 
reference to the authority of any Church and indepen­
dent of (although buttressed by) Scriptural texts, 
Locke unwittingly played an important part in turning 
the Christian political tradition of natural law into 
the secular tradition of natural rights, and in chang­
ing the emphasis from obligation and submission to 
authority, to the assertion of rights and the ques­
tioning of claims to authority.2̂  
Although Locke did not consider his rationalism as 
inconsistent with Christianity, he opened the way for a type 
of rationalism to develop which would allow government to be 
based upon reason, rather than God's will and upon scrip-
292 ture. Locke's writings had a singular effect upon the 
thinking of Thomas Paine, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson, 
as well as Jean Jacques Rousseau. There are direct quotations 
of Locke's terminology in the Declaration of Independence, 
and his theories are sprinkled liberally in The Federalist, 
as well as amply incorporated in the Constitution of the 
293 United States. 
On the eve of the first American Constitutional con­
vention in 1787, the European Respublica Christiana had dis-
294 integrated in the face of the emerging nation states. 
Some degree of religious conformity continued, based on 
295 the historic principle of cuis regio, eus religio. The 
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Augsburg concept became more form than substance as the prac­
tice of Toleration began to spread and the secular arm began 
to rely upon the power of the military and economics. Europe 
was comprised of a multiple patchwork of religious represen­
tation. Toleration as a practice ranged from the coercive 
rule of the Inquisition in some areas, to the freer air of 
296 the Dutch Republic. Religious wars became less frequent, 
but the traditions, memories, and habits of war were trans­
ported as painful psychological residue with the luggage of 
the settlers of the new world. 
European strife had its effect upon the inhabitants 
of the colonies by furnishing a constant flow of immigrants, 
as well as providing more fuel for supporters of civil and 
religious liberty. Most observers agree that the European 
religious climate had a direct influence upon philosophies 
expressed in the Constitution and Bill of Rights in the United 
297 States. 
In a religious sense, the philosophical base was pro­
vided with a built-in controversy: establishment versus the 
principle of voluntarism. The world had never been witness 
to the manner of civil-religious arrangement that took form 
in America. The English colonies were mainly Protestant and 
varieties of extreme Protestantism accurately reflected a 
296 Grimm, Reformation Era, p. 591. 
297 Palmer and Coulton, History, pp. 285-288; Latour-
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diversity of European roots. Rhode Island and Pennsylvania 
contained more religious liberty than European countries. 
Toleration was better understood and more freely practiced 
than religious liberty. "Toleration" was predicated upon 
the favor of the sovereign, whereas religious liberty presup­
posed inalienable rights possessed by the citizen. A high 
philosophical wall between the two concepts had to be breached 
before intelligent debate could take place concerning civil 
liberties, most especially freedom of expression. Although 
the concepts were being aired, there was little application 
of religious liberty, and there were frequent incidents where 
the concept of Toleration was in doubt. Latourette indicates 
that: 
In more than half the thirteen colonies one or 
another church was fully established or given pref­
erence ... but ... enforcement was weakening. The 
separation of Church and State was foreshadowed.298 
Cleric and political theorist alike seized the oppor­
tunity for new beginnings. Men like Jefferson, Madison, and 
Paine saw in America the opportunity for building the ideal 
society: "because of its predominantly Reformed rootage, 
American Protestantism ... was seeking to build an ideal 
299 Christian society." 
Protestant extremism helped to shape the emerging 
nation, in terms of activism and individualism. The 
298 Latourette, History of Christianity, p. 962. 
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Judeo-Christian ethic formed the mold for morals, ideals, 
and institutions. Before 1750, all higher education was 
church-related. Theoretical foundations were laid for democ­
racy and the Revolution through the dissemination of the doc­
trines of radical Protestantism. Latourette continues: 
For example, in New England the clergy was preach­
ing the rights which came from nature's God, the 
theory that all men are born free, the duty of en­
croachment on those rights, and the popular element in 
government. While many of the clergy looked askance 
at pure democracy, the radical Protestantism . . . 
seeking ... to carry through the distinctive prin­
ciples of the Reformation, salvation by the faith of 
the individual and the priesthood of all believers, 
underlay and permeated the democracy which charac­
terized the United States. 
Harold Grimm gives a great deal of credit for the 
philosophical move from Toleration to freedom of religion. 
Williams concluded that the government had no right to 
enforce a religious creed and each individual should be 
free to act in religious matters guided by the dictates of 
301 his own conscience. Grimm continues: 
Freedom was for him [Roger Williams] absolutely 
essential for the spread of the gospel. . . . Because 
he drew a sharp distinction between the church and the 
state, maintaining that only the few regenerate belonged 
to the former (the Church], he advocated complete sepa­
ration of church and state. 
The separation of church and state, in turn hurried 
the process of the state: and the secularization of the 
state was accompanied by the secularization of the 
entire culture of Western civilization. . . .302 
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Robert G. Torbet is more explicit in his claim for 
the Baptist influence in the Constitution, especially where 
303 it touches separation of church and state. However, the 
record is also clear that they could not have accomplished 
the goal without the strong support and leadership of liberal 
Presbyterians and enlightened Anglicans such as Madison and 
Jefferson. Western civilization also reflects influence by 
Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, and Loyola. 
Torbet is essentially accurate in his contention 
that: 
The logical corollary of the doctrine of religious 
liberty is the principle of separation of church and 
state. As minority groups in the sixteenth, seven­
teenth, and eighteenth centuries, Anabaptists and 
Baptists had learned the serious restrictions upon 
religious liberty which a state can place upon an 
individual or a congregation. . . .305 
The conclusion was finally drawn that complete sep­
aration of the church from the state would provide the best 
opportunity to develop the ideal religious condition. Con­
current with the separatist concept is the absence of any 
claim by the church upon the state for financial support. 
Similar thoughts were expressed by Thomas Jefferson as he 
sought to explain democratic ideas to the Europeans in his 
303 Robert G. Torbet, A History of the Baptists, 
Revised (Valley Forge: The Judson Press, 1963), p. 489. 
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Notes on the State of Virginia (1787). His thoughts concern­
ing liberty of the mind form a bridge from Europe to the new 
world, as he argues against coercion in church-state rela­
tionships: 
Subject opinion to coercion: whom will you make 
your inquisitors? ... and why subject it to coercion? 
To produce uniformity. . . Difference of opinion is 
advantageous in religion. The several sects perform 
the office of a censor morum over each other. Is uni­
formity attainable? Millions of innocent men, women, 
and children since the introduction of Christianity 
have been burnt, tortured, fined, imprisoned; Yet we 
have not advanced one inch toward conformity.306 
Jefferson's concern for future generations of Ameri­
cans who might face the same kind of terror inspired him to 
head off such a confrontation. Possibly, the states could 
follow the lead of Pennsylvania and New York, who had devised 
the practice of "no establishment of religion." He predicted: 
The spirit of the times may alter, will alter. Our 
rulers will become corrupt, our people careless. A 
single zealot may commence persecutions, and better men 
be his victims. It can never be too often repeated, 
that the time for fixing every essential right on a 
legal basis is while rulers are honest and ourselves 
united.307 
A next logical step would be for the representatives 
of the states, "honest and united," to formulate a constitu­
tion of such endurance that European church-state aberrations 
might never be repeated in the new nation. 
306 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, 
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Thomas Jefferson and two other Virginians share the 
credit for the existence of the "establishment clause" in 
the First Amendment: George Mason and James Madison. Mason, 
a wealthy Virginia planter, was well-versed in the law. He 
was said to hold the "clearest understanding" of republican 
government of anyone in the state. He was clearly the men-
308 tor of the two younger legislators. 
Jefferson (1743-1826), son of a prosperous Virginia 
landowner, received his higher education at the College of 
309 William and Mary. During adolescence he had spent two 
years learning Latin and Greek in the home of a Tory clergy­
man, James Maury. Jefferson's tutor was the plaintiff in the 
Penny Parsons court case, which demanded more money for the 
clergy from the state treasury. Patrick Henry was lawyer 
for the defense who had "lost" when the court had awarded a 
310 penny to the plaintiff. Fawn Brodie contends that the 
contentious Rev. Maury is probably one of the prime sources 
311 for Jefferson's anticlerical stance. Jefferson sought 
the destruction of the power of the established Anglican 
308 Robert A. Rutland, ed., The Papers of George 
Mason, (1725-1792) (Chapel Hill: University of North Caro-
lina Press, 1970), I, cxix. 
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History (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1974), 
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Church as one of his prime goals during the Revolution 
312 (1776-1778). One of his initial acts after he became gov­
ernor of Virginia (1779-1781) and a member of the Board of 
Visitors of William and Mary, was to fire the clergy and to 
place the school in the hands of a more scientific leadership. 
As a lawyer he was well aware of the English Common Law pro-
313 visions contained in the Virginia legal code. 
By the time Jefferson was elected to the Virginia 
Legislature in 1774, his philosophical position had reached 
the point of recognizing a distinction between "natural 
rights" which the individual has the capacity to exercise by 
himself, and another classification of rights which cannot 
314 be safely enjoyed without society's protection. The 
social compact theory recognized the first rights as reserved 
to the individual and are inalienable, but the second class 
of rights are partly given up in return for the security pro­
vided by membership within the society. Therefore, the cit­
izen no longer had to surrender his rights to the stater "he 
315 remained sovereign in a sovereign society." Later, as 
Jefferson was asked to apply his philosophy to the writing of 
312 Brodie, Thomas Jefferson, pp. 55, 129. 
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the national constitution, he extended the concept of indi­
vidual civil liberties to include individual, sovereign 
states as they form a federal government. In order for the 
individual state to receive the advantage of more security 
against potential foreign enemies, it retained its sover-
316 eignty, yet yielded certain rights in return. 
George Mason lent his voice and considerable influ­
ence to the development of philosophical bases that provide 
foundation for church-state separation. Mason was a scholarly 
Virginia planter, much in the mold of Jefferson. Little is 
known of his philosophical background, other than its expres­
sion through his concern for human rights, and especially 
through freedom of religion. In 1784, he supported Madison's 
attack on state support for "teachers of the Christian Relig-
317 ion." In 1787, Mason attended the Philadelphia Consti­
tutional Convention, but because the main Constitutional doc­
ument did not contain a Bill of Rights, he said he would 
318 rather chop off his right hand than to sign. Madison pub­
lished a pamphlet, "Objections to the Constitution," which con­
tained the specifics of Mason's concern with the first draft. 
Mason's stand undoubtedly influenced Madison's stance toward 
support of inclusion of Amendments that were called the Bill 
of Rights. 
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James Madison (1751-1836), born in Orange County, 
Virginia, was educated at the school later called Princeton. 
Madison, who served in the Virginia Legislature, was instru­
mental in the rewording of Article XVI in George Mason's 
version of the Declaration of Rights. The young lawyer also 
served in the Continental Congress, the House of Representa­
tives, and drafted the "Memorial and Remonstrance" against 
the religious assessment bill of 1785. He attended the Vir­
ginia ratifying convention in 1788, and supported Jefferson's 
program. Madison also produced the first Bill of Rights 
which was presented in the first meeting of Congress, amend­
ing the Constitution. According to Meyers: 
Madison remained among the finest and firmest 
American voices of the eighteenth century liberal 
tradition: the tradition of natural rights and 
social impact, bills of rights and constitutional 
government. The prime article of that faith was 
embodied in the final clause of the Virginia Declara­
tion of Rights and the opening clause of the First 
Amendment ... freedom of conscience under nature1s 
distant God.319 
The same author points to the philosophical ancestors 
of Madison as Locke, Harrington, Montesquieu, Grotius, Coke, 
320 Blackstone, Bacon, Newton, and others. He possessed an 
excellent liberal education, and had access to a well-chosen 
321 library. The job of the founders of the nation was to 
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translate worthy principles into laws and institutions with 
322 the materials provided by history. 
As Madison and the other Pounding Fathers worked 
through the different aspects of republican government, it 
occurred to them that power in the hands of the majority 
could be used to oppress the minority. Madison and the 
others sought to remove such error from republican form of 
government and to give it workable structures. Madison 
thought the key to workability lay in the concept of civil 
rights. Integral to the concept was his illustration: "In a 
free government the security for civil rights must be the 
323 same as that for religious rights." 
Or as Meyers suggests, the resolution in the case of 
religious rivalries need only be a stand off: "the multi­
plicity of sects" competing for members and for recognition 
serves to keep religion out of politics. No sect can have a 
324 monopoly on political power, "nor strike out in fear," 
so the principle of voluntaryism (of the Baptists) is prac­
tical. Meyers suggests that a common core of faith somehow 
emerges from all the competition and dialogue: 
Although it would seem to be enough for Madison— 
as for Jefferson—if the political sum of the religious 
differences were zero, i.e., if private conscience were 
left strictly free to choose the God of Nature or the 
322 James Madison, The Federalist Papers (New York: 
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God of Wrath, twenty gods or none, any moral code con­
sistent with the social order and the equal rights of 
all. Even absurd or pernicious opinions can be tolerated 
as long as they are not armed with public power or embod­
ied in acts of violence.325 
In a letter to William Bradford, one of Madison's 
Princjeton colleagues, Madison reveals his changing attitude 
326 toward church and state. The letter requests a copy of 
the Pennsylvania Constitution, and expresses a deep interest 
in the founding of religious Toleration. He also put forward 
the question, Is an ecclesiastical establishment absolutely 
necessary to support civil society in a supreme government? 
327 And how far is it hurtful to a dependent state? The 
letter was the first of a series he wrote as he prepared to 
shift from the conventional view that government supported 
religion. He was not yet satisfied with the arguments for 
free inquiry at the expense of religious truth. His opinions 
showed a rapid development in his next letter to Bradford, 
in a little over a month. He said that "Ecclesiastical estab­
lishments tend to great ignorance and corruption." In the 
same letter he reported that in a neighboring county, Cul­
pepper, five or six Baptist ministers had been imprisoned for 
expressing their religious sentiments. He had made efforts 
to free them, although he did not share their faith. His 
325 Meyers, The Mind of the Founder, p. xxxii. 
326 Ralph Ketcham, James Madison, A Biography (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1971), pp. 55-56. 
327Ibid. 
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immediate concern was with the concept of "liberty of con-
328 science. Ketcham eScplains in detail: 
A Baptist elder had been jailed for praying in a 
private home and for good measure# his host was com­
mitted as well. Elijah Craig ... had been arrested 
while "at the plough," jailed and fed rye bread and 
water. At another time he was arrested in the pulpit 
.... If Madison wrote precisely when he spoke of 
religious Toleration in December 1773, and "liberty of 
conscience" . . . that his study . . . helped him from 
the condescending idea of toleration to the more liberal 
concept he was to implant in the Virginia Bill of 
Rights in June/ 1776. 
By April, Madison was telling Bradford that the men­
tal capacities of the free colonies were better than those 
that had established churches. He said, "Religious bondage 
shackles and debilitates the mind and unfits it for every 
330 noble enterprise, every expanded prospect." 
Madison's mental momentum toward unlimited civil and 
religious liberty was given further impetus through his 
careful choice of philosophical and polemical publications. 
His reading included: Adam Ferguson's An Essay on the His­
tory of Civil Society (Edinburgh, 1767); Joseph Priestly's 
An Essay on the First Principles of Government: and on the 
Nature of Political, Civil, and Religious Liberty (London , 
1768); Josiah Tucker's Tracts; Philip Furneaux's Essay on 
Toleration. It is believed that these writers helped Madison 
328 Ketcham, James Madison, p. 57. 
329 
•"^Ibid., p. 58. 
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in his intellectual move from a stance of toleration to that 
of free expression. Furneaux, for example, extends logically 
the idea of religious liberty to its rational limits by his 
argument that the state has no right whatever to restrain 
331 expressions of conscience. Whether the writers led Mad­
ison to his liberal position, or merely confirmed 
him in the notion, he utilized the same arguments as he pre­
sented his ideas in 1776, 1785, and in 1780 as he defined 
freedom of expression. 
Madison is often referred to as "the Father of the 
Constitution." Meyers agrees that he did the most of anyone 
to prepare what resulted from the Philadelphia Convention. 
His arguments helped to shape the form the federal union 
would take in such a way as to preserve the essential sov­
ereignty of the states. His arguments were repeated as the 
Constitution made its rounds among the state ratifying con­
ventions by way of his contributions to the Federalist Papers. 
Again, at the Virginia ratifying convention. The Bill of 
Rights came from his pen with some modification, but through 
support of the Bill Madison won the trust of many of those 
332 who had refused to vote for ratification. 
As a legislator, leader, and philosophical scholar 
James Madison perceived that freedom of thought and expression 
331 Ketcham, James Madison, p. 66. 
332 Meyers, The Mind of the Founder, pp. 7-8. 
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could not exist inside the bleak grey walls of the religious 
establishment. In addition, "the founder" came to realize 
that religion itself could never be free of the threat of 
coercion by the state so long as it depended upon the state 
for its legitimacy and financial support. An enlightened 
society could attain its highest destiny as a moral and pro­
ductive civilization only in proportion to its freedom from 
the shackles of intellectual and religious controls. 
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CHAPTER III 
SHAPE OF THE CONTROVERSY 
The conclusion of the Revolutionary War brought to 
a head need for unification of the former colonies into a 
single government. The Continental Congress took steps lead­
ing to a written constitution. Prominent among issues that 
emerged from constitutional formulation was separation of 
church and state. Although the Constitution practically 
excluded the separation question, the Bill of Rights stated 
flatly that "Congress shall make no law respecting the estab­
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof. Instead of resolving the church-state question 
for all time, inclusion in the Bill of Rights assured prom­
inence in the Constitutional debate characteristic of the 
democratic experience. The controversy became national 
in 1789.2 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS 
Use of a written covenant or compact was customary 
by early American colonists. Many looked toward Magna Carta 
1U. S., Constitution, Amendments, Article I. 
2 William Warren Sweet, Religion in the Development 
of American Culture 1765-1840 (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1952), pp. 50ff. 
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and the English Bill of Rights for inspiration. John Locke's 
theories suggested since revolution nullifies previous com­
pacts, men become free to make new ones. Most ̂ tate consti­
tutions predate the federal constitution and seven state 
3 constitutions contained separate bills of rights. The Con­
gress had managed to operate during the war under the Art­
icles of Confederation. The articles were a temporary legal-
4 ization of the Confederacy. 
The ad hoc government that served during the Revolu­
tion was considered powerless to hold together or administrate 
the new nation. Congress was given no power to enforce tax 
collection. It, therefore, had no credibility among the 
states beyond an advisory status. The states had permitted 
the loose organization limited status, but enforcement was 
beyond its scope. To the credit of Congress, it passed endur­
ing and significant educational legislation. The Northwest 
Land Ordinance of 1785 provided for proceeds of government 
land sales to be applied to the national debt. One section 
of each township was set aside for the benefit of public 
education. James Madison was appalled that the original 
draft proposed another section be set aside for the support 
3 Alfred H. Kelley and Winfred A. Harbison, The Amer-
ican Constitution (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 
1963), pp. 95f. 
4Ibid., p. 101. 
5 Thomas A. Bailey, The American Pageant: A History 
of the Republic (Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1967), p. 133. 
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g 
of the clergy. The proposal was defeated, but that it was 
proposed, augured the religious question would emerge a 
viable political issue. 
Without radical revision, Congress, existing under 
Articles of Confederation, could not function as a national 
government. At war's conclusion, Congress and the states 
possessed a revolutionary mandate to provide a structure for 
governing the nation. A crucial crossroads had been reached 
prior to call for a convention. The words of Madison reveal 
the sorry state of the nation's affairs as he wrote to Gov­
ernor Edmund Randolph of Virginia: 
Our situation is becoming every day more and more 
critical. No money comes into the federal treasury; 
no respect is paid to the federal authority: and people 
of reflection unanimously agree that the existing con­
federacy is tottering to its foundation. Many individ­
uals of weight, particularly in the eastern district 
are suspected of leaning toward monarchy. Other indi­
viduals predict a partition of the states in two or more 
confederacies. It is pretty certain that if some radi­
cal amendment cannot be revised and introduced, one 
or another of these revolutions ... will take place.̂  
Pressures catalogued by Mr. Madison produced a call 
from Congress to the states for representatives to meet for 
the purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation. On 
May 25, 1787, fifty-five delegates from thirteen states 
assembled in Philadelphia and convened the first constitutional 
Leo Pfeffer, Church, State & Freedom (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1967), p. 120. 
7 Frank Donovan, Mr. Madison's Constitution, the 
Story Behind the Constitutional Convention (New York: Dodd, 
Mead & Co., 1965), p. 8. 
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8 convention. In Philadelphia were assembled some of the 
best minds in America: George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, 
James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton. Thomas Jefferson was 
in Europe, with John Adams, but their influence was reflect­
ed in the final document. 
Early in the proceedings the Articles of Confedera­
tion were scrapped in favor of an entirely new constitution. 
The document emerged after a period of seventeen weeks and 
was submitted to the states for ratification. As the proposed 
constitution made its rounds, most recurring of objections 
to ratification was the absence of a bill of rights. By 1787 
most state constitutions embodied specific guarantees for 
protection of individual liberties. An attempt for a federal 
bill of rights during the convention by George Mason of Vir­
ginia, failed unanimously. The chief argument in justifying 
the omission was expressed by Alexander Hamilton in The 
Federalist: 
. . .  b i l l  o f  r i g h t s  . . .  a r e  n o t  o n l y  u n n e c e s s a r y  
in the proposed Constitution, but would even be danger­
ous. They would contain various exceptions to powers 
•which are not granted; and on this very account, would 
afford a colorable pretext to claim more than granted. 
For why declare that things should not be done which 
there is no power to do? [He added]. ... The Consti­
tution is itself ... a bill of rights.^ 
Q 
Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, The Amer­
ican Constitution: Its Origins and Development, 3rd. 
ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1963), p. 115. 
Q 
Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers (New York: 
The New American Library, Inc~ 1961), pp. 513-515. 
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Hamilton's reasoning rested upon the assumption of 
the continued control of the government by the people: 
"Here in strictness the people surrender nothing; and as they 
retain everything they have no need of particular reserva­
tions. Colleagues Jefferson and Madison did not agree. 
Jefferson maintained a constant stream of correspondence 
with Madison from Paris, in which he dealt explicitly with 
the instrument produced by the constitutional assembly. A 
point of great concern centered upon failure of the conven­
tion to express explicitly: 
. . . without the aid of sophisms ... freedom of 
religion, freedom of the press. . . the eternal and 
unremitting force of the habeas corpus laws, and 
trials by jury. . . . Let me add that a bill of rights 
is what the people are entitled to against every gov­
ernment on earth. 
Jefferson's subsequent letters dealt with the subject 
of a bill of rights in more detail. After giving careful 
thought as to the provisions of a bill of rights, Jefferson 
offered a seriatim rebuttal to Madison's reasons against 
12 inclusion of a bill of rights. 
Madison spent months making rounds to ratifying con­
ventions as an observer and participant. In fall of 1787, 
"̂ Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, p. 513. 
T̂o James Madison, Paris, December 20, 1787, The 
Works of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul Leicester Ford (New 
York: [no publisher listed] , 1904), V, 371. 
12 To Madison, Paris, July 31, 1788, Ibid., V, 426; 
To Madison, Paris, August 28, 1789, Ibid., V, 492. 
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supporters of the Constitution (the Federalists) saw evidence 
of hopes for easy passage and early ratification slipping 
away. State by state Federalists experienced uncertainty. 
Madison undertook to exercise persuasive powers by defending 
the Constitution both through personal confrontation and by 
the pen. Madison visited Mount Vernon and solicited and 
received the clearly stated support of George Washington on 
13 behalf of constitutional passage. 
Among others whom Madison successfully persuaded 
was an influential Baptist, the Reverend John Leland. Leland 
shared Jefferson's concern for a specifically stated bill of 
rights, especially for religious freedom. Madison had been 
concerned during the convention that premature insertion of 
amendments would effect the scuttling of the entire govern­
ment. However, Leland secured Madison's agreement to press 
for an amendment concerning religious freedom in return for 
14 the Baptist's considerable support and influence. 
Madison participated in another campaign tactic which 
proved effective - The Federalist. A collaborative publica­
tion effort on the part of John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and 
James Madison, The Federalist Papers produced invaluable com­
mentary on the proposed Constitution. Published in serial 
13 Ralph Ketcham, James Madison, A Biography (New 
York: Macmillan Co., 1971), pp. 248-50. 
14Ibid., p. 251. 
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form, the material dealt entirely with the proposed new gov­
ernment, article by article. Appearing under the pseudonym 
of "Publius," the federalist case was strengthened by a 
clearly-stated case for ratification. The Federalist was 
collected into a one-volume edition and circulated prior to 
15 the convening of the new Congress. 
Madison's position underwent a metamorphosis during 
the campaign for the Constitution's ratification. In the 
beginning, Madison assumed powers granted in the Constitution 
were an automatic guarantee of personal liberties. Also he 
feared too much specificity might lead to the loss or denial 
of some rights. Madison at last came to advocate passage of 
a bill of rights. 
Upon realization that English law was valid to a 
point, an American Bill of Rights would insure individuals 
against tyranny of the legislative, as well as the executive. 
Under British law, however, a bill of rights protected against 
the executive only. Furthermore, freedoms of speech and of 
17 conscience had come to mean more in America than in England. 
The enlarged concepts were stated in language applicable to 
18 the nature of the Republic, which rests upon the people. 
The bill defined limits of the legislative, and insured that 
15 Ketcham, James Madison, p. 239. 
16Ibid., p. 290. 17Ibid. 18Ibid. 
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the rights of the minority were secure against oppression by 
19 the majority. 
Once sufficient states had approved the newly-formed 
Constitution, the government was organized; an executive was 
chosen, and a quorum of Congress met in its first session. 
Congress opened business on April 8, 1789. It was early May, 
however, before James Madison served notice concerning amend­
ment proposals. Madison proposed amendments sifted from notes 
and summaries gathered at state ratifying conventions. The 
amendments were appropriately seasoned with his particular 
Madisonian philosophy and colored with the rich hues of Jef-
fersonian idealism.̂  
States with strong constituencies of established 
churches were loathe to devise a strong statement setting 
forth religious freedom: 
New Englanders intent on preventing Congressional 
interference with their state-supported churches, and 
others who still cherished government assistance to 
religion in general, sought a clause on religious 
liberty merely prohibiting establishment of a national 
religion and restraining Congress from prescribing 
articles of faith or a mode of worship.21 
Madison's predilection of writing amendments which 
had support of a majority of people in the states, made a 
Bill of Rights a practical reality. Twelve amendments were 
submitted to the states, and ten were ratified. The Bill of 
19 Ketcham, James Madison, p. 290. 
20Ibid., p. 291. 21Ibid. 
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Rights, through the approval of two-thirds of the states, 
was embedded forever in the Constitution. The article con­
cerning religion in the First Amendment reads: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an estab­
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.22 
The language fulfilled perfectly the goal of Madison 
and Jefferson: "Absolute separation of church and state and 
23 total exclusion of government aid to religion." Madison's 
intent is clarified by his words concerning the census of 
1790: 
As to those who are employed in teaching ... the 
duties of religion, there may be some indelicacy in 
singling them out, as the central government is pro­
scribed from interfering in any matter whatever, in 
matters respecting religion. . . .24 
While serving as President in 1811, Madison vetoed 
the granting of a parcel of government land to a Baptist 
Church in Salem, Mississippi. He said in explanation: 
The Bill ... comprises a principle and a prece­
dent for the appropriation of funds of the United 
States for the use and support of religious socie­
ties. . . .5 
Thomas Jefferson had the most enduring effect upon inter­
pretation of the First Amendment. In a letter to the Dan-
bury, Connecticut Baptists Association, he wrote: 
22 Kelley and Harbison, The American Constitution, 
Appendix 2, p. 1010. 
23 Irving Brant, James Madison, Father of the Consti­
tution, 1787-1800 (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1950), 
p.272. 
24 25  ̂Ibid. Ibid. 
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Religion is a matter which lies solely between man 
and his God, that he owes account to none other for his 
faith or worship, that the legitimate powers of govern­
ment reach actions only, and not opinion. I contemplate 
with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American 
people which declared that their legislature should 
make "no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus build­
ing a wall of separation between church and state.26 
The final phrase has been picked up by disputants 
within the controversy and used as a term to describe an 
actual or an ideal condition or relationship of church and 
state. Perhaps the most accurate and revealing historical 
truth lies in the First Amendment as a means of "building" 
the "wall" between the two institutions of society. There 
was no solid "wall" at the time of Jefferson's presidency, 
although a trend toward disestablishment was growing in the 
states. Insertion of Jefferson's opinion into statements and 
opinions of twentieth century decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court tend to magnify the importance of the Founder's 
ideas. The constitutional principle which lay at the heart 
of the First Amendment meant simply, freedom of religion, 
the heart of Jeffersonian philosophy. His words are not to 
be used as a cudgel against religion or a particular denomi­
nation. Dumas Malone sums up Jefferson's motives this way: 
He was no Voltaire, no Thomas Paine. If he was 
ever drawn into an attack on any Church it was not 
because it was a religious organization, but because 
26 To Danbury Baptist Association, January 1, 1802, 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Edited by Andrew A. Lipscomb 
and Albert E. Bergh (Washington: Memorial Edition, 1903-1904), 
XVI, 281-82. 
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it had assumed a political character, or because it 
limited, in some way or another, the freedom of the 
mind—on which, as he never ceased to believe, the 
progress of the human species toward happiness de­
pends . ̂ 7 
The history of the controversy over public support 
of higher education comes to rest at the feet of Jefferson, 
sharply accenting treatment time has afforded this vital 
constitutional principle. How one construes "the wall" deter­
mines to a great extent the position one assumes in the con­
troversy. Some commentators quote the Jefferson statement 
as authoritative, others argue discounting it as "metaphor." 
Other writers ignore the concept altogether. 
CONSTITUTIONAL SYNTHESIS 
The time span between creation of the Constitution 
and synthesis into jurisprudence of constituent American 
states was a lengthy and complex interim. Limited dispute 
was made over condition of religious freedom in the states 
through the nineteenth century. Guaranties of the First Amend­
ment were held by courts to apply only to Congress. If James 
Madison had had his way in the Senate in 1789, the First 
Amendment would have then been binding on the states. However, 
pro-establishment forces prevailed. Brant explains: 
Consequently the guaranty of religious freedom did 
not become binding on the states until after the Four­
teenth Amendment forbade them to deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 
27 Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time, Jefferson 
and the Rights of Man (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 
1951), II, 111. 
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Religious liberty, as defined in the First Amendment, 
was held by the Supreme Court to fall within that pro­
tection. 28 
Both Jefferson and Madison were consistent in their 
hard-line position for absolute separation of church and 
state. Their statements undoubtedly had considerable influ­
ence upon the states. Eventually, by 1833, total disestab­
lishment was a reality in the states. The influence is evi­
dent in the wording of state constitutions of the period, 
which were more explicit than the national instrument. The 
Supreme Court acknowledged Jefferson's term, "wall of sepa­
ration," as "an authoritative declaration of the scope and 
29 effect of the amendment." The notion of separation was not 
entirely property of the Pounding Fathers. The states assumed 
themselves to accomplish what had been impossible through 
Congress. The pattern of disestablishment is clarified 
somewhat when charted chronologically, as seen in Table 1 
(page 117). The chart displays a persistent movement toward 
30 disestablishment from 1775 through 1833. The figures do 
not reveal that non-established churches had been allowed 
right to worship without harassment in most states. Although 
the public no longer paid taxes for church support, some 
28 Brant, James Madison, p. 273. 
29 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,164 
(1878). 
30 Bailey, The American Pageant, p. 75. 
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Table 1 
Established (Tax-Supported) Churches* 
in the Colonies 1775 
Massachusetts 
(incl. Maine) 
Connecticut 
New Hampshire 
Rhode Island 
New York 
New Jersey 
Delaware 
Pennsylvania 
Maryland 
Virginia 
North Carolina 
South Carolina 
Georgia 
CONGREGATIONAL 
NONE 
When Disestablished 
1888 
1818 
1819 
ANGLICAN (in N. Y. City and 
in three neighboring counties) 
NONE 
ANGLICAN 
(Note the persistence of the Congregational 
establishment in New England; also, there 
was no Roman Catholic Establishment in any 
of the colonies.) 
1777 
1777 
1786 
1776 
1778 
1777 
*Bailey, The American Pageant, is the source of these 
dates, p. 75. 
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states retained a religious test for public officials, and 
all church property was declared tax-exempt. 
Disestablishment fulfilled popular sentiment, for 
until the Fourteenth Amendment was passed in 1868, there was 
no provision in the Constitution to prevent: (1) re-
establishment of a religion, (2) the new establishment, 
or (3) the limiting of religious expression. Leo Pfeffer 
attributes movement toward disestablishment to the "unitary 
31 principle of separation and freedom." He maintains that 
it "was as integral a part of American democracy as republi-
32 canism, representative government and freedom of expression." 
He further asserts that by 1868 synthesis between the First 
Amendment principles and the attitude of the American people 
33 toward church and state had been "finally established." 
Pfeffer's statement makes the point that "separation" had 
become a basic ingredient in American life. Disestablishment 
did not, however, end distrust or bigotry, nor draw an end to 
controversy in religion, or between religions. Pluralistic 
accommodation which accompanied disestablishment meant that 
some religions were generally accepted, while others bore the 
brunt of second-class citizenship. Synthesis would be aided, 
in time, by the application of the Fourteenth Amendment, but 
such adjustment was far from complete in 1868. 
31 Leo Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom, rev. ed. 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 142. 
32Ibid. 33Ibid. 
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THE CATHOLIC INFLUX 
Possibly hastening action of the states toward dis­
establishment was an incursion of great numbers of Roman 
Catholics from Ireland and Eastern Europe. Americans were 
culturally unprepared to welcome Catholics under terms other 
than those consistent with philosophies found in the Federal 
Constitution. Those ideas which had molded and colored the 
American dream, rejected traditions of coercion and repres­
sion which many Catholic newcomers and their prelates rep­
resented. Immigrants retained customs, languages, and 
Catholic education in the schools. Immigrant poverty 
provided concern to the Puritan ethic. Catholics clustered 
34 together in ghettos and grew in number. 
Although the First Amendment was not specifically 
directed against Catholicism, its provisions contradicted a 
number of Catholic principles. Native-born Americans had cer­
tain expectations of the newcomers. Primarily, immigrants 
were expected to be hard-working, thrifty, honest, and to 
assimilate democratic ideals. It was thought one could not 
accomplish all that by keeping to one's self, retaining old 
customs, old languages; even the old religion was suspect. 
Catholics were expected to send their children to public 
34 Samuel Eliot Morison, Henry Steele Commager, and 
William E. Leuchtenberg, The Growth of the American Repub­
lic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), I, 452. ~ 
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school where the young could be properly indoctrinated with 
35 rules of living in a democratic society. 
Early in the century, Bishop John Hughes of New York 
led a fight for aid to Catholic parochial schools on the 
basis that public schools were actually Protestant and anti-
Catholic in nature. He met with failure and thus began the 
church's own system of schools, separate from the public 
36 school system. 
Anti-Catholicism escalated from the level of paper 
and pulpit propaganda into violent mob action. Nativists 
and "Know Nothings" assumed the responsibility for organized 
resistance to the Vatican in the United States. On August 10, 
1834, the Reverend Lyman Beecher preached three anti-Catholic 
sermons. On the following day a mob burned an Ursuline con-
37 vent. In Philadelphia two Catholic churches were destroyed, 
and people were killed on both sides, as Christian once again 
killed Christian. The Civil War provided a temporary lull in 
the nativist movement, giving way for a time to the aboli-
38 tionist cause. 
35 Morison, Commager, and Leuchtenberg, The Growth 
of the American Republic, I, 452. 
36 Edwin Scott Gaustad, A Religious History of 
America (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966), 
pp. 212-13. 
37 Thomas T. McAvoy, C.S.C., A History of the Cath­
olic Church in the United States (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), p. 134. 
38 Gaustad, Religious History, p. 209. 
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In the political sense, Roman Catholic leadership did 
little to dispel concerns of Americans. Pope Gregory XVI 
(1831-1846) published in 1832 an encyclical that added fuel 
to the pamphleteers' fire. He said: 
. . .  F r o m  t h a t  p o l l u t e d  f o u n t a i n  o f  i n d i f f e r e n c e  
flows that absurd and erroneous doctrine, or rather 
raving, in favor and in defense of liberty of conscience, 
for which most pestilential error the course is opened 
by the entire and wild liberty of opinion, which is 
The above words seem directed at philosophies support­
ing the American and French Revolutions, but to the American 
whose memories contained the struggle for independence and 
more recent debates concerning the shape the Republic would 
40 take, the Pope exacerbated religious ferment. As if 
Gregory's words were not enough, his successor, Pius IX, 
published in December, 1864, the Syllabus of Errors as a 
41 supplement to the encyclical, Quanta Cura. Among the 
eighty headings were included what the Pope considered the 
errors of the time. 
The Pontiff rejected as error, claims that the 
church had overreached itself by inserting its influence in 
secular affairs, and by the utilization of temporal force. 
39 Elwyn A. Smith, Religious Liberty: The Develop­
ment of Church and State Thought Since the Revolutionary 
Era (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), p. 103. 
40_, . , Ibid. 
41 Latourette, A History of Christianity, pp. 1099-
H00. 
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He rejected also the idea that the civil power should have 
full control over the education of youth even in Christian 
states: that public schools should be free of the authority 
42 of the clergy. Pius would not accept the concept that 
church and state should be separated, or that moral and civil 
codes should be separated from religious authority. Odious 
to the Pope also was the concept of majority rule—"superior­
ity of numbers." Pius IX saw no reason for disestablishment 
or toleration, especially where the Roman Church was the 
43 established institution. 
Latourette1s analysis of the Syllabus helps to place 
light upon the source of so much disquiet in America, over 
the pronouncements that came from the Vatican. He says: 
. . .  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  P i u s  I X  w a s  h o l d i n g  t o  t h e  
position which the Roman Catholic Church had been taking 
for centuries in its conflict with the state, in its 
claim to be the sole custodian of saving truth, in its 
struggle against what it regarded as heresies, and in 
its efforts to shape youth and direct the lives of 
Christians. The area of conflict had broadened.44 
When the Pope1s words were translated into actions 
of local Catholic priests and laymen, it appeared that 
America1s pattern of religious liberty was incompatible with 
45 Roman Catholicism. Papal decrees ultimately took away lay 
control of church property, and the right for the local 
42 Latourette, A History of Christianity, pp. 1099-1100. 
4*3 44 
Ibid. Ibid., p. 1101. 
45 
Ibid., p. 1098. 
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congregations to choose their priest. Such tight external 
46 control seemed to be tyrannical, and therefore un-American. 
Bishops in 1857 reacted to the American viewpoint in a pas­
toral letter, strongly objecting to Catholic treatment as 
citizens. Catholic leaders complained about state inter­
ference with the Catholic requirement that the bishop, not 
the trustees, own church property; that priests and nuns 
were not allowed to teach in public schools; and finally 
47 expressed their side of the aid to education question. 
They objected to: 
The force resorted to compel Catholic children in 
such (public) institutions to attend Protestant worship 
and to receive Protestant instruction, and the pre­
venting of such children attending Catholic worship . . . 
the hardship of compelling Catholics to contribute to 
the support of free schools which they conscientiously 
believe bad in system and which are Protestant in their 
textbooks. . . Compelling Catholics to contribute by 
tax, to school libraries representing the Catholic 
religion as false ... The exclusion of Catholics from 
being actually represented pro-rata in legislative 
bodies.48 
Catholic strategy consistently involved removing 
Protestant influence from public schools and lobbying for 
financial support of parochial schools. Nineteenth century 
Catholics concentrated upon development of a parochial school 
system. Late in the century the Pope required each parish 
46 Gaustad, Religious History, p. 211. 
47Ibid., p. 1100. 
48 McAvoy, A History of the Catholic Church, pp. 181-82. 
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to provide a school which would make Catholic religion the 
core of their teaching. In opposition, states were obliged 
to remove all vestiges of religious expression from public 
49 schools, thus abandoning them to neutrality, or secularism. 
The reason that the issue has endured over the span 
of a century and a half turns on the core of the matter. 
Smith's understanding of the difficulty between the partici­
pants in the controversy lies in the realm of civil liber­
ties. He says: 
The touchstone of Freedom was conscience. If con­
science should be taken captive by the spirit of dogma, 
restrictive education, authoritative rule or coercion, 
freedom would die. Here was America's precise and most 
elemental quarrel with Roman Catholicism: in the Ameri­
can view—not solely the Protestant view, much less 
than that of a tiny band of propagandists—the Catholic 
conscience, both in principle and in fact was captive 
to the pope.50 
It was assumed Protestantism had given birth to 
republicanism in government: Catholicism reflected the sup­
port of the old monarchial tyrannies, and had no understand-
51 mg or appreciation of civil liberties. It seemed per­
fectly logical to men like Lyman Beecher that in order for 
Catholics to understand the meaning of America they should 
52 be assimilated in the "common schools." The Jeffersonian 
basis for a republic such as the United States depends upon 
49 McAvoy, A History of the Catholic Church, pp. 181-82. 
50 Smith, Religious Liberty, p. 101. 
5lIbid., p. 105. 52lbid. 
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an "enlightened" citizenry. Therefore, it is required for 
the citizens to learn the meaning of great documents, such 
53 as the Constitution. In addition, they are to be permitted 
freedom of thought and expression, so that the Republic may 
54 continually renew itself. Reluctance on the part of the 
Catholics to "mingle" with the natives promoted the suspicion 
that they were indeed subject politically to a foreign power 
and therefore could not be trusted to become "good citi-
..55 zens." 
BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES 
Passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 provided 
the first step toward application of the Bill of Rights to 
states. The amendment was particularly important with regard 
to the First Amendment. The measure placed limitations upon 
the states with regard to the securing of the natural rights 
of citizens through due process. Concern for the rights of 
the individual (Madison, supra, p. 104) surfaced through the 
new amendment. Though over seventy years passed before the 
principle of absorption permitted the First Amendment to become 
legally operative in the several states, application of the 
test of reasonableness would require that the guaranty of 
civil freedoms be extended to include religious freedom. The 
53 Smith, Religious Liberty, p. 101. 
54 55 
Ibid. 33Ibid. 
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critical clause in the Fourteenth Amendment deals with "due 
process" and "equal protection of the laws." It states: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property without due pro­
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its juris­
diction the equal protection of the laws.56 
The Fourteenth Amendment emerged as the product of 
generations of dispute, controversy, and war over the nature 
of the Union. The old antifederalist arguments had compacted 
into states'rights positions. In his final decision, Chief 
Justice John Marshall ruled the Bill of Rights could not be 
applied to states. It was the Court's contention that the 
Constitution was framed for the government of all the peo­
ple, but did not pertain to the states unless specifically 
57 stated. The result of the decision was to keep such cases 
in state courts for a considerable portion of the century. 
Marshall's successor, Justice Catron, held that in 
the case of religious liberties against a city ordinance, 
protection is "left to the state constitutions and laws; nor 
is there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the 
58 United States in respect to the states.11 
56 Kelley and Harbison, The American Constitution, 
Article XIV, Section 1, p. 1013. 
57 Barron v. Baltimore 
58 Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, 
3 Howard (44 U. S.) 589 (1845): 14. 
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The nation, in 1857, was far different from 1789. 
Social and political forces began to lay their disputes at 
the door of the Supreme Court. Retreat to the letter of the 
Constitution for justification of decisions was becoming more 
difficult. Although the Dred Scott case may be a poor exam­
ple of justice, it provides a turning point in the manner in 
59 which the Court dealt with the cases that came before it. 
Chief Justice Taney based his opinion upon preconceived 
social and political ideas, instead of the Constitution. In 
addition to its social philosophy, it vetoed an act of Con­
gress based on that stance. The ivil ar was fought before 
the Fourteenth Amendment was passed which rendered the deci­
sion null and void. 
The Fourteenth Amendment became the instrument whereby 
the Bill of Rights placed limitations upon states with regard 
to liberties that had been promised in the founding of the 
nation. The Amendment became the keystone to the unification 
of the states under a Constitution consistent with its philo­
sophical foundations.̂  ̂
The first cases that were brought before the Supreme 
Court, pleading the protections of the Bill of Rights under 
the due process and free exercise clauses of the Fourteenth 
59 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 Howard (393) 1857. 
60 Kelley and Harbison, The American Constitution, 
p. 504. 
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Amendment, were rebuffed. In the Slaughterhouse Cases, the 
Court maintained the historic narrow position of previous 
years, which denied the application of the Bill of Rights in 
61 State matters. Due process, however, experienced a gradual 
emergence as case after case came before the Justices over 
the years. The position that the other amendments were 
absorbed under the Fourteenth came into its own in the mid-
6 2 twentieth century. 
Attention was focused, for a time, on the First Amend­
ment. In 1876, threat of the emerging strength of Catholics 
in the East prompted President Grant to speak out against 
tax support of sectarian schools. The House of Representa­
tives moved rapidly under leadership of James G. Blaine to 
amend the First Amendment to read: 
No state shall make any law respecting an estab­
lishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any state 
for the support of public schools, or derived from any 
public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted there­
to .. . shall ever be under the control of any religious 
sect. . . nor shall any money so raised or lands so 
devoted be divided between religious sects or denomi­
nations. 64 
61 Kelley and Harbison, The American Constitution, 
pp. 502f. 
62Ibid., p. 506. 
6 3 Anson Phelps Stokes, Church and State in the 
United States (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950), Vol. II, 
p. 722. 
64 U. S., Congressional Record, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., 
(1876), IV, 5245, 5246, 5595. 
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The House passed the motion overwhelmingly, but when 
it reached the Senate, there was insufficient support for 
passage. The measure died. However, a number of states 
including New York, adopted the wording in their constitu­
tions, and some of the "Blaines" persist to the present. 
One of the laments of those who are encouraging pub­
lic support of church-related colleges, is that the state 
constitutions, in many instances, are more specific in the 
exclusion of public funds for education than is the First 
Amendment. Public pressure, however, has caused some states 
to change their Constitutions in recent years, simply for the 
purpose of allowing aid.̂  ̂
The historical record does little to clarify the orig­
inal intent of the Fourteenth Amendment. Neither a study of 
debates which produced it, nor historical narrative, reveal the 
full intent of its creators. The importance for contemporary 
America, therefore, lies not in its origins, but in the use 
to which the courts have assigned it: the implementation of 
the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the United States.̂  
The Fourteenth Amendment has made it possible for this nation 
to utilize an eighteenth century document written in the 
context of a medieval past, and modify it through interpre­
tations that render it as current as the present moment. 
®̂ See following chapters four and five. 
66 Michael R. Smith and Joseph E. Bryson, Church-State 
Relations; The Legality of Using Public Funds for Religious 
Schools (Topeka, Ka.: National Organization on Legal Problems 
of Education, 1972), p. 19. 
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EMERGENCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
William Warren Sweet sees emergence of higher educa­
tion as a transition from the ancient Greeks, preserved by 
the church through the Middle Ages to its apex in the Age 
of the Universities. From there it came to America by way 
6 7 of Paris, Oxford, and Cambridge. John S. Brubaker and 
Willis Rudy describe the phenomenon as a synthesis of the old 
traditions and the "native American conditions" that emerged 
6 8 as "a unique system of education." • That system democratized 
an institution that had been previously reserved for the 
wealthy and titled, and made it available for the first time 
to the great American middle class. 
New England provided the first colleges sponsored by 
sectarian interests which were primarily concerned with the 
training of ministers and teachers for the perpetuation of 
the denomination. The curriculum rigidly emphasized religion 
and the classics to the exclusion of science until mid-
century developments made liberal inroads in the curriculum. 
During the colonial era, nine colleges were begun. 
Table 2 (page 131) displays in chart form the origins and 
control of the nine. Harvard was the first, with other New 
6 7 Sweet, Religion, p. 162. 
68 John S. Brubaker and Willis Rudy, Higher Educa­
tion in Transition: A History of American Colleges and Uni­
versities 1636-1976 (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 
1976), p. 3. 
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Table 2 
Colonial Colleges* 
Name Location Open or 
Pounded 
Denomination 
Harvard Cambridge, Mass. 1636 Congregational 
William and Mary- Williamsburg, Va. 1693 Anglican 
Yale New Haven, Conn. 1701 Congregational 
Princeton 
(College of 
New Jersey) 
Princeton, N. J. 1746 Presbyterian 
Pennsylvania 
(The Academy) 
Philadelphia 1751 Non-sectarian 
Columbia 
(King's College) 
New York City 1754 Anglican 
Brown 
(Rhode Island) 
Providence, R. I. 1764 Baptist 
Rutgers 
(Queen's College) 
New Brunswick, N.J. 1766 Dutch Reformed 
Dartmouth Hanover, N. H. 1769 Congregational 
*Bailey, The American Pageant , P. 77. 
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England sectarian colleges following in rapid succession. 
In Philadelphia, the Academy (later the University of Pennsyl­
vania) was the lone non-sectarian college of the period. 
Benjamin Franklin's struggle with the Presbyterians centered 
69 about the Academy which he founded. They were at odds with 
Franklin concerning the philosophical stance of the Academy. 
At the outset his intent was to avoid any monopoly of any 
single religious sect. His emphasis was to be upon science 
and basic morality, not religion. 
Yet, his associates managed to inject religion 
into the charter of the Academy. ... He was determined 
that the school would never suffer from denominationalism 
and sought out a rector who was an educator and a moral­
ist, rather than a religious partisan.70 
Harvard, Yale, and Princeton used as prototypes 
Emmanuel College, Cambridge, "the most Puritan of the Cam-
71 bridge colleges," and the alma mater of John Harvard. 
William and Mary began with a royal grant of 12,000fc 
from its namesakes, King William III and Mary Stuart. Later 
income was supplemented from taxes on the fur trade and the 
tobacco industry. Connecticut provided Yale with proceeds 
from a prize ship, and Massachusetts divided bank taxes among 
Harvard, Bowdoin, and Williams. In addition, the colonies, 
69 Melvin H. Buxbaum, Benjamin Franklin and the 
Zealous Presbyterians (University Park, Pa.: Penn State 
Press, 1975), p. 156. 
71 Sweet, Religion, p. 162. 
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and later states, gave tax exemptions to the colleges, as 
well as direct financial supplements. Harvard benefited in 
direct tax grants from the colony of Massachusetts the sum 
of $115,797.73.72 
There is no controversy concerning that some precedent 
exists for the receipt of public monies by private and church-
controlled colleges and universities. The practice was consis­
tent with initial close ties of education, religion, and 
government. The tendency persisted as a rare exception. One 
Catholic partisan, Virgil Blum, S. J., has managed to isolate 
a list of isolated instances where private education was 
73 assisted by government. Blum argues that this kind of giv­
ing was not unusual throughout the nineteenth century into 
the early twentieth. He cites the following instances of the 
trickle of public money falling into the hands of sectarian 
74 institutions: 
Union (Presbyterian) College received from New York 
a total of $350,000 over a period of twenty years, from 1795 
through 1815: Columbian (Baptist) College, received land 
grants in 1832, and in 1833, Georgetown (Catholic) College 
received a grant of real estate, from the federal government. 
72 Brubaker and Rudy, Higher Education in Transition, 
p. 36. 
73 Virgil C. Blum, Freedom in Education, Federal Aid 
for All Children (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 
1965), p. 103. 
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New York assisted the Baptists and Unitarians through aid to 
the colleges of Rochester and St. Lawrence. In 1870, Congress 
voted a grant to Wilberforce (Methodist) University: and in 
1909, McPherson (Lutheran-Baptist) College was the beneficiary 
of $62,000 in tax money. The same year, St. Olaf (Lutheran) 
75 received $13,000 in city tax funds. 
These gifts reflect a genuine desire on the part of 
the contributors to encourage, for the public good, the insti­
tutions of higher learning. The connection was not always 
made between assistance of church-related schools and the 
constitutional prohibition of the establishment of religion. 
Private support and tuition was the general source 
of sustenance for private higher education during the last 
century. During colonial times, not all tuitions or gifts 
were paid in currency. It was not unusual to witness a 
young man riding up to the door of his college on a wagon 
loaded with sacks of grain, or a bale of cotton. There are 
records of tuition paid in kind with sheep and pewter. 
Promissory notes were often signed in lieu of tuition, long 
76 before the custom became institutionalized. 
The initial growth occurred in the private sector 
and the pattern persisted throughout the bulk of the nine­
teenth century. Successive religious revivals coupled with 
75 Blum, Freedom in Education, p. 103. " • 
76 Brubaker and Rudy, Higher Education in Transition, 
pp. 36-37. 
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the westward movement of the population and the advent of 
industrial growth in the West produced a proliferation of 
77 small colleges along the cutting edge of the frontier. 
Brubaker depicts the situation of "an oversupply of struggling 
colleges of meager income and limited curriculums." He goes 
on to describe conditions of lowered standards as a conse­
quence of the lack of funds and "educational mismanagement." 
He adds finally the predictable comment, "Mortality was very 
, . , ii 78 high." 
Contributing to this growth immeasurably was the 
knowledge by the founders that the college was inviolable 
from state interference, or takeover. The issue was settled 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Dartmouth 
79 case. Dartmouth was a private church-related college 
(Congregational) which had been faced with the prospect of a 
80 state takeover through a pretext of its charter revocation. 
In 1769, King George II had granted trustees of the institu­
tion a charter under the English constitution. However, the 
colonial governor was allowed an ex officio seat on the Board 
of Trustees. The controversy resulted in revocation of the 
charter by the State Legislature. The Legislature added a 
77 Brubaker and Rudy, Higher Education, pp. 36-37. 
78Ibid. 
79 Dartmouth v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518 (U.S.1819). 
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large number of partisan members to the Board, thereby enab­
ling New Hampshire to control the school. In 1816, the "old 
trustees/' having lost in the state court, appealed to the U. S. 
Supreme Court. It was the Court's opinion that the charter 
comprised a proper contract under the Federal Constitution. 
The Court also held that the Legislature1s act converted a 
"literary institution" controlled by "literary men into a 
machine entirely subservient to the will of the govern-
81 ment. ..." Chief Justice Marshall concluded: 
. . .  T h e  a c t s  o f  t h e  L e g i s l a t u r e  o f  N e w  H a m p s h i r e  
... are repugnant to the Constitution of the United 
States; and the judgement in this verdict ought to have 
been for the plaintiff. 
The Court reversed the decision of the New Hampshire 
83 Supreme Court in a five to one decision. The question of 
church-state establishment was not at issue in the case to 
the degree that the Justices felt obligated to discuss it. 
However, from the vantage point of educational history, the 
effect of the case touches on dimensions of freedom of 
expression, and autonomy of operation, which fall under the 
First Amendment. 
A number of economic effects have been mentioned as 
resulting from the Dartmouth case. Traditionally, it opened 
81 
Dartmouth v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518 (U.S. 1819). 
82 Clark Spurlock. Education and the Supreme Court 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1955), p. 26. 
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the way for permanent endowments, as well as encouraged 
growth in private and church-related colleges. Clark Spur-
lock, however, maintains that the growth would probably have 
84 occurred without the court decision. He draws his inference 
from such factors as the beginnings of American industrial 
growth, the New England Renaissance, and the humanitarian 
revolt. He also noted the increase in population through 
85 birth and immigration. He says: 
So it may be conjectured, with these influences 
prevailing, there would have been a marked extension 
of the prevailing denominational and private schools 
without Chief Justice Marshall's helpful decision.86 
On top of the economic effects, the traditional 
statement notes that the decision made the way clear for 
states to create universities chartered under their own 
constitutions and supported by and controlled by the public. 
Again, there is a great deal of evidence to show that despite 
the development of some state universities, the decision 
"checked the development of state universities for at least 
_c . -, ii 87 fifty years." 
Notable exceptions, however, were the universities 
of North Carolina and Virginia. North Carolina counts its 
beginning from the date of its charter of 1774. In Virginia, 
88 the doors opened in 1825. 
84 85 Spurlock, Education, p. 26. Ibid. 
86Ibid. 87Ibid. 
88 Gilbert Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, The Apostle of 
Americanism, 2d Ed. Revised (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 
1939), p. 508. 
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Thomas Jefferson's dream for education was that the 
United States be led by people trained as elites in a dis­
tinctly American university. He proposed to build such an 
institution in Virginia. The plan was to be a "broad, lib­
eral, and modern institution which would command public sup-
89 port." The idea was the capstone of a pyramid of a compre­
hensive educational system which provided primary, secondary, 
90 college, and university levels. The curriculum balanced 
languages, literature, mathematics, science, and surveying. 
Also allotted in the legislation were state scholarships for 
91 selected students. 
Gilbert Chinard points out the significance of the 
unique institution and observed that: 
. . . For the first time in the history of the 
country, higher education was made independent of the 
Church, and to a large extent the foundation of the 
University of Virginia marks the beginning of the 
secularization of scientific research in America. . . . 
The man who wished to be remembered as the "father of 
the University of Virginia" was also, in more than one 
sense, the father of the State Universities which play 
such an important part in the education of the American 
democracy.^2 
Although Jefferson's plan effectively excluded con­
trol of public universities by sectarian interests, most 
public institutions prior to the Civil War observed cere­
monies that closely resembled Protestant worship. Chapel 
89 90 
Chinard, Jefferson, p. 508. Ibid. 
91 Q? 
Ibid., p. 512. Ibid. 
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attendance was usually required, and it included sermons, 
93 Bible-reading and prayers. During the same period it was 
generally accepted that the clergy held most top administra­
tive posts in higher education. The custom continued until 
the late nineteenth century when the nature of higher educa-
94 tion began to require more business expertise. 
Brubaker and Rudy note the example of the University 
95 of Michigan at the mid-nineteenth century mark. They quote 
Henry P. Tappan's description of the school as "neither 
religious nor political in its character, but purely scien-
96 tific and literary." Tappan was noted as one who carried 
on a "running battle" with sectarian interests over control 
of higher education. Strict requirements by private founda­
tions in return for their "largess" forced denominational 
schools into improving their standards, and becoming broader-
based institutions. Henry S. Prichett, administrator of the 
Carnegie wealth, refused to include sectarian institutions in 
97 the Carnegie pension plan. Such institutions had difficulty 
in passing Prichett's exacting requirements. He was also 
concerned that some churches planted more colleges than they 
could financially support, thus lowering standards in the 
93 Richard Gabel, Public Funds for Church and Private 
Schools (Washington: The Catholic University of America, 
1937), p. 279. 
94 Brubaker and Rudy, Higher Education in Transition, 
p. 360. 
Q f i  Q 7  
Ibid., p. 361. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 361-362. 
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sectarian sector. The magnetic pull of foundation aid, how­
ever , caused many institutions to dilute their loyalties to 
98 religion and assume non-sectarian status. 
The two Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890, respectively, 
were the products of concern by many educators and prominent 
business leaders over the limitations of the traditional cur-
99 riculum of higher education. They found it inadequate to 
meet the needs of the majority of the masses desiring to apply 
a post high school education in the changing industrial and 
agricultural complex. Congress, in 1862, provided for each 
state which was willing to accept the terms of the act, land 
or script in lieu of land, in the amount of 30,000 acres for 
each congressional representative. Property in excess of 
that utilized by the institutional plant could be sold and 
the money could be applied to permanent endowment. The "land 
grant colleges" were to be public institutions which empha­
sized agriculture and mechanics, as well as the classics, 
, ., . , . 100 science, and military science. 
The Morrill Acts were followed in Congress by the 
Hatch Act of 1887, which set up state agricultural experiment 
98 Brubaker and Rudy, Higher Education in Transition, 
pp. 361-362. 
QQ 
Act of July 2, 1862, Ch. 130, 2 Statute 503. 
Act of August 30, 1890, Ch. 841, 26 Statute 417, 7 U.S.C. 
Sees. 321-28 (1958). 
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stations; the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 aided agricultural 
study and home economics; the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917 and 
the George-Barden Act of 1946 provided funds for vocational 
The land grant colleges appeared at a time of great 
need and change. Living standards had begun to rise, and 
increasing demands were made upon the private sector to pro­
vide permanent endowment, buildings, and better qualified 
faculty. The three historic ways of support of higher edu-
102 cation have been through endowments, taxes, and tuitions. 
The Morrill acts accomplished establishment of a great number 
of colleges throughout America. Land, or script was supposed 
to be sold and converted to stock of at least five per cent 
yield. Since land was cheap and time was of the essence, 
transactions were hurried, and receipts were often inadequate. 
103 In such cases states stepped in with additional funds. 
The one notable exception to the short fall" was Cornell, 
whose situation was such that the trustees could afford to 
hold its script until it reached the value of $5,000,000.00. 
Had Cornell's example been typical, public higher education 
would have had a bright success earlier in its history."*"0̂  
education. 101 
101 Pfeffer, Church, State and Freedom, p. 581. 
102 Brubaker and Rudy, Higher Education in Transition, 
p. 376. 
103 Ibid., p. 379 104 Ibid. 
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According to Brubaker and Rudy, money has never been 
equally distributed among institutions of higher education: 
. . .  B y  t h e  1930's twenty universities were receiv­
ing 75 per cent of all foundation grants, the remaining 
25 per cent going to 310 institutions, leaving 700 others 
without any subsidy at all. The General Education Board 
long made it a policy to disburse its funds by making 
additions to college and university endowments, but as 
costs mounted faster than additions it came to lose 
faith in this policy.105 
Sectarian colleges proliferated with shallow finan­
cial resources, thus producing a national complex of below-
standard colleges. Many land grant colleges were burdened 
with scant finances, inadequate faculty, and low standards. 
In the South, public colleges were established for whites and 
for blacks. Tennessee and Kentucky placed "separate but 
equal" laws on the books. Later civil rights studies noted 
that there were "separate," but not "equal" situations all 
over the country. In the South it was imperative that normal 
schools be established for the training of teachers for the 
106 newly-established public school systems. 
If the public black colleges had a rocky beginning, 
private black institutions were faced with geometric ampli­
fication of analogous troubles faced by white, church-related 
schools. The 1960 Federal Civil Rights Commission Report 
stated that: 
105 Brubaker and Rudy, Higher Education in Transition, 
pp. 377-379. 
106 United States Commission on Civil Rights, Equal 
Protection of the Laws in Public Higher Education (Washing-
ton, D. C., 1960), pp. 8-11. 
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The first definitive study of Negro education, pub­
lished in 1916 found that "hardly a colored college 
meets the standards set by the Carnegie Foundation and 
the North Central Association." Only Fisk and Howard 
Universities and Meharry Medical School were classified 
as "colleges" at that date. Fifteen private and church-
supported institutions are listed as "secondary" and 
"college" and fifteen others as offering college subjects. 
All of the latter, except Florida Agricultural and Mechan­
ical College are church supported institutions. 
With such challenging conditions prevailing in both 
private and public sectors, in black and white institutions, 
economic conditions at the turn of the century were crucial 
to the survival of American higher education. It was during 
this period that large personal fortunes were made, thus 
allowing money to be designated for higher learning. Millions 
of Victorian era dollars were donated in the name of such 
persons as Cornelius Vanderbilt, Johns Hopkins, Ezra Cor­
nell, Leland Stanford, and James B. Duke. 
In the twentieth century, large-scale giving took 
a different turn. Not millions, but now hundreds of 
millions of dollars were poured into philanthropic 
foundations by men like Carnegie, Rockefeller, and 
Ford. . . . spent their income. ... not to found new 
institutions, but to strengthen old ones.-'-®® 
Financial development became a perennial part of 
college and university administration. The president did 
less and less fund raising, as financial development was 
placed into the hands of a special officer. In addition to 
occasional conspicuous gifts, most institutions depended upon 
107 United States Commission on Civil Rights, Equal 
Protection of the Laws, p. 5 (footnote). 
108 Brubaker and Rudy, Higher Education in Transition, 
p. 377. 
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special fund drives. The purpose for these was usually the 
endowment fund, and the target for the drives was the loyal 
, . 109 alumni. 
The financial health of the public institutions did 
not depend upon the donations of private individuals as did 
private institutions. Typically, one church-related college 
breaks down its income: 
Alumni—27 percent; denominational support and 
foundations—20 percent; trusts—3 percent; other sour­
ces (corporations, foundations, individual church gifts 
and government)—9 percent.HO 
In public colleges and universities, the traditional 
source of support has come from: land grants and other 
public investments; legislative appropriations; federal 
research grants and contracts; and nominal student tuition. 
Conditions in higher education over the past decade have 
forced revisions in the traditional picture of sources of 
support whose solutions have created considerable controversy. 
The trend has been toward greater dependence upon government 
funding, in spite of its constitutional and political ramifi­
cations. 
109 Brubaker and Rudy, Hiqher Education in Transition, 
p. 379. 
"^^Lenoir Rhyne College, 1975 Loyalty Fund (Hick­
ory, N. C.: Development Office, 1975). Promotional Folder. 
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FEDERAL SUPPORT IN THE ASCENDANT 
At the turn of the twentieth century, higher educa­
tion was typically private and church-related.^^""'" Until the 
early 1930's private higher education was the dominant force. 
The private sector controlled large endowments, maintained 
selective enrollments, and enjoyed a good reputation. When 
the Great Depression arrived, the student market was almost 
112 evenly divided between the two sectors. Since then, growth 
in the private sector has slowed proportionately until the 
mid-1970's when it could control only 25 percent of the 
= v 4- H3 market. 
Most accounts attribute the surge of growth in public 
institutions to the initiation of federal money going to 
higher education. Demand for increased educational oppor­
tunity was expressed following World War XI by returning vet­
erans. A grateful Congress responded with passage of the 
114 Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1943 (GI Bill of Rights). 
The law provided for tuition and other expenses to be paid 
directly to the college of the student's choice. There was 
no restriction at first as to payments being made directly to 
111 The National Commission on United Methodist Higher 
Education, A College-Related Church: United Methodist Per­
spectives (Nashville, 1976), p. 63. 
112 . 113 x ^Ibid. Ibid. 
114 Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom, p. 596. 
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schools, even divinity schools. Following the Everson and 
McCollum decisions, the law was changed to provide for pay­
ment to the veterans, leaving it to them to take care of tui­
tion, and this pattern was followed in respect to Korean 
115 veterans. At the time of the writing of the law, cate­
gorized aid directed toward helping an individual was not 
considered contrary to the provisions of the First Amendment 
establishment clause. Other acts were passed during the 
1940's and 1950's, such as The National School Lunch Act 
of 1946, The National Education Defense Act, the College Aid 
Act, and the Anti-Poverty Act."1""''® As the precedents were 
accumulated, Americans were becoming conditioned to accept 
and expect government assistance in the areas upon which 
they placed high public priority. This was especially true 
when threatened with a crisis. 
On October 4, 1957, Russia announced the launching 
of a satellite weighing 184 pounds, which they called Sput-
117 nik. Russia had entered the space age with America as a 
118 humble spectator. The American educational system was 
singled out as the national scapegoat. While Americans con­
centrated on "frills," Russian schools were turning out 
115 Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom, p. 596. 
116ibid. 
117 Bailey, The American Pageant, p. 953. 
118 , . , Ibid. 
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119 scientists and engineers. The United States entered it­
self in the space race through a crash program, and American 
V-2 rockets soon placed a tiny satellite into orbit about 
120 the earth, and the space race had a new contestant. 
To the Congressional mentality, national defense was 
in serious jeopardy and steps must be taken to prevent any 
1°1 
more "psychological Pearl Harbors." ^ Consistent with Con­
gressional policy of voting for educational aid only in a 
crisis, the National Defense Education Act of 1958 was 
122 passed. The rationalization carefully avoided usurpation 
of state constitutional responsibility for education, but 
it provided basic ingredients for a national defense based 
123 on an army of engineers and scientists. Using the argument 
of national defense, Congress sidestepped the First Amend­
ment question and voted $887,000,000 in loans for college 
and university students, research grants, and language instruc­
tion. President Eisenhower was not influential enough to 
overcome Congressional aversion to undergraduate scholarships. 
124 No one was going to get a "free ride" on this Congress. 
The same Congress, however, gave Korean War veterans oppor­
tunity for higher education with the extension of the GI Bill 
119 Bailey, The American Pageant, p. 954. 
120Ibid. 121Ibid., p. 953. 122Ibid., p. 954. 
123 124 
Ibid. Ibid., pp. 953-54. 
148 
125 of Rights. The program, begun as an ad hoc measure in 
126 .1943, soon began to assume dimensions of permanency. 
Higher education, through maintenance of a low pro­
file, managed to avoid much constitutional and political con­
troversy that has characterized discussion over aid to pri­
vate parochial education. Some of this can be attributed to 
the nature of the respective levels of the institutions, as 
well as the different patterns of their development. The 
lower levels of education formed easily-identifiable divisions: 
Catholic (primarily), and secular-Protestant. 
"Perpetuation of pluralism" has been the watchword 
of proponents of public support of private colleges. Patrick 
E. McCarthy, the Chancellor of the Massachusetts Board of 
Higher Education, speaks of the concept as an initiative for 
public support. He describes the development of the idea: 
Prior to World war II, public and private institu­
tions of higher education moved in totally separate 
orbits. With the concentration on expanded access, 
national attitudes shifted to a point at which both pub­
lic and private institutions were viewed as members of a 
single system. Such landmark legislation as the G.I. 
Bill did not discriminate between them and thus fore­
shadowed changes in federal and state attitudes toward 
large-scale higher education. A concept of pluralism 
has emerged from these new attitudes that places a high 
value on choice as well as on access, thereby producing 
in recent yearsi an initiative for public financial sup­
port for both students and institutions in the private 
sector.127 
125 Lawrence E. Gladieux and Thomas R. Wolamn, Con­
gress and the Colleges: The National Politics of Higher Edu­
cation (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1976), p. 8. 
126Ibid. 
127 Patrick E. McCarthy, "Higher Education: Expansion 
without Growth," Daedalus, 104, No. 1 (Winter 1975), 80. 
149 
The private sector was about 50 per cent in enrollments 
until mid-twentieth century, when it became alarmingly appar­
ent that private education was beginning to decline in num­
bers. From what had been a virtual monopoly for private 
higher education , by 1972 it was only 24 per cent of total 
128 college enrollment in the United States. 
The letter of the Constitution has been observed by 
Congress in the provision of federal support, not of: 
. . .  h i g h e r  e d u c a t i o n  per se, but rather to use it 
as an instrument to accomplish other purposes, the bene­
fits. . . extended alike to public and private institu­
tions that can accomplish the federal objectives. 
Federal policy, therefore, was one of operating in the national 
interest. Research grants extended through the National 
Science Foundation, founded in 1950, provided a link between 
Federal money and higher education which helped develop 
advanced weapons systems and provide trained manpower for 
130 government leadership. Through these grants the practice 
of federal aid edged its foot into the door of higher educa­
tion. The ruse was deemed necessary, because supporters of 
the aid concept understood that political considerations 
1.28 Richard Lyman, "In Defense of the Private Sector," 
Daedalus, 104, No. 1 (Winter 1975), 156. 
129 Gladieux and Wolanin, Congress and Colleges, 
p. 5. 
130 Martin Meryerson, "After a Decade of the Levelers 
in Higher Education: Reinforcing Quality While Maintaining 
Mass Education," Daedalus, 104, No. 1 (winter 1975), 305. 
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131 prohibited direct financial subsidy. In method, supporters 
of the lower level of financial aid to education followed the 
indirect route, as well. They usually asked for indirect aid 
to specific areas such as bus transportation, school lunches, 
132 and textbooks. These areas of indirect aid have had their 
day in court, and although the flow of tax appropriations has 
not been completely cut off, there is considerable retarda-
133 tion. 
Catholics resisted as "discriminatory" legislation 
which would assist public schools and which restricted aid to 
sectarian schools. Senator Robert Taft of Ohio sponsored a 
bill (S.472) in March, 1948, which had as its stated purpose: 
. . . to authorize the appropriation of funds to assist 
the States and Territories in financing a minimum founda­
tion education program of public elementary and secondary 
schools. . . .134 
Senate Bill 472 contained no specific inclusions or 
exclusions regarding sectarian aid. Once the bill had been 
brought to the floor, it was virtually riddled with attacks 
135 from opponents of parochial aid. Senator Donnell of Missouri 
offered an amendment which effectively killed the bill. It 
read: 
p. 974. 
131 Kelly and Harbison, The American Constitution, 
132 133 
Ibid. Ibid. 
134 U. S. Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1st Sess., 94 
(1948), 3586. 
135Ibid., 3587. 
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That no funds appropriated under this act shall 
be disbursed in any state for the support or benefit 
of any sectarian or private school.136 
The amendment was followed up by the entry into the 
record of information gathered by the National Education 
Association and other organizations and individuals who 
opposed use of public funds in support of sectarian 
137 schools. 
In the House, Representative Ralph Barden of North 
Carolina perennially persisted in efforts to pass similar 
138 educational bills. His 1949 effort was bitterly attacked 
by Cardinal Spellman, who labelled the bill's supporters 
"bigots" and accused them of "a craven crusade of religious 
139 prejudice against Catholic children. ..." Barden's sup­
port by Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt in her syndicated newspaper 
column aroused the ire of the Cardinal, who wrote a scathing 
letter to her in reply. The letter, released to the press, 
accused her of anti-Catholic prejudice, ignorance, and of 
"discrimination unworthy of an American mother." The Card­
inal was unprepared for the wave of public reaction that came 
from all sides. He was forced to apologize to the former 
140 First Lady. 
"^^U. S. Congressional Record (1948), 3587. 
137Ibid., 3591-3594. 
138 Kelley and Harbison, The American Constitution, 
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139 U. S. Congressional Record, July 1949, A4855-56. 
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Spellman evidently lost a great deal of influence 
following the unfortunate exchange. The Prelate did not 
renew efforts toward gaining assistance for parochial educa­
tion until February, 1962, after John F. Kennedy was in the 
White House. Again, the Cardinal was rebuffed, following a 
bitter confrontation with Kennedy regarding aid to parochial 
141 schools. 
The President maintained the previous stand, which 
was that he believed in an America "where the separation of 
142 Church and State is absolute." Milton Konvitz saw irony 
in the contribution of Kennedy's election toward relaxation 
of tension between church and state: the election of a 
143 Catholic president "shattered an old image." Certainly, 
the old image of nineteenth century "Papist Puppet" was 
belied by the presence of an Irish Catholic President who 
thought and acted independently of Rome. Konvitz may give 
too much credit to the Kennedy election for relaxation between 
Protestants and Catholics as he discusses the Johnson educa­
tion bills which: "weaken, if they do not violate, the prin-
144 ciple of church and state." President Johnson possessed 
unusual skill and ability in guiding educational legislation 
through Congress. In addition to his years of experience, 
141 Milton R. Konvitz, Religious Liberty and Con­
science: A Constitutional Inquiry (New York: The Viking 
Press, 1968), p. 7. 
142 , . , 143 . , 144 , . , Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 
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Johnson came into his first full term of office from a land­
slide victory over a weak opponent, and he pushed his "man­
date" to the hilt. The irony is in the fact that a Protestant 
president provided the first blunting of the "wall of separa-
145 tion" rather than a Catholic. 
President Kennedy's firmly-stated position against 
aid to parochial schools did not preclude his support of any 
federal aid to education. His program included substan­
tial aid to elementary and secondary schools, federal loans 
for higher education facilities construction, and undergrad-
146 uate scholarships awarded to students on the basis of need. 
The program ran into immediate difficulty in Congress as it 
foundered on the twin shoals of religion and race. Although 
most of the controversy centered on the elementary and secon­
dary level, Kennedy's package included scholarship and con­
struction aid to public and church-related colleges which 
appeared to be constitutionally questionable. When the 1961 
school bill died in the House Rules Committee, the higher 
147 education portion of the bill suffered the same fate. 
In 1962, unencumbered with the "albatross" of public school 
measures, Congress passed a number of higher education aid 
145 Bailey, The American Pageant, p. 985. 
146 Kelly and Harbison, The American Constitution, 
p. 975. 
147 Gladieux and Wolanin, Congress and Colleges, 
p. 10. 
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bills. The legislation was aimed at providing money for 
student loans and limited types of construction assistance. 
Timing proved their undoing, however, as the Supreme Court 
produced the controversial "prayer decision" (Engle v. 
148 Vitale), which called renewed attention to the First 
Amendment issue and the bill was sent back to committee where 
•4- ^ 149 it died. 
President Kennedy proposed in 1963 the National Edu­
cation Improvements Act of 1963. The Act included a varia­
tion of facilities construction and expansion of the NDEA 
loan and fellowship programs, insured loans, work-study, and 
federal aid for teacher training. The measure, submitted 
by Kennedy, was signed by President Lyndon Johnson in 1963, 
150 just after his sudden elevation to the presidency. 
Gradually a new policy in higher education emerged; 
equality of educational opportunity replaced national defense 
151 as a rationale for funding. The "Work Study Program" 
begun in 1964 was one of the first products of the new direc-
152 tion. The legislation initiated a recognizable partner­
ship between the state and federal interests in higher educa­
tion. Despite strong opposition to the "nondiscrimination 
148 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
149 Gladieux and Wolanin, Congress and Colleges, p. 11. 
150 Daniel P. Moynihan, "The Politics of Higher Educa­
tion," Daedalus, 104 f No. 1 (Winter 1975), 133-34. 
151 15? 
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between public and private institutions, both were declared 
eligible. As 1963 drew to a close, a wedge had been driven 
into the "wall of separation" that opened the way for federal 
interest in all higher education, from church-related to 
153 public. Gladieux and Wolanin hold that this legislation 
draws the curtain on any further controversy over church-state 
principles regarding higher education. They wrote: 
The consideration of the 1963 legislation laid the 
foundation for future enactments. Programs for fed­
erally insured loans, work-study, teacher training, 
and college libraries would reappear in the 1965 legis­
lation. The church-state issue with respect to higher 
education was largely laid to rest. The emerging con­
cern with educational opportunity would edge closer to 
the center of federal policy. And the tradition of 
omnibus higher education bills considered in an atmos­
phere of muted partisanship would continue to be the 
hallmark of higher education policy through the 1960s. 
The passage of the 1963 Higher Education Facilities 
155 Act failed to "lay to rest" the church-state controversy. 
The issue was far from settled. There continued to be resis­
tance in the Congress as later bills were offered, but the 
156 center of the controversy was shifted to the courts. 
Aware that there was resistance to the Higher Education 
Facilities bill based upon constitutional grounds, sponsors 
of the measure asked for an opinion from the Secretary of 
153 Moynihan, "The Politics of Higher Education," 
Daedalus, pp. 133-34. 
154 Gladieux and Wolanin, Congress and Colleges, p. 11. 
^®See following, Chapter five. 
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157 Health, Education, and Welfare. The constitutional ques­
tion involved the feasibility of federal construction grants 
being given to sectarian schools and colleges. The Secre­
tary's memorandum supported the Administration's position. 
He ruled that government grants would be constitutional at 
the college level. The H.E.W. memorandum introduced the 
notion that a distinction between lower and higher education 
depends upon the degree of susceptibility to sectarian per­
suasion; i.e., the greater sophistication and maturity of 
the college-age student permits him to be more perceptive 
158 and resistant to proselytism. 
Leo Pfeffer took exception to the Secretary's opinion 
on the basis of logic. He argued: 
(1) The distinction between lower and higher edu­
cation in respect to the church-state issue appears to 
be a novel one. . . . (2) The factors listed in the mem­
orandum may well be relevant to a decision on the wisdom 
or desirability of according governmental aid at the 
higher level, but hardly to the question of constitu­
tionality. (3) It is particularly difficult to compre­
hend the relevancy of the argument—often made—that aid 
at the college level is constitutionally permissible 
because "college enrollment does not have the power of 
state compulsion supporting it." If relevant at all, 
it would seem to point to a directly contrary conclusion. 
One of the arguments most asserted by Catholic spokes­
men in support of their claim to governmental funds 
for parochial schools is that unless the government 
makes it financially feasible for Catholic children to 
157 Constitutionality of Federal Aid to Education 
in Its Various Aspects, Document 29, 87th Congress, 
1st sess. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 
1961), p. 6. 
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attend parochial schools their religious liberty is 
being violated by. being forced against their consciences 
to attend secular public schools pursuant to compulsory 
attendance laws. This argument is obviously absent 
where, as at the college level, there is no compulsion 
by law to attend.159 
The memorandum was politically effective in the 
passage of the Higher Education Facilities Act. But its 
real significance was not apparent until the concept sur­
faced in two landmark U. S. Supreme Court decisions concern­
ing use of public funds in private educational facilities. 
The first was the Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) in which it was 
determined that salary supplements paid to lower level 
160 
parochial school teachers were unconstitutional. The other 
case was Tilton v. Richardson, which was a direct constitu-
1 C "I 
tional test of the 1963 Facilities Act. In the 5-4 deci­
sion Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion drew the same 
distinction between higher and lower levels of educational 
understanding as had been expressed in the 1963 H.E.W. memo-
162 randum. Mr. Justice Burger contended: "There is substance 
to the contention that college students are less susceptible 
16 3 to religious indoctrination." 
Aside from the constitutional implications, passage 
of the Facilities Act over constitutional objections, raised 
159 Pfeffer, Church, State and Freedom, p. 598. 
^^Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., 602-671 (1971). 
161Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). 
162T, . , 163T, . , Ibid. Ibid. 
158 
by Senator Sam Ervin and others, had the effect of diverting 
such questionable legislation to the courts instead of resolv­
ing the difficulties during the legislative process. James 
Davis, commenting upon the process a decade later (1972), 
observed: 
Congress has struggled for many years to serve two 
noble causes: to uphold the legal intent of the Con­
stitution to separate the affairs of church and state, 
and to serve the needs of the public welfare in provid­
ing increased opportunity for private higher education 
of higher quality. In its earliest legislation, Con­
gress expressed its deep concern for finding the proper 
Constitutional vehicle. In later legislation the need 
to provide greater Federal support for private institu­
tions qua institutions of higher education has been 
ascendant, and the Constitutional question has been 
passed to the courts.1^4 
Having laid groundwork in 1963 and 1964, President 
Johnson, in January of 1965, sent his education message to 
Capitol Hill. In the message, he boldly requested the sum 
of over one billion dollars for the funding of the educational 
aid program. The Congress obliged him, and in April the Ele­
mentary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) became 
law."*"^ In addition to masterful use of his considerable 
persuasive powers, which included the neutralization of con­
stitutional opposition and fears of federal intervention, 
164 James R. Davis, "The Higher Education Amendments 
of 1972: A New Form of Aid for Private Colleges and Univer­
sities? Intellect, December 1972, p. 159. 
165 National Education Association, Special Report, 
"The Elementary-Secondary Education Act of 1965," April 22, 
1965, p. 1. 
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Johnson linked the program to the War on Poverty. Traditional 
opponents of such programs were persuaded of its sectarian 
166 neutrality. To set such fears to rest, the final section 
included a disclaimer which disallowed any funds for relig­
ious worship or instruction. 
Following close on the heels of the Elementary-
Secondary Education Act (E.S.E.A.) was the Higher Education 
168 Act of 1965. The program utilized contracts, which 
allowed public and nonprofit institutions to establish pro­
grams for the purpose of encouraging qualified youths consid­
ered to be in exceptional financial need into a program 
169 leading to completion of "post-secondary" education. 
Students were given a grant (Equal Opportunity Grant) if they 
proved need. In addition to student aid, libraries were 
given help in small colleges ("developing institutions"). 
The higher education bill was regarded a landmark, signifying 
170 a national commitment to higher education. 
Growth, in federal higher education expenditures, 
from 1954 to the mid-1960s, from a modest $44 million to 
$3.5 billion for all programs, was spread among the universe 
171 of American higher education. Following this, additional 
166 Bailey, The American Pageant, p. 985. 
"'"^Public Law 89-329, Section 408. 
168 Gladieux and Wolanin, Congress and the Colleges, 
p. 12. 
169_, . , -j- 170_, . , Ibid., pp. 12f. Ibid. 
171 Moynihan, "The Politics of Higher Education," 
Daedalus, p. 129. 
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funds were committed, new programs devised, and new rationales 
have been promoted to maintain and enlarge existing programs 
172 to number in the billions of dollars. 
The Higher Education Amendments of 1972 Bill was 
signed into law June 23, 1972, by President Richard Nixon. 
A patchwork of political compromise, the amendments extended 
most federal programs which were the residue of previous leg­
islation. Some innovations were added, especially concerning 
assistance for needy students, community colleges, and a form 
173 of direct, generalized aid which proved very controversial. 
Nixon had proposed in his education message of 1970: 
I am also proposing a new National Foundation for Higher 
Education, funded with $200 million in its first year, 
to give grants to colleges in support of excellence and 
new ideas.1^4 
Moynihan explained, "The object of the Foundation was to 
channel 'free' money to institutions of special merit. 
In quite disproportionate measure this meant, private insti-
..175 tutions." 
Sponsors of the amendments were required to deal with 
such diversionary roadblocks as: antibusing amendments: 
"backlash" from campus activism; and the Administration's 
order of educational priorities. In 1969 President Nixon 
vetoed a higher education bill because it had exceeded his 
172 Moynihan, "The Politics of Higher Education," 
Daedalus, p. 129. 
173t, . , 174_, . , 175_, . , Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 
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budget. The primary problem in 1971-72 was to seek out and 
solve the main issues in higher education. The Amendments 
of 1972 incorporated the heart of three important studies 
176 which concerned higher education: The Carnegie Report; 
177 178 The Rivlin Report; and the Newman Report. 
The Carnegie Report was the result of a study begun 
in 1967 to examine all aspects of higher education and to set 
179 projections up to the year 2000. Both the Carnegie and 
Rivlin reports arrived at the primary concept of equal access 
to education and encouraged federal aid to education to 
include student tuition grants, work-study programs, and 
180 guaranteed loans. The Newman Report was sharply critical 
of higher education. Still centering its attention upon 
student support, it asked the question which strongly influ­
enced the Nixon Administration's view, "Will more money solve 
181 the problems affecting Postsecondary Education?" The 
176 Clark Kerr, Priorities for Action; Final Report 
of the Carnegie Commission for Higher Education (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973). 
177 Alice Rivlin et al., Toward a Long Range Plan 
for Federal Financial Support of Higher Education (Washing­
ton, D. C., Department of Health, Education, and Welfare: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 166-68. 
178 Frank Newman et al., Report on Higher Education 
(Washington, D. C., Department of Health, Education and Wel­
fare: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1971). 
179 Kerr, Priorities for Action, Passim. 
180 Ibid.; Rivlin, Long Range Plan, Passim. 
181 Newman, Report on Higher Education, Passim. 
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Rivlin Report, released on the eve of the first Nixon Admin­
istration, agreed substantially with the Carnegie position 
on student aid and access. But the study fell short of 
endorsing institutional aid. According to the report, loans 
to church-related institutions were to some an acceptable 
alternative to unrestricted grants. The report duly noted 
that at the time, a legal and conceptual haze surrounded the 
question of federal aid to church-affiliated colleges; there 
is often a distinction drawn between general support of such 
institutions and categorical support. It is the distinction 
between "general" and "categorical" that has provided con­
siderable debate between the public and private sectors and 
their spokesmen. The distinction is drawn in the Rivlin 
report which says: 
Some people regard the distinction as important, 
feeling that aiding science, education, or language 
instruction at a church-related college does no vio­
lence to the Separation of Church and State since the 
money cannot be used for religious indoctrination. 
Others regard this distinction as unrealistic, point­
ing out that government support of non-religious pro­
grams releases institutional funds for other purposes, 
including religious teaching . . . helping students pay 
higher tuition fees is also seen as a method of aiding 
private church-related institutions indirectly without 
running into any Constitutional problems.182 
Gladieux observed that there were many candidates for 
the main issue, depending upon the source of concern: (1) the 
higher education lobby, representing primarily independent 
232 Rivlin, Long Range Plan, pp. 66-67. 
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institutions/was concerned about the "financial crisis:" 
(2) the Administration concentrated upon needs for lower 
income students: (3) middle income students rated attention 
according to representatives Edith Green and John Brademas; 
(4) while Daniel P. Moynihan saw the need to "preserve 
excellence and to stimulate innovation and reform in higher 
183 education." Hovering in the background of these issues 
was strong sentiment among some Congressional members to 
regard the Constitutional issue as primary. 
Administration-sponsored provisions for aid to institu­
tions apparently reflected an attempt to circumvent the Con-
184 stitutional prohibition of aid to religion. However, 
James R. Davis saw the measure as a "genuine search" for a 
185 Constitutional vehicle to aid private colleges. 
Throughout the Congressional hearings, the Constitutional 
question remained a viable issue. Congress had a long his­
tory of attempting to resolve uncertainty and ambiguity sur­
rounding the First Amendment and church-state legislation. 
Little had been done, however, to make it possible to allow 
taxpayer suits to be heard before the Supreme Court, chal­
lenging federal legislation on the basis of the First Amend­
ment. In 1966, Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina introduced 
183 Gladieux and Wolanin, Congress and the Colleges, 
p. 122. 
184Davis, Intellect, 1972, p. 157. l85Ibid. 
164 
to the Senate Bill S 1097, which had the intent and purpose 
of providing taxpayers the standing necessary for such legal 
186 challenges. The Ervin Bill named explicitly such higher 
education acts as that of 1963 and 1965 as well as the Nat­
ional Defense Education Act of 1958, and the ESEA bills of 
1965.187 
Before the Senate had opportunity to pass a final 
vote on the matter, in 1968, the Supreme Court handed down 
188 its decision in the case of Flast v. Cohen. The landmark 
case rendered the Ervin bill moot by opening the door for 
suits against federal or state laws in cases where the 
statute is alleged to violate the "establishment" or "free 
189 exercise" clauses of the First Amendment. Flast over­
turned a previous attempt to bring a taxpayer suit to court, 
in a 1923 case, Frothingham. The Court found: 
Consequently, we hold that a taxpayer will have 
standing ... to invoke federal judicial power when 
he alleges that congressional action under the taxing 
and spending clause is in derogation of those consti­
tutional provisions which operate to restrict the 
exercise of the taxing and spending power.I90 
The case was important because it placed for the first time 
the question of federal aid before the United States Supreme 
"I  OC 
Leo Pfeffer, God, Caesar, and the Constitution 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), pp. 264-267. 
187ibid. 
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Court. The House Education Subcommittee chaired by Represen­
tative Edith Green was charged with the responsibility of 
providing a constitutionally-workable plan for aid to higher 
education. The Green subcommittee was concerned over the 
constitutional implications of impending legislation, espe­
cially in regard to direct, general institutional aid. One 
session of the hearings was devoted entirely to testimony by 
Thomas Kauper, Deputy Assistant Attorney from the Office of 
Legal Counsel. The consultant explained there were still 
difficulties in determining the weight the Supreme Court 
placed on the criteria used in the Tilton case. No norms 
existed to determine the constitutionality of aid as used at 
a particular school. Kauper expressed the Court's concern 
over use of federally-financed buildings by church-related 
schools. Such use approximated Congressional allocation of 
unrestricted grants of financial aid. He felt that the lat­
ter would probably be viewed as unconstitutional, "because 
once again the possibility exists that the aid will be 
191 employed for sectarian purposes. The legislators were 
pervasively nervous about the judicial prospects of their 
192 bill. Gladieux and Wolanin report: 
Privately, the attitude of some Senators was that 
if an institution was so weak it could not attract 
191 Laura C. Ford, "Institutional Aid," Journal of 
Law and Education , 1, No. 4 (October 1972), 575. 
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sufficient numbers of students to remain solvent, it 
probably should close down. To guarantee the survival 
of every college and university in the country they 
felt, was not an appropriate federal role. . . . Though 
no one could predict how the courts might rule, the 
staff (of the Education Subcommittee] held that a [more] 
defensible constitutional case could be mounted for 
cost-of-instruction than for general aid to institu­
tions. 193 
Officially, the White House and HEW opposed the 
initiation of any manner of institutional aid program, on 
both philosophical and financial grounds. Elliot Richard­
son, then Secretary of HEW, testified: 
It is hard to imagine a mode of financing less 
suited to alleviating an immediate short-term crisis 
than general-formula institutional aid. It is much 
too blunt an instrument for dealing with acute prob­
lems of particular institutions, for such aid is 
addressed to the perceived need for the general 
strengthening of all post-secondary institutions. 
It is really a whole new approach to financing higher 
education involving a major reallocation of responsi­
bilities for support of these institutions.194 
Despite the strong objection of Administration 
spokesmen and ignoring the warnings of legal and fiscal 
experts, the House passed a provision for general institu-
195 tional assistance. Representative John Erlenborn attempted 
to amend the bill to make it subject to constitutional con­
straints . The debate that ensued was initiated by Subcom­
mittee chairman, Gongresswoman Edith Green: 
193 Gladieux and Wolanin, Congress and the Colleges, 
pp. 139-140. 
194 
Ford, "Institutional Aid," p. 572. 
195 U. S. Congressional Record, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1971), 117, 10288-10303. 
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. . .  i f  w e  r e a l l y  v a l u e  a  d u a l  s y s t e m  o f  e d u c a t i o n ,  
with private and public institutions, then we must 
give some financial aid.196 
Congressman John B. Anderson considered passage of 
general assistance as initiation of an "addition" to federal 
aid which could actually undermine the very diversity and 
197 autonomy of the institutions that would receive it. The 
Constitutional issue was met directly, as Congressman Buch­
anan proposed an amendment to exclude all church-related 
institutions from receiving benefit from Title VHI-general 
198 assistance. The House was in no mood to entertain amend­
ments which would inhibit their determination to aid the pri­
vate sector, regardless of the constitutionality of their 
acts. The Buchanan amendment was subsequently defeated, 
along with a similar motion submitted by Administration 
199 spokesman, Congressman Quie. 
While Davis placed emphasis upon need for survival 
of the diminishing private sector, federal aid legislation 
in 1972 expressed intent of avoiding collision with the Con­
stitution through the policy of making student access and 
student aid the central thrust.The Congressional tactic 
did not guarantee avoidance of Court challenge; however, 
Congressional planners remained confused or unconvinced from 
196 
U. S., Congressional Record, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1971), No. 117, 10303. 
197T, . , t noaq 198T, . j 199t, . , Ibid., 10309. Ibid. Ibid. 
2<̂ °Davis, Intellect, 1972, p. 159. 
168 
the testimony of legal "experts" analyzing the Tilton 
decision. Their actions suggest that they concluded that 
the Supreme Court alone could rule on the legislation they 
were in the process of producing, and there was no predict­
ing how the Court would rule. They simply went about the 
process of legislation and disregarded negative admonitory 
caveats with regard to possible First Amendment challen-
201 ges. 
Public Law 92-318, or the "Higher Education Amend­
ments of 1972," is a lengthy publication representing a great 
deal of effort, energy, controversy, and grief. The Car­
negie Commission described the Amendments as the "second 
most important federal legislation affecting higher educa-
202 tion m our history." The first, they regard as the 
Morrill Act, which created the land grant colleges and uni­
versities. The final form of the bill distributed aid 
directly to institutions on basis of past experience in pro­
viding for assistance of needy students. Other highlights 
included: (1) continuation of main features of the 1965 
Higher Education Act and Basic Opportunity Grants which 
encouraged equal access to "post-secondary education;" 
201 Gladieux and Wolanin, Congress and the Colleges, 
p. 140. 
202 Carnegie Commission, Institutional Aid: Federal 
Support to Colleges and Universities (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Co. , 1972) , p. 1~. 
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(2) loans were made more accessible through warehousing under 
the Student Loan Marketing Association; and (3) Upward Bound 
and other related programs were consolidated and revitalized 
under the Act.20̂  
The legislative activities of 1972 marked a formi­
dable step toward higher education's enlargement of federal 
aid programs. The year closed on a euphoric note for most 
administrators of fiscally-troubled institutions throughout 
the country. Their mood changed quickly as President 
Nixon's budget proposals were made public. Congress and 
the educators felt betrayed by the President's impoundment 
of funds, his "item vetoes" of programs for which there was 
provided no line allocation, and the general direction the 
action seemed to take.2<̂  
Using the argument that he was fighting inflation 
and securing the national defense by holding down taxes, 
the Administration slashed the "Amendments" beyond recog­
nition. Direct, emergency institutional grants were elimi­
nated, as was $500 million in occupational education; addi­
tional money for veterans1 education and a number of state 
205 coordination and incentive grants had been left unfunded. 
203 Rufus E. Miles, Jr., The Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare (New York: Praeger Pub., 1974), p. 154. 
204 Robert Wood, "Academe Sings the Blues," Daedalus, 
104, No. 1 (Winter 1975), 47. 
205 William L. Turner and Leigh H. Hammond, "Emphasis 
on Higher Education," Adult Leadership, 22, No. 4 (April 1974), 
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The budget for fiscal year 1974 signalled a shift of empha­
sis from categorical and institutional aid to affirmation 
the Basic Opportunity Grant program to three other programs: 
Educational Opportunity Grants, Work-Study, and direct low-
interest loans (NDSL). The Administration had ignored com­
pletely the specifics of the interrelationship of the student 
aid programs to one-another and had funded $959 million for 
Basic Opportunity Grants (BOG) and had allowed nothing for 
the other three programs. Spokesmen for the Adult Education 
Amendments reacted by stating the obvious: that "such a 
blatant move to ignore specific wishes of Congress would 
207 lead to widespread Congressional discontent." They con­
cluded their evaluation of the 1972 passage of the Higher 
Education Amendments by the following comment: 
. . .  t h e  q u e s t i o n  i s  s t i l l  o p e n  o n  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  
impacts of the Education Amendments of 1972. The 
optimism and enthusiasm of a year ago has been re­
placed by a feeling of frustration. . . . the full 
impact ... must await the outcome of the struggle 
between the Executive and the Legislative Branches 
of Government, with final settlement of some issues 
having to come from the Judicial Branch.208 
Victims of the impoundment legislation and other 
affected parties initiated litigation which challenged the 
authority of the President to hold back funds authorized by 
of student aid through grants and loans. 206 Congress tied 
206m Tu 
tion," p. 147 
2 0 1 ^  
rner and Hammond, "Emphasis on Higher Educa-
Ibid 208 Ibid 
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209 Congress. The 35 or so suits were far-ranging and cov­
ered funding more than for higher education. The Administra­
tion lost most of the suits, thus weakening the claim of the 
Executive over fiscal legislation. The effect was such that 
by Christmas week, 1973, the President was forced to release 
the $1 billion approved for educational and health programs 
despite his concern to hold down government spending to con­
trol inflation. 
The impoundment controversy provided the advocates 
of state aid with an additional, powerful argument to initiate 
or to enlarge state programs because of the uncertainty and 
tentativeness of the federal programs. In addition, it was 
now apparent that the higher education lobby, made up of 
institutions associated together, could influence federal 
programs, and subsequent legislation would reflect their 
influence. Moreover, on the state and national level, the 
courts were defining the legal boundaries and removing the 
ambiguities that surrounded the process of legislation on both 
state and national levels. 
In the period between 1972 and 1976, external eco­
nomic and political forces impinged upon higher education 
from a number of directions. Emphasis upon student grants 
continued to progress as student loans lost ground. Efforts 
209 "The President Yields to Congress," Time, December 24, 
1973, 46. 
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increased to devise a means to provide direct aid to insti­
tutions for the purpose of retention of educational diversity, 
choice, and "centers of excellence." The prevailing assump­
tion was there existed a "depression in higher education" 
of such magnitude that it would require federal and state 
211 aid to bail out the seriously-ailing private sector. 
Following close behind reports of the "new depression" were 
revisions suggesting that the crisis probably was overstated, 
and the cry of "wolf" had made the public and legislatures 
more amenable to legislation favoring public aid to private 
212 institutions. It did not escape the eyes of some that 
"erosion in the private sector was a separate matter although 
213 the financial crisis sped the process." One could con­
clude that if erosion is not entirely of financial origin, 
money alone will not provide the cure. 
During 1974 the higher education lobby in a rare 
show of unity urged Congress to provide general institutional 
214 support to institutions. In February 1975, Representative 
John O'Hara, who replaced Representative Edith Green as 
211 Earl Cheit, The New Depression in Higher Educa­
tion (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1971), Passim. 
212 Ernest Bartell, "The Enduring Non-Crisis m Higher 
Education," Daedalus, 104, No. 1 (Winter 1975), 16-17. 
213 William D. Hyde, Jr., Student Financial Aid for 
Higher Education; An Evaluation of Proposed Federal Educa­
tion, The National Academy of Education, a Legislative Review, 
1975 (ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. 097-827), p. 89n. 
O *1 A 
The Higher Education Chronicle (May 27, 1974), 
p. 7. 
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Chairman of the Special Sub-Committee on Education, intro­
duced the Student Financial Act of 1975 to the House for 
215 consideration. He led off by a pointed referral to the 
tactics of the Nixon and Ford Administrations with regard to 
educational priorities. He had been especially concerned 
over the Congressional and Administration practice of the 
non-funding of direct, general institutional aid. He said: 
As with many other parts of the 1972 Amendments, 
the Nixon-Ford Administration has simply refused to 
carry out the law. Grants to which the law says insti­
tutions are entitled, have never been budgeted by the 
administration. . . . we in the Congress have made no 
serious effort ... either. So the victory of 1972 
has been emptied of its content ... if we have not 
the will to fund institutional aid, let us stop enacting 
what we know to be empty words.216 
Earl Cheit, who had raised the cry of crisis in 
higher education, noted that legislation such as O'Hara was 
discussing was "of little value if it could not be put into 
effect because of insurmountable administrative or constitu-
217 tional problems." The attractiveness, he suggested, was 
in the "supposed ease of administration" that made "federal 
institutional grants or programs based on general formulas 
p 1 O 
particularly attractive" on all levels of administration. 
215 U. S. Congressional Record (February 20, 1975), 
Volume 121, No. 25, H1967. 
216_, . , Ibid. 
217 Cheit, The New Depression, p. 89. 
218Ibid. 
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The drawback of the general formula approach lies in the 
fact that "it also runs the greatest risk of being found 
219 unconstitutional." Cheit pointed to two recent Supreme 
Court decisions as a case in point. 
. . .  i n v o l v i n g  g o v e r n m e n t a l  f i n a n c i a l  a i d  f o r  p r i ­
vate education and involving possible First Amendment 
violations, called into question the constitutionality 
of some types of institutional grants programs, at 
least insofar as these programs would provide funds 
for private institutions with strong religious affil­
iations. 220 
It is not clear why the funding was not forthcoming, 
but neither the Senate nor the House voted to fund the amend­
ments, authorized since 1972. Fifty million dollars in general 
aid authorization was attempted through the Byrd-Bayh amend-
221 ment during the 1975 Congress. Some funding akin to insti­
tutional aid, however, was included in a House-Senate com­
promise bill in 1976. The program included funds to upgrade 
facilities and programs at financially ailing or substandard 
institutions: (1) the basic program required $52 million 
222 and (2) the Advanced Program, $58 million. The bill was 
vetoed by President Gerald Ford on September 29, 1976, but 
it was easily overridden by both houses of Congress. The 
total bill (HR 14232) appropriated $56,618,207,575.00 for 
219 Cheit, The New Depression, pp. 89-90. 
220 , . ,  Ibid. 
221 Higher Education and National Affairs , 24, 
No. 25 (June 20, 1975), TT 
222 "Congress Revamps Aid to Manpower Health Training 
Programs," Congressional Quarterly, Oct. 2, 1976, p. 2684. 
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223 Labor-HEW financing during fiscal 1977. President Ford 
charged that the bill was "a perfect example of the triumph 
of election-year politics over fiscal restraint and respon-
2 2 a  sibility." Congressional leaders, however, claimed they 
had cut back $2 billion in programs, rather than providing 
225 for program expansion. A controversial amendment to the 
bill concerning anti-abortion also caused Ford some degree 
of consternation, since he was on record as favoring a con-
n J  f L  
stitutional amendment against legalized abortion. Thus 
an examination of federal aid in its ascendancy reveals a 
classic study in the growth of bureaucracy: once programs 
were legislated, Congress had a tendency to fund them, re­
fund old ones, and periodically add or enlarge administrative 
mechanisms for their administration. More recent legislation 
has tended to blur the constitutional question through empha­
sizing political process and the necessity for retention of 
227 a strong and viable private sector. Powerful political 
voices backed by an emerging and more vocal voice of higher 
education has gradually moved the constitutional question to 
223 Îbid. 
224 , . , Ibid. 
225 "Red Tape Blues," Newsweek, Aucrust 30, 1976. 
p. 77. 
226 , Ibid. 
227 Moynihan, Daedalus, p. 128. 
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a "back burner" and has shifted that responsibility to the 
223 states and to the courts to sort out. As more and more 
dependence has developed upon federal aid, the more respon­
sive higher education has become to the shifts in policy and 
229 leadership of the government. As political winds shifted, 
so did the fortunes of higher education. It was no accident 
there was a strong anti-intellectual current during the 
Nixon Administration. Students expressed strong opposition 
to the Administration's Viet Nam policies; politicians over­
reacted to campus anti-war demonstrations. The period was 
one of a general tug and pull between the White House and 
230 Congress. The events contributed to fiscal uncertainty 
at those institutions that had grown accustomed to federal 
largess which were suddenly faced with huge operating def-
. . 231 lcits. But despite the controversy, a great deal of 
growth has taken place, fiscally,over the past decade in 
terms of federal aid. Table 3 (page 177) provides an indica­
tion of the rate of that growth as well as the effects of an 
effort to slow the rate of federal involvement in favor of 
the contributions of the states and private interests in 
232 support of higher education. 
228 Moynihan, Daedalus, pp. 130-132. 
229Ibid., pp. 138-139. 230Ibid., pp. 36-37. 
231Ibid., p. 131. 232Ibid., p. 129. 
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Table 3 
Federal Expenditure for Higher Education 
Including Academic Research, 
Fiscal 1965-1975 in Millions of Dollars 
1965 $1,993 1969 $4,379 1973 $7,641 
1966 2,438 1970 5,142 1974 8,627 
1967 3,317 1971 6,153 1975 8,785* 
1968 4,363 1972 6,502 
*Moynihan, "Politics of Higher Education, " p. 129. 
178 
No changes of substance have been made concerning 
the basic structure of federal aid statutes since their 
233 creation. Although the laws were amended a number of 
times, particularly in 1967, 1972 and in 1976, the programs 
234 remained essentially stable. Basic Opportunity Grants 
enlarged the application of their progenitor, Educational 
Opportunity Grants, which are maintained under the appellation 
235 Supplemental Opportunity Grants. 
The Basic Equal Opportunity Grant Program is the 
most broadly-based federal program, which has as its pur­
pose access to higher education for students from lower 
2 36 income families. Such students must be accepted and 
attending approved post secondary institutions. The amount 
of award to a student is based upon a determination of his 
237 cost of education. During the 1978-79 academic year the 
238 awards are projected to range from $200 to $1,600. 
Briefly, other forms of aid are: "The National Direct 
Student Loan Program (NDSL) is for students who are enrolled 
at least half-time in an eligible institution, who need a 
233 . Richard L. Tombaugh, Financial Aid Administrator's 
Handbook (Denver: Educational Methods, Inc., 1976), pp. xiv-5. 
234.,-, 235_,., 236T, . , . a Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., pp. xiv-6. 
237 U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Wel­
fare, HEW Fact Sheet, No. (OE) 78-17907 (Washington: 1978), 
p. 2. 
238T, . , Ibid. 
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loan to help meet educational costs." Students who qualify 
may borrow up to (a) $2,500 if they are enrolled in a voca­
tional program and have not yet completed two years toward 
their bachelor's degree: (b) or $5,000 if one has passed the 
first two years, the first two years inclusive; and an aggre-
239 gate of (c) $10,000 for graduate study. The statute re­
quires repayment to begin nine months after graduation, and 
the three percent loan must be paid back within 10 years. 
Certain special occupations qualify the graduate for loan 
cancellations. 
Under certain exceptional conditions the Supplemen­
tal Educational Opportunity Grants are awarded. The half-
time conditions apply, and the SEOG must not be less than 
241 $200 or more than $1,500 per year. The awarding institu-
t 
tion must provide the student "with additional financial 
242 assistance at least equal to the amount of the grant." 
The College Work-Study Program (CWS) is a need-based 
program for students who need to earn a portion of their col-
243 lege costs. Eligibility requirements are the same as for 
other college-based programs. CWS places the student in 
jobs on or off campus with a "public or non profit" institu-
244 tion. The plan limits the student to a 40 hour week. 
2 
HEW Fact Sheet, No. (OE) 78-17907, p. 2 
240 Ibid 241 Ibid 242 Ibid 
243 Ibid 244 Ibid., p. 3 
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The institutional financial aid officer determines 
the student's need for the assistance, the time the student 
has available, and his health and ability to perform the 
245 work. Pay must at least equal minimum wages. 
The Guaranteed Student Loans (GSLP) do not depend 
upon tax money for their sources. Private lenders, such as 
banks and building and loans, assist students whose residence 
and satisfactory progress qualify them for the loans. "Some 
states and educational institutions also are lenders. The 
loans are insured by the Federal Government or guaranteed by 
246 a state or private nonprofit guarantee agency." 
As with other student loans, a scale of limits is 
set up, based on the length of time the student attends 
school. For an undergraduate, the yearly limit is $2,500 
per year? in most states graduate students may borrow up to 
247 $5,000 per year. The aggregate limit for undergraduates 
is $7,500, while graduate students are limited in debt accum­
ulation to $15,000. Graduate students in health-related 
248 studies may borrow up to $15,000. The loans are non-
cancellable , and must ordinarily be repaid within ten years, 
249 at 7% interest. 
P45 
HEW Fact sheet. No. (OE) 78-17907, p. 3. 
246Ibid. 247Ibid. 248Ibid. 
249Ibid. 
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Richard Tombaugh, a nationally known consultant in 
federal aid, is careful to indicate the states' role in the 
ascendancy of aid to education. He suggests: 
Suffice it to say that the emergence of the federal 
government as a primary provider of student assistance 
has been paralleled by a similar involvement by state 
government. State support has been provided primarily 
through scholarship and student loan programs, most of 
the latter being provided in association with the 
Guaranteed Loan Program of the federal government.250 
The constitutional and statutory bases for the state 
programs are briefly outlined in the next chapter# with a 
special emphasis upon their relationship to the First Amend­
ment. Growth in state aid since 1965 has reached the point 
that Tombaugh can say: "... virtually all states and ter­
ritories have either established state agency programs or 
251 are in the process of doing so." 
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISSONANCE 
During the late 1960s it was customary for educa­
tional commentators to describe the changing relationships 
between public and private higher education as a "blurring" 
of their historic distinctions. The predicted consequence 
252 would be a "quasi-public" system of education. As the 
250 Tombaugh, Financial Aid Administrator's Handbook, 
pp. xiv-6. 
251 Ibid., pp. xiv-7. 
252 William Kinnison, "Private Higher Education: 
Demise or Transition?" Educational Record, 50, No. 3 
(March 1974), 273. 
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rate of growth in the public sector increased and the pri­
vate sector assumed a "steady-state" pattern, ominous 
statistics sent a shudder throughout the postsecondary 
253 world. Enrollments were off, costs were rising, and pri­
vate support fell off considerably causing many church-related 
colleges to compromise once-proud principles by asking for 
254 government to aid them in their "plight." Their arguments 
were bolstered by a timely national recession and a mass of 
supportive research garnered by prestigious independent study 
255 groups. Instinctive reaction from leaders of the public 
sector was that of antipathy. The private sector wished to 
obtain a substantial share of public tax resources, thus 
causing a severe threat to the well-being of the public-
256 supported colleges and universities. Polarization was 
inevitable, and despite attempts to arrive at consensus, 
higher education has rarely been able to provide a united 
front as its testimony before Congressional committees bears 
257 witness. 
253 
Clark Kerr, "What We Might Learn from the Climac­
teric," Daedalus, 104, No. 1 (Winter 1975), 2. 
254 Moynihan, Daedalus, pp. 138-139. 
255 Walter Metzger, "The American Academic Profession 
in 'Hard Times,'" Daedalus, 104, No. 1 (Winter 1975), 27-41. 
256 Kerr, Daedalus, pp. 2-3. 
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It was early realized by the private higher educa­
tion community that favorable legislation would be passed at 
the national level only if a national policy of postsecon-
dary education were devised. Such policy efforts had been 
completed or were in the process within individual states. 
On a national scale a profusion of authoritative studies, 
258 position papers, and conference reports ensued. Litera­
ture thus produced, reflected arguments and positions which 
were emotional, polemical, replete with often-unintelligible 
logic, repetition, and contradictory conclusions drawn from 
259 the same data sources. 
The Education Commission of the States coordinated 
an effort by the higher education community "to evolve a 
consensus" to devise better policy and decision making 
260 in financing of higher education. The study document 
provides a revealing look at the kinds of problems that tend 
to polarize the responsible segments of higher education, as 
well as a chance to examine the exchange of ideas typical of 
261 each sector's perception of the problem. The Conference 
258 Robert Wood, "Academe Sings the Blues," Daedalus, 
104, No. 1 (Winter 1975), 49. 
259 
Daedalus, 104, No. 1 (Winter 1975), Passim. 
260 Robert F. Corcoran, ed., Financing Postsecondary 
Education; Policy Development and Decision Making (Denver: 
Higher Education Services, Education Commission of the States, 
September, 1974), Passim. 
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Workbook provided the springboard for a series of conferences 
conducted from October, 1974, through January, 1975. This 
researcher observed that although tangible results were not 
forthcoming from the series of conferences, their historic 
significance lies in the realm of "possibility" rather than 
263 "actuality." The precedent was established within the 
"higher education community" for discussions leading to 
political action designed to influence educational policy. 
265 Reaction to the pre-conference literature was mixed. 
Conclusions forwarded by reports and position papers tended 
to reflect predilections of their respective constituencies 
266 as might be expected: i.e., the American Association of 
State Colleges and Universities did not accept the conclu-
7 
sions of the Carnegie Commission and the CED as "gospel." 
Report conclusions were seen critically as: 
. . .  n o t  . . .  s c h o l a r l y  p u b l i c a t i o n s  o r  a s  o b j e c ­
tive or scientific approaches to better decision mak­
ing. Rather, they are viewed as both political and 
ideological—based heavily on the value judgements. . . 
held by their sponsors rather than on evidence rising 
out of the studies—and definitely intended to influ­
ence public policy at all levels.268 
262 Corcoran, Financing Postsecondary Education, Passim. 
263_,., 264t, . , Ibid. Ibid. 
265 Commentary on The Carnegie and CED Reports, 
"Financing Reports and the Attack on Low Tuition," American 
Association of State Colleges and Universities, in Corcoran, 
Financing Postsecondary Education, p. 24. 
266_,., 267--. . , 268_, . , _, Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 31. 
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In this instance, the reports were seen as an effort 
to "add to existing political and fiscal pressures in the 
269 states and at the federal level to raise tuition." Included 
in the pre-conference literature to which participants were 
requested to react were reports including: (1) The Committee 
for Economic Development; (2) the Carnegie Commission; 
(3) The Second Newman Report; (4) The National Board on 
Graduate Education; and (5) the National Commission on the 
270 Financing of Post-secondary Education. Emphasized within 
these reports were compilations of characteristic issues 
arising from diverse efforts to produce a national policy of 
271 "post-secondary education." Among the issues regarded 
269 Commentary on The Carnegie and CEP Reports, p. 31. 
270 The sources for the reports were cited by editor 
Robert Corcoran as: Committee for Economic Development, 
The Management and Financing of Colleges (New York: Com-
mittee for Economic Development, 1973); Carnegie Commission 
on Higher Education, Priorities for Action: Financial Report 
of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (New Jersey: 
McGraw Hill Book Company, 1973);The Carnegie Commission on 
Higher Education, The More Effective Use of Resources: An 
Imperative for Higher Education (New Jersey: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1972); The Carnegie Commission on Higher Educa­
tion, Higher Education: Who Pays? Who Benefits? Who Should 
Pay? (New Jersey: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974); Report 
of a Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare, The Second Newman Report: National Policy and 
Higher Education (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1973); National 
Board on Graduate Education, Federal Policy Alternatives 
Toward Graduate Education, January, 1974; National Board on 
Graduate Education, Doctorate Manpower Forecasts and Policy, 
November, 1973; National Board on Graduate Education, Grad­
uate Education: Purposes, Problems, and Potential, November, 
1972; National Commission on the Financing of Postsecondary 
Education, Financing Post-secondary Education in the United 
States (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973). 
271 Ibid., Passim. 
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as most controversial were: (1) access: (2) delivery mech­
anisms; (3) equity; (4) the private sector; (5) federal-
272 state relations; and (6) educational priorities. 
Each issue relates in some way to the other, and 
especially to the controversial question of constitutionality. 
Although initial debate between the public and private sec­
tors hinged about the legal question, more recent literature 
273 tends to be centered upon economic and political issues. 
As a means of providing equity, or general access to the pri­
vate sector, both the Carnegie Commission and the Committee 
for Economic Development (CED) urged that public tuition be 
sharply advanced as a means of reducing the gap between the 
274 sectors. The suggestion could provide means of favoring 
the private, church-related college without passing money 
directly to the institution. 
Dr. Carol Van Alstyne suggests that utilization 
of such schemes of delivering aid to higher education is 
"a false and oversimplified debate ... semantic ... 
confusing the issue. ... an interesting political 
272 Carol Van Alstyne, "Progress Report on the 
National Debates about Financing Postsecondary Education: 
Ten Basic IssuesCorcoran, Financing Postsecondary Edu­
cation, p. 125. 
273 Committee for Economic Development, Report: Cor­
coran, Financing Postsecondary Education, p. 9; Carnegie 
Commission on Higher Education, Report: Corcoran, Financing 
Postsecondary Education, p. 4. 
274 Ibid., p. 11. 
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275 question." To the noted economist, there is no actual 
difference between aid to students and aid to an institution. 
She further declares that "no means has yet been devised to 
show how much aid is actually spent for educational pur-
2 76 poses." Dr. Van Alstyne urges that debate should move 
past "semantic labels student aid and institutional aid . . . 
[which] make much more difficult identification of the actual 
277 flows of support." According to her, direction of sup­
port flows in a cycle: 
Aid to students is used, in part, for tuition, 
which is a source of funds for institutions; aid to 
institutions is used, in part, to offset (cost of] tui­
tions, which helps students pay for education.275̂  
The controversial "recommendations" forwarded by the 
National Commission on the Financing of Postsecondary Educa­
tion were formulated through means of an analytical model, 
279 which was the target of severe criticism. Spokesmen from 
the American Association of State Colleges and Universities 
considered recommendations to raise tuition in public insti­
tutions "bad judgment based on erroneous data and dangerous 
2 80 assumptions." The model based its conclusions upon the 
assumptions that student aid would control tuition costs 
so that no economic group would suffer: that the institution 
275 Van Alstyne, "Progress Report," Corcoran, Financing 
Postsecondary Education, pp. 130-131. 
276T, . , 277T, . , 278 , . , Ibid., p. 130. Ibid. Ibid. 
279 AASCU, "... Attack on Low Tuition," Corcoran, 
Financing Postsecondary Education, pp. 33-37. 
280Ibid., p. 36. 
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cost arrangement would predict student reaction accurately; 
that raising tuition is the only alternative resource remain-
p Q I 
ing that can be expanded. 
Public institutions could not accept the model 
2ft? because, in their view, it denies the world of actuality. 
A final disputed assumption was challenged by economists, 
Howard Bowen and Carol Van Alstyne, who discounted "depres­
sion mentality" and predicted a more optimistic future for 
higher education than either CED or Carnegie in company with 
poo 
the National Commission was able to deduce. More recent 
reports of improving fiscal and enrollment conditions have 
appeared, which provide encouragement to those who cling to 
. . 284 a more positive viewpoint. 
A recent Carnegie report recognizes that the "depres-
2 85 sion is lifting." It characterizes the state of higher 
education as in a phase of ". . . continuing, but reduced 
281 AASCU, "... Attack on Low Tuition," Corcoran, 
Financing Postsecondary Education, p. 36. 
282 , . 283t, Ibid. Ibid. 
284 W. John Minter and Howard R. Bowen, Private Higher 
Education: Third Annual Report on Financial and Educational 
Trends in the Private Sector of American Higher Education 
(Washington, D. C.: Association of American Colleges, May 
1977). 
OQC 
The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement 
of Teaching, The States and Higher Education: A Proud Past 
and a Vital Future (San Francisco: Carnegie Foundation, 
1976), p. ix. 
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growth." 286 Preservation of the private sector and institu­
tional independence are two of five major concerns expressed 
by the Commission. Justification for the continued existence 
and public support of the private sector was reviewed: 
(1) The sector has a "special contribution" to make in higher 
education; (2) reduces burdens on state funds; (3) creates 
competition; and (4) maintains faculty pay standards and 
28*7 
teaching loads at the high standard. Carnegie introduced 
a vital "peril point" concerning the amount a private insti-
288 tution could receive and remain non-public. The peril 
point is reached 
. . .when an average of one-half as much state subsidy, 
on a per student basis, is given directly or indirectly 
to support of institutional costs to private as to a 
comparable public college. The closer a private insti­
tution gets to being supported on an equal basis with 
public institutions, the closer it gets to being made, 
de facto , a public institution.289 
As more private institutions receive state and federal aid, 
they are becoming substantially accountable to both state 
and federal agencies. Carnegie says: 
Guerilla warfare now goes on all across the nation 
over what belongs to the institution and what belongs 
to the state. Independence erodes yearly in the face 
of the greater forces in the hands of the state, and 
The second concern is closely related to the first 290 
286 Carnegie Foundation, The States and Higher Edu­
cation, p. ix 
287 Ibid., p. 10. 288 Ibid 289 Ibid. 
290 Ibid., pp. 18-19 
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frustration on both sides grows daily. ... There is a 
revulsion across the nation against needless and unwise 
controls.̂ 91 
Concern over possible incursion of government into 
church-related higher education has long been a concern of 
292 opponents to state aid. The Carnegie Commission1s ex­
pressed concern over problems of independence from govern­
ment entanglement in education serves to reinforce "excessive 
entanglement" as an issue in the public debate over state 
.. 293 aid. 
Recent studies by the Association of American Col­
leges have revealed that despite the harsh realities of 
fiscal deprivation, "the staying power" of the private sec-
294 tor is "enormous." Howard Bowen and John Minter support 
their conclusions by evidence that shows net worth, assets, 
and revenues have kept pace with inflation, and no single 
major college had failed since the onset of the "depres-
295 sion." 
The latest report noted that the competitive posi­
tion between private and public sectors was very strong, 
291 Carnegie Foundation, The States and Higher Edu­
cation, pp. 18-19. 
292 293 Ibid., p. 19. Ibid. 
294 Howard R. Bowen and W. John Minter, Private 
Higher Education; First Annual Report on Financial and 
Educational Trends in the Private Sector of American Higher 
Education (Washington, D. C.: Association of American Col­
leges , 1975), pp. 78-79. 
295 
Ibid. 
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296 especially favoring the private sector. In actual dollar 
figures, the difference between public and private student 
costs relative to the incomes from which the charges would 
297 be paid did not change. Student aid, however, plays a 
vital factor in this "staying power," the researchers 
• , 298 noted. 
History has often invested man's institutions with 
potential or surprising twists and ironic outcomes. The 
idealist concept of a pluralistic educational system is 
still in its infancy and predictions of its future are by 
necessity little more than conjecture. Bowen and Minter 
voice a real concern: 
It would be a hollow victory if the private sector 
were to survive and even prosper financially at the 
expense of giving up the characteristics that make 
their survival important.299 
Some church groups are aware of the above possibil­
ity as they take a closer look at their educational institu­
tions. A commission studying Methodist higher education 
chose as its mission identification of archetypes of the 
church-related Methodist institutions deserving of continued 
church support: 
296 . Minter and Bowen, Private Higher Education, 
1977, pp. 61-67. 
297x, . , 298_, . , Ibid. Ibid. 
299 Bowen and Minter, Private Higher Education, 
1975, p. 79. 
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The crucial problem is for the United Methodist 
Church to decide if it values intellectual life suf­
ficiently to continue its responsibilities in higher 
education.300 
The implications are that "marginal" colleges will either 
be abandoned by the church to state systems or allowed to 
In 1972, Lutherans developed a policy report closely 
akin to the Methodists in principle, but it was not nearly 
as specific in its recommendations. They said: 
(5) If the Church wants a church-related college 
and wants it to perform a unique mission, it must be 
ready to more adequately provide financial support. 
(6) Church members. . . should concern themselves ... 
to the end that the aid . . . do(es) not require com­
promise of the church's purpose.302 
Despite educational idealism expressed in both studies 
the pragmatism of the compromise is beginning to hold sway 
over most institutional policy. Methodist spokesmen indicate 
that some institutions have already dropped their Methodist 
affiliation since 1969: 
-The University of Chattanooga, to become part of 
the University of Tennessee. . . in 1969. 
-Northwestern University, in 1974. 
-Athens College in Georgia, to join the state 
system in 1975. 203 
-Western Maryland College, in 1975. 
"̂ N̂CUMHE, A College-Related Church, p. 13. "̂ "'"Ibid. 
302 Report of the Lutheran Committee on Public Policy 
and Church-Related Higher Education (Wagner College, Staten 
Island, N. Y., January, 1972), p. 4. 
303 Gael M. O'Brien, "United Methodists Debate Changes 
in College Aid," The Chronicle of Higher Education, July 12, 
1976 , p. 6. 
193 
It is vital under the circumstances that all church-
related institutions consider their future with great care. 
A crucial point was recently raised in a Supreme Court deci­
sion, bearing upon the seductive power of state aid to sub-
304 vert the unique mission of church-related institutions. 
Justice Stevens of the U. S. Supreme Court warned in his 
dissent in Roemer: 
. . .  I  w o u l d  a d d  e m p h a s i s  t o  t h e  p e r n i c i o u s  t e n ­
dency of a state subsidy to tempt religious schools to 
compromise their religious mission without wholly aban­
doning it.305 
Mary Mullaney could see two options in the Justice1s 
words: church colleges must either "... abandon their 
religious character" in order to get government or state aid, 
or "refuse to submit to government.demands and be forced to 
306 close their doors." In her summary Mullaney expresses 
the Roman Catholic view of state aid, which calls for sup­
port without government enforcement machinery: 
It is in the public interest to support private 
education yet not to become its master. ... it is 
not salutary for federal enforcement agencies to estab­
lish themselves on private college campuses.30? 
304 Roemer et al. v. Board of Public Works of Mary-
land et al., 96 S. Ct. 2337, 2358 (1976). 
305 , . , Ibid. 
306 Mary Mullaney, "Religious Discrimination and 
Higher Education: A Continuing Dilemma," Notre Dame Lawyer, 
52 (1977), 165. 
307Ibid. 
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Public-private dissonance continues caught on the 
horns of a dilemma. The private sector wishes both to sur­
vive and simultaneously to maintain its historical religious 
character keeping government entanglement at arms length. The 
school that is adjudged "pervasively sectarian" must either 
desist from its sectarianism, or do without the aid it main­
tains is necessary for its survival. 
North Carolina higher education provides an illustra­
tion of the classic controversy between public and private 
sectors. Representative of the private sector is an organiza­
tion entitled the Association of Independent Colleges and 
Universities (AICU). The AICU is composed of 39 private 
church-related colleges and universities. Their non-public 
character and the fact that they are chiefly church-related, 
sets them apart from the public sector. They are led by 
their chief spokesman and president, Dr. Cameron West. 
The public sector is represented by the Board of Gov­
ernors of the University of North Carolina. The entire six­
teen public senior institutions of the university system are 
directed by the Board, which in turn, reports to the Governor 
and the Legislature. The intricacies of the debate over state 
aid are further complicated because State law places requests 
for financial aid from the private sector under the Board of 
Governors of the University of North Carolina. The statute 
reads: 
308 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). 
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The Board of Governors shall assess the contribu­
tions and needs of the private colleges and universi­
ties of the State and shall give advice and recommen­
dations to the General Assembly to the end that the 
resources of these institutions may be utilized in the 
best interest of the State. All requests by private 
institutions of higher education for state assistance 
to the institutions or to students attending them shall 
be submitted first to the Board for review and recommen­
dation before being presented to any other State agency 
or to the General Assembly.̂ 09 
The initial purpose of the law was to provide a 
vehicle for coordination of higher education within the 
state. The inclusion of both sectors under one board was 
intended to reduce likelihood of higher education being 
subjected to political disputes within the General Assem-
310 bly. Declining enrollments and subsequent loss of reve­
nue placed the burden of urgency upon proposals toward state 
assistance to the private sector. Preliminary explorations 
311 into the feasibility of tax aid began m 1968. A later 
report released by the Board of Higher Education in North 
Carolina reported on conditions of enrollment and fiscal 
needs in the church-related colleges of the state and 
312 adjudged most of them as "distressed.11 The impact of 
°̂̂ General Statutes of North Carolina, 116-11(11). 
310 Planning for Higher Education in North Carolina 
(Raleigh: N. C. Board of Higher Education, 1968), 2-68, 261. 
311ibid. 
312 Private Higher Education in North Carolina: Con­
ditions and Prospects - A Study of Enrollment, Finances, and 
Related Subjects, 1965-1970 (Raleigh: North Carolina Board 
of Higher Education, 1971), p. 33. 
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Earl Cheit's 1971 report worked its sorcery upon the North 
Carolina Legislature in much the same manner it had influ­
enced Congress. Despite warnings of paying too much atten­
tion to dire predictions that often effect a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, the Cheit report served to abrogate longstanding 
constitutional objections to public aid of church-related 
313 institutions. Legislators appeared receptive to economic 
arguments for an aid plan. Dr. West indicated a considerable 
drop in enrollments in the private sector, while the public 
314 sector kept on growing. He further lamented a rising 
"tuition gap" which allowed students to attend public insti­
tutions at low tuition, while inflation was driving the cost 
of a private education out of reach for all but the afflu-
315 ent. The resulting legislation was founded upon the 
assumption that the state saves money when it makes use of 
vacancies in the private sector instead of expanding public 
..... 316 facilities. 
The 1971 Legislature authorized the plan but did 
317 not provide the money. An institutional aid plan was 
funded but cost-per-student far exceeded projections and the 
plan was aborted. The budget for 1972-73 provided a $26.59 
313 Private Higher Education in North Carolina, p. 33. 
314T, . , 315_,., 316 T, . , Ibid., p. 6. Ibid. Ibid. 
317 The Board of Governors, Private Higher Education 
in North Carolina: Report and Recommendations (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina, 1975), III, 16-17. 
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318 per student enrolled in the private sector. Aid increased 
•51 Q 
in 1973 to $75.00 per FTE (full-time-equivalent student). 
Aggressive lobbying by the AICU raised the level in 1973-74 
320 to $200 per student, and to $400 for the 1975-77 bien-
321 322 nium. State allocations grew from $1,017,000 to 
$9,200,000 in 1977. AICU spokesmen envision that aid will 
323 
soon reach $20,000,000 for church-related higher education. 
Concern was expressed that: 
. . .  w h i l e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  f r o m  o t h e r  
sources to needy North Carolina residents declined by 
over 50 percent, from $2,600,000 in 1911 to $1,180,000 
in 1973-74. . . . Thus, although ostensibly a program 
of aid to students, the legislation in effect also pro­
vides institutional aid to private higher educa­
tion. . . .324 
The implication,therefore, suggests that the aid 
legislation provides aid to church-related colleges, thus 
raising serious constitutional questions, which were recently 
325 tested in the federal courts. Once the breach had been 
318 The Board of Governors, Private Higher Education, 
pp. 16-17. 
319 , . , 320 , . , Ibid. Ibid. 
321 
State of North Carolina, Budget, 1975-1977, M-48. 
322 The Board of Governors, Private Higher Education, 
p. 17. 
323 William D. Snider, Greensboro Daily News (Nov. 18, 
1976), Editorial, A-6. 
324 The Board of Governors, Private Higher Education, 
p. 17. 
325 Michael Smith v. The Board of Governors of the 
University of North Carolina et al., (no. C-C-76-131 (March 
1977). 
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opened to the state treasury, the way was widened annually 
as the private sector grasped effective political leverage 
in each legislative session subsequent to 1971. The momentum 
continued as the private sector consolidated its forces into 
a tightly-run group of professional lobbyists, behind Dr. 
Cameron West. 
The statute requiring the private sector to present 
its fiscal requests to the legislature via the Board of Gov­
ernors provides assurance that controversy has been substan­
tially blunted before issues reach the stage requiring leg-
326 
islative action. However, the private sector is dis­
quieted over the process and is making an effort to extract 
their organization from control of the Board of Governors, 
327 so that they might deal directly with the Legislature. 
The spokesmen for the Board see the move as ill-conceived, 
and possibly disruptive of the whole structure of higher 
328 education in the state. 
Opening salvos in anticipation of the 1977 session 
of the General Assembly first sounded in fall 1976, between 
William A. Johnson, Chairman of the Board of Governors, 
and various spokesmen from the private sector. In an address 
North Carolina General Statutes, 116-1 to 116-213. 
327 Ned Cline, "Private Colleges Seek State Funding 
Changes," Greensboro Daily News, Feb. 23, 1977, p. B-7. 
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Mr. Johnson delivered at Campbell College, he plead for the 
retention of the "private senior institutions as a valuable 
329 and unique resource which must be preserved." But he 
warned of the "trend" of the increasing dependence of private 
institutions upon the public treasury, which has seen a dras-
330 tic shift in sources of support by the private sector. 
According to Mr. Johnson, the state is headed for 
eventual appearance, or possible dominance of a "mutant" 
331 sector which he calls the "quasi-public" sector. Based 
upon conclusions drawn from a recent Carnegie Report, the 
quasi-public growth model (Figure 1, page 200) shows how 
332 such a "quasi-public" mutant might emerge. The model 
depicts three stages of change, although a number of inter­
mediate steps, caused by the intervention of variables, 
occur between the stages. The three stages simply are: 
past, present and future. 
The "past" status shows two sectors, private and 
public, appearing to have a true "dual system" of higher 
education. Size and power appear to be balanced, and sour­
ces of support reflect the nature of institutions supported. 
The public sector is supported primarily by tax monies, low 
329 
William A. Johnson, "State Aid: 'Serious 
Peril,'" Greensboro Daily News, Oct. 3, 1976, p. D-5. 
330Ibid. 331Ibid. 
332 
Carnegie, The States and Higher Education, 
pp. 9-20, Passim. 
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Quasi-Public Growth Model 
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tuition, private revenue and gifts. The public sector is 
almost completely under regulation of the state and federal 
governments, while the private sector is traditionally sup­
ported by tuition, private gifts and sponsoring church orga­
nizations. Government research monies, G.I. loans, federal 
construction loans, and non-profit exemptions require the 
accompaniment of government money into the private sector 
in the nature of standards and audits of reports. The state 
licensing requirement also places government limits upon the 
333 fiscal base of new institutions in the state. 
Depiction of the "present status" in the model reveals 
that a number of changes have taken place which resulted in 
a modification of the respective size of the two sectors. 
There is change in the sources of funds for each sector, as 
inflation has increased tuition costs in both sectors, but 
public rates remain considerably lower than those in the 
private sector. Some public institutions are beginning to 
receive an increasing amount of money from private sources 
and development programs. 
Changes in the private sector reflect the recent 
national recession, along with a number of other factors 
that have affected the fiscal health and enrollment of the 
non-public institutions. Church attendance and giving are 
"off" and the college percentage has suffered proportionately. 
333 
General Statutes of North Carolina, Section 116. 
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Since more funds from the private industries and institutions 
have been directed toward public institutions, many of the 
334 church-related schools have suffered as a consequence. 
As noted above, tuition has increased; some colleges have 
had to use such increases as a means of meeting current 
expenses. Taxes show a great increase, as federal aid, 
student aid, and institutional construction loans have been 
either added or enlarged relative to the initial stage. In 
both sectors, governmental control and accountability require­
ments have increased considerably, indicating the "trend" 
emphasized by Mr. Johnson. 
The debate, however, is not tied to the past, nor do 
the speakers wish to retain the reputation for being against 
"progress." The model has its value in depicting one view 
of what lies ahead for education if the same trend continues 
to enlarge upon itself. Mr. Johnson is saying there will 
emerge from the mists of controversy a new sector, not quite 
public, not quite religious, or not quite private, for its 
uniqueness will have been eroded, and this he calls "quasi-
public." In the "future status" there will eventuate 
three sectors out of the former two. The private sector 
334 
In the late fifties, the Minzes family from 
Rocky Mount, N. C. donated a substantial sum toward a new 
science building at Lenoir-Rhyne, which was named in their 
honor. Subsequently, East Carolina University diverted 
money from the same family toward the construction of Minzes 
Memorial Football Stadium. All switches of support have 
not been so dramatic, but telling, nevertheless. 
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will polarize between the terminals of "church-related" 
and "quasi-public." The quasi-public sector will divest 
itself entirely of church support, although it may retain a 
semblance of church-relatedness. It will couple into the 
public sector, thereby coming under the same strictures 
imposed upon public institutions. Its sources of support will 
blend with those of the public sector and will differ little 
in the monies derived from private sources, taxes, or tui­
tion. 
A tiny remnant of the former private sector will sur­
vive. It will be structured much like the "past stage" 
private sector, maintaining its strong ties with its spon­
soring denomination, contributing unique concepts, and inno­
vating novel designs of teaching and learning; in a word, 
fulfilling the purposes for survival claimed for the "private 
sector" and its champions. Fiscally, the "church-related" 
sector remains afloat through reliance upon multiple sources 
of income: the sponsoring churches, the substantial tuition, 
private foundations, wills, bequests, minimal state and fed­
eral aid, and good business efficiency. 
In his words, Mr. Johnson sees the present dual 
system in "serious peril," threatened primarily by an addic-
335 tion to tax support of the private church-related college. 
He says: 
335 Johnson, Greensboro Daily News, p. D-5. 
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The plea for public aid to private institutions 
is bottomed on the premises that such aid is necessary 
to save the private colleges and universities. Perhaps 
this is true in some cases, however, I argue that it is 
not enough just to preserve these institutions. They 
must be preserved as free and independent institutions; 
otherwise, they shall lose those very attributes and 
characteristics which make them so unique and so val­
uable to our system of higher education. And I am 
convinced that this cannot be done if we continue to 
pump more and more money into the private higher edu­
cation machine. 
So we are confronted with what appears to be an 
irreconcilable conflict.336 
In Mr. Johnson's view, the debate turns upon two 
primary issues: 
In one side we have the private institutions who 
say they should be given increasing sums of public 
moneys, but at the same time must be left unfettered 
by state regulation and state accountability so that 
they will be free to develop and pursue the kind of 
educational programs they desire, fix tuition and fees 
as they elect, and pay such faculty salaries and 
establish such student and faculty standards as 
they prefer. 
The other issue involves the questions of the public 
good. A long-standing constitutional principle requires 
that public money shall be spent for the general welfare of 
the public. The question of accountability is properly 
applied to the second issue also: 
On the other side we have the taxpaying public 
which has the right to determine how public money will 
be used and this means, of course, the right to exer­
cise some control over the user and to require the user 
to account.338 
3 36 Johnson, Greensboro Daily News, p. D-5, 
337 , . , 338t, . , Ibid. Ibid. 
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It is the second point which threatens the church-
related private colleges with "excessive entanglement," while 
339 the first speaks more to academic freedom. In the long 
run, both kinds of independence are menaced by the ever-
shortening rope between the institution and government.34^ 
If the private sector is asking the question, "How will we 
survive?" then Mr. Johnson is asking the question containing 
341 more critical consequences, "How well will we survive?" 
Throughout the fifty states the debate continues with 
different degrees of intensity, and over similar issues, 
producing a variety of outcomes. There seems to be no defi­
nite resolution to the controversy in legislation or through 
the courts. The next chapter examines the constitutional 
status of state support in the states, followed by the out­
standing court cases directly bearing upon the controversy. 
339 
Johnson, Greensboro Daily News, p. D-5. 
340 
The Carnegie Foundation, "Actual and Potential 
Controls over Private Institutions," The States and Higher 
Education, Supplement (Berkeley: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 
1976). 
341 Johnson, Greensboro Daily News, p. D-5. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONSTITUTIONAL BASES RELATIVE TO RELIGION AND 
HIGHER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE IN THE 50 STATES 
State governments have provided student aid in a 
growth pattern which parallels closely that of growth in fed­
eral aid. States have, for the most part, kept away from 
providing grants to institutions and students. State law­
makers have utilized scholarship and student loan programs. 
Most of the loans are provided in association with the Fed­
eral Guaranteed Loan program. 
Historically, the bulk of state government involve­
ment in student assistance has been carried on by a 
half dozen or so states, most notably the states of 
New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, California, New Jer­
sey, and Ohio, which collectively account for more than 
75% of the awards and dollars provided by state govern­
ment. . . the normal expansion of such programs has been 
escalated by the enactment of the State Government 
Incentive Program in the Higher Education Amendments 
of 1972, whereby matching funds were provided by the 
federal government to states who were willing to begin 
or expand state grant programs. As a result, virtually 
all states and territories have either established 
state agency programs or are in the process of doing 
so.l 
Growth of all state aid from 1969-70 through 1978 
is shown in Table 4 on page 207. A comparison of state 
funds vs. enrollment costs appears in Figure 2 on page 208. 
Richard L. Tombaugh, Financial Aid Administrator's 
Handbook (Denver, Colorado: Educational Methods, Inc., 
1976), xiv-6—xiv-7. 
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Table 4 
Growth of State Aid in the 
Fifty States and Territories** 
Number of Number of Dollars 
states or enrolled awarded 
Year territories recipients in millions 
1969-70 19 470,800 $ 199.9 
1970-71 21 535,200 236.3 
1971-72 23 604,000 268.6 
1972-73 29 661,700 315.5 
1973-74 31 733,300 364.2 
1974-75 37 813,100 440.8 
1975-76 48 901,900 510.2 
1976-77* 53 1,095,300 645.4 
*Estimated 
**Source, The Chronicle of Higher Education Deskbook (Wash­
ington: Editorial Projects for Education, Inc., 1977, 
p. 138. 
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Figure 2 
State Funds vs. Enrollment, Costs** 
Percentage increase since 1966-67 
300 
State appropriations-/ 
250 
200 
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100 
Public college 
enrollment-^ 
Higher education 
price index 
—0 
67-68 69-70 71-72 73-74 75-76 
* Estimated 
Increases in state funds for higher education are 
compared above with enrollment and operating costs. 
**Source, M. M. Chambers and W. Kent Halsted, National 
Center for Educational Statistics, The Chronicle of Higher 
Education Deskbook, p. 133. 
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The various state programs which supply aid to private and 
church-related schools are analyzed in Table 5 on page 210 . 
The rapid growth of aid programs is cause for concern among 
those who must administer them. Tombaugh observes: 
General agreement probably exists that the rela­
tively rapid expansion of financial assistance programs, 
many of them with a specialized manpower or targeting 
purpose, has provided us with an excessive number of 
programs and an inadequate supply of funds to meet the 
needs of actual and potential participants in post-
secondary education. The philosophical and political 
compromises, the well-intended "safeguards" against 
abuse, and the absence of definitive purpose, respon­
sibility, or jurisdiction, have given the country a 
collage of financial assistance effort that is less 
efficient, and therefore less effective than it might 
be.2 
The variety of financial aid programs among the 
fifty states may be categorized within five general types, 
which are analyzed in Tables 5 and 6 on pages 210-213. 
States provide assistance to medical schools or students, but 
medical aid differs from other categories in amount of money 
provided. States are usually generous with aid to institu­
tions and students that are involved in health services. 
Most of the programs described in Table 6, page 212, have 
been challenged in state and federal courts, and some have 
3 gone to the United States Supreme Court. The basic programs 
which most states enacted are variations on the themes of 
scholarships, grants or loans. In 1976-1977, there were 
o 
Tombaugh, Aid Administrator's Handbook, pp. xiv-7. 
3 Chapter V, below. 
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Table 5 
State Aid Programs to Church-Related Colleges 
Student Aid 
w G 
ft 0 
•H -H 
A -P CO W (0 EH * 
•• M C N g 1 H 
CO rtj 0 -H $ l rfl Eh <H -r) r-H CO a ° 2 O +> (d 
^ .3 -H 2, IS S "d 
2 O 3 & Q O EH OJ 0 CO ^ <D 3 o o s 
Institutional Aid 
CO 
EH 
O 
•M CO 
U EH 2 CO Oi 
<D a Q M 
M a z K 
•pj o o EH 
P O o pq O 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
X X XX 
X XX X 
X 
X XX 
X XX X X 
X 
X  X X X  X X 
X X X  
X  X X X  X 
X  X X X  
X X* 
X 
X X X XX 
X 
X X X 
X  X X *  X 
X  X X X  
X X X  X X 
X X X  
X  X X *  X X 
X X X* X* X X 
X X X* X* X X* X X 
X X X  X X X *  
X* 
X 
X X* 
X 
*Medical, dentistry, nursing-assistance to students, 
institution, or building program, depending upon the category 
indicated. 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Student Aid Institutional Aid 
CO 
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New Hampshire X X X 
New Jersey X X X* X X X 
New Mexico X X X X* 
New York XX X X* X X X 
North Carolina X X* X X* 
North Dakota XX* 
Ohio X X X X* X X 
Oklahoma X X X 
Oregon X X X X X 
Pennsylvania X X X X* 
Rhode Island X X X X X* X 
South Carolina X X X X X X X 
South Dakota X X X 
Tennessee X X* X X X* 
Texas X X X* X X* X 
Utah 
Vermont X X X X X* 
Virginia X* X X X X 
Washington X* 
West Virginia X X X 
Wisconsin X X X* X X* X* 
Wyoming X 
*Medical, dentistry, nursing-assistance to students, 
institution, or building program, depending upon the category 
indicated. 
Source: Richard M. Millard, Higher Education in the 
States (Denver: Education Commission of the States, 1976). 
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Table 6 (continued) 
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Nevada x 
New Hampshire X X 
New Jersey X X X X 
New Mexico X X X 
New York x x x 
North Carolina X x 
North Dakota x x x 
Ohio x x x 
Oklahoma x x x 
Oregon X X 
Pennsylvania X X X X 
Rhode Island X X 
South Carolina X 
South Dakota X X X 
Tennessee X 
Texas X X X 
Utah x X 
Vermont X 
Virginia X X X X 
Washington X X X 
West Virginia X 
Wisconsin X 
Wyoming x X X 
214 
38 states which provided some form of scholarship or student 
equalization grant to students of both private and public 
4 colleges. Loans to students were provided by 30 states. 
These loans were either guaranteed by the state, or were 
included as a part of a revolving fund which theoretically 
allows for perpetual growth in terms of money available to 
5 an increasing student market. Contracts are made between 
students and 27 states for specific vocational fields in 
return for aid money. The money is often paid directly to 
the institution on the basis of the numbers of students in a 
certain field. This latter plan is followed in only 19 
7 states. Direct grants to institutions, shunned by federal 
legislation, were utilized by only 17 states to assist insti-
O 
tutions in capitalization and construction. Issuance of 
construction bonds backed by state credit became a legal, 
9 indirect method of funding of colleges by 15 states. The 
category of "other" is applied to 12 states and includes 
such plans as educational tax credits, regional agreements, 
and grants applicable out-of-state.10 In the case of all 
the above plans, they apply to private, church-related col­
leges, either directly or indirectly. 
^Table 5, page 210. 
^Ibid. ^Ibid. ^Ibid. 
®Ibid. ^Ibid. 10Ibid. 
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Constitutional restraints within the fifty states 
generally forbid direct aid to religion or to religious 
institutions. State constitutions by and large hold to the 
consensus that states control tax funds and do not allow 
for their utilization by religious or private concerns, nor 
for the use of state credit by such organizations.^""'" 
According to the fifty state constitutions, there 
are 13 which prohibit the use of state tax money in support 
12 of private corporations. States which specifically forbid 
aid to private and/or sectarian higher education are limited 
13 to seven. However, 13 states single out sectarian higher 
14 education for non-receipt of aid from the public treasury. 
Other states draw an even harder line as 11 of them recognize 
a danger to the state in providing aid to "sectarian con-
15 trolled" institutions. In 30 states, prohibition or guar­
antees varied in their expression to the degree that some 
bear upon the church-state-education issue in an oblique 
way, or in a unique manner.^ 
Guarantees for the general welfare of the people are 
provided by most states through constitutional control of 
the governments' taxes and credit. Constitutions of 14 states 
deem the issue significant enough to express concern in a 
"^Table 6, page 212. 
12Ibid. 13Ibid. 14Ibid. 
"̂ Ibid. "̂ Ibid. 
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17 guarantee within the constitution. Finally, misapplication 
of state credit by or on behalf of private or sectarian orga­
nizations, institutions, groups or individuals is prohibited 
18 by 28 states. It should be noted that each state has some 
form of prohibition which if strictly applied might provide 
basis for litigation. Chapter five, following, will discuss 
further how litigation has characterized the church-state 
controversy, especially as it applies to the fifty states. 
The state-by-state account which follows deals with 
the constitutional references to state support of religion, 
or religious education. Following the constitutional standard 
will be noted the most recent legislative programs and appro­
priations which directly or indirectly serve to support 
church-related colleges. 
ALABAMA 
The state constitution forbids the establishment of 
religion by law, and taxes shall not be used for places of 
19 worship or ministerial salaries. More explicit, however, 
is the provision forbidding appropriations for other than 
state-controlled educational institutions, unless the state 
20 legislature votes with a two-thirds majority to overrule. 
"^Table 6, page 212. "^®Ibid. 
19 Alabama, State Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 3. 
20 
Ibid., Art. IV, Sec. 73; see also Table 6. 
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But the article on education is more explicit, denying the 
expenditure of monies raised for support of public schools, 
21 "for the support of any sectarian ... school." 
In 1971, a proposal was made to revise the consti­
tution in order to make way for a program proposed by the 
council for the advancement of private colleges in Alabama. 
The proposal provided for a step-by-step program of financial 
assistance to students attending all private colleges, includ-
22 ing church-related institutions. 
The Legislature submitted the plan to the Alabama 
State Supreme Court for an advisory opinion, which held that 
the unrestricted grant program would violate both the state 
23 and federal constitutions through "excessive entanglement." 
Presently, Alabama does not report appropriations for 
private colleges or universities. However, some money under 
the guise of scholarships or other appropriations finds its 
24 
way to private colleges such as Tuskegee Institute. 
21 Alabama, State Constitution, Art. XIV, Sec. 263; 
see also Table 6. 
22 Elden T. Smith, A Survey of State Programs of Aid 
to Independent Colleges and Universities and their Students 
(Washington, D. C.: -National Council of Independent Colleges 
and Universities, 1971). 
23Alabama, 301, 280 So.2d.547(1973). 
24 Elden T. Smith, A Survey of State Programs of Aid, 
p. 4. 
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ALASKA 
Considerable controversy has persisted over the 
support of private church-related colleges in Alaska. The 
Alaska Constitution provides essentially the same safeguards 
as does Alabama with regard to freedom and establishment of 
25 religion. Schools maintained by the state must be free of 
sectarian control, and no tax money shall directly "benefit 
26 any religious or other private institution." 
However, in 1974, the Legislature passed House Bill 
181, which specifies that tuition grants: 
. . .  m a y  n o t  b e  i n  a n  a m o u n t  t h a t  w o u l d  r e s u l t  i n  
a student paying less in tuition or fees at a private 
college or university than would be required for a 
similar enrollment at the state institution in the 
same city.27 
In a more recent development, Alaska was presented 
with a proposed constitutional amendment, Proposition No. 4, 
which would have provided state grants for students attending 
private, church-related schools. The amendment was rejected 
by voters, 56.3% to 43.7%, providing a disappointment to 
administrators at financially shaky Alaska Methodist Univer-
28 
sity. The referendum, however, did not affect the scholar­
ship appropriations for 1976-1977, as Chambers reports 
25 Alaska Statutes, Article 1, Sec. 4; see also Table 6. 
26 Ibid., Article 7, Sec. 1; see also Table 6. 
27 
Ibid., Article 9, Sec. 14.40.776; see also Table 6. 
28 "Nebraska, Alaska, Maryland Voters Uphold Separa­
tion," Church and State, 29, No. 11 (Nov. 1976), 3. 
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$218,000 in student scholarship aid, as well as $47,768 in 
29 "other appropriations." 
In a political sense, however, the popular opinion 
of the Alaskan public prefers that tax money provide for 
public, not private or religious educational services. The 
constitutional requirements were upheld once the voters were 
given opportunity to express their opinion. 
ARIZONA 
Under the Arizona Constitution, freedom of conscience 
involves the restriction of public money and property from 
30 aiding "religious worship exercise, or instruction." The 
state constitution furthermore forbids any "... tax ... 
or appropriation or public money made in aid of any church, 
31 or private or sectarian school. ..." 
No data exists on direct or indirect appropriations 
supporting private church-related institutions inside the 
state. However, the Arizona legislature passed in 1976 a 
measure which allows for placement of Arizona students with 
other public and private educational institutions and agencies. 
M. M. Chambers, "State Funds for Higher Education, 
1976-77," The Chronicle of Higher Education Deskbook (Wash­
ington, D. C.: Editorial Projects for Education, Inc.), p. 127. 
30 
Arizona, Constitution, Article II, Sec. 12; also 
see Table 6. 
31Ibid., Art. IX, Sec. 10 
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The legislature authorized "payment of partial or full tui­
tion," not in excess of similar costs within the area covered 
by the "Compact for Western Regional Cooperation in Higher 
Education."^ 
Such an agreement could eventuate the indirect sup­
port of a church-related institution through tuition payments 
to a student placed outside the compact area. However, under 
present Supreme Court rulings, excessive entanglement would 
be difficult to prove. 
ARKANSAS 
The Declaration of Rights of the State of Arkansas 
maintains the First Amendment freedoms by saying: 
. . .  N o  m a n  c a n ,  o f  r i g h t ,  b e  c o m p e l l e d  t o  a t t e n d ,  
erect or support any place of worship; or to maintain 
any ministry without his consent.^ 
The implication for state support of church-related schools 
is indirectly noted under the article regarding the Legisla­
tive Department: 
No state tax shall be allowed, or appropriation of 
money made except to raise means for payment of the just 
debts of the State, or defraying the necessary expenses 
of government, to sustain common schools, to repel 
32 Arizona Revised Statutes, Title 15, Ch. 7, Arti­
cle 4, 15-761.01 amending 15-764 A.R.S.; The Compact in­
cludes: California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New 
Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, Alaska and 
Hawaii. 
33 Arkansas, Constitution, Article II, Sec. 24; 
also Table 6. 
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invasion and suppress insurrection, except by a major­
ity of two-thirds of both houses of the General Assem­
bly. 34 
In addition, state control over appropriated funds 
is maintained in the article on education: 
No money or property belonging to the public school 
fund, or to this state for the benefit of schools or 
universities, shall ever be used for any other than the 
respective purposes to which it belongs.35 
Arkansas became involved in financing higher educa­
tion through the necessity of administering federal loans. 
A state student loan program is funded through the sale of 
state revenue bonds "... not to exceed $3,000,000.00." 
The Legislature based its actions, which seem to be 
inconsistent with constitutional mandate, upon an "urgent 
need" to make loan funds available for more eligible stu­
dents. An emergency was declared to exist and the article 
of passage read in part: 
. . .  a n d  t h i s  a c t  b e i n g  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  i m m e d i a t e  
preservation of the public peace, health, and safety 
shall be in full force and effect from and after its 
passage and approval.37 
As of 1976-77, state scholarship aid appropriated 
amounts to $259,000, and "other appropriations" are $2,249,000. 
34 Arkansas, Constitution, Article V, Sec. 31; see 
Table 6. 
"^Ibid., Article XIV, Sec. 2; Table 6. 
36 Arkansas Statutes, Public Laws, Sec. 80-416; 
80-341. 
37 Arkansas Statutes, Revised 1975, No. 884. 
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It is unclear as to whether the loan funds mentioned above 
are included. 
CALIFORNIA 
The California State Constitution provides a sweep­
ing, but specific "no aid" provision. It first says: 
No public money shall ever be appropriated for the 
support of any sectarian or denominational school, or 
any school not under the exclusive control of the offi­
cers of the public schools. . . .3® 
and it continues: 
Neither the legislature nor any county shall ever 
make any appropriation, or pay from any public fund 
whatever, or grant anything to or in aid of any relig­
ious sect, church, creed, or sectarian purpose, or help 
support any school, college, university, hospital, or 
other institution controlled by any religious creed, 
church, or sectarian denomination, nor shall any grant 
or donation ... ever be made by the state ... for 
any religious creed, church, or sectarian purpose what­
ever . 39 
The article on education is more to the point: 
No public money shall ever be appropriated for the 
support of any sectarian or denominational schools or 
any school not under the exclusive control of the offi­
cers of the public schools. . . .40 
The Constitition notwithstanding, California has 
had a state scholarship program since 1956. The three objec­
tives of the program are to: 
38 
California, Constitution, Article IV, Sec. 22. 
39 
Ibid., Article IV, Sec. 30. 
40 
Ibid., Article IX, Sec. 8. 
223 
1) Provide education for able, but needy students; 
2) "Divert" students to independent colleges and 
universities; 
3) To help, "indirectly, to keep independent insti­
tutions strong and vigorous." 
Independent college presidents agree that the schol­
arship program helps their institutions by bringing them 
outstanding students and by relieving the students and 
budgets of the colleges.41 
The "Cal Grant" program was formulated by the con­
solidation of three existing programs into one, and as of 
1977, utilized a common application form. Unique to the bill 
was the provision that allows student aid to go to the part-
time students. "The legislation provides for a $3.5 million 
expansion of state programs to be financed by Federal State 
42 Student Incentive Grant moneys." 
The program paid $34,003,000 in scholarships in 
1974-75, and increased to an estimated $47,000,000 in 1977. 
The 1976-77 appropriations for student aid totalled $60,620,000 
44 an increase over a two-year period of 51%. 
According to the National Council of Independent 
Colleges and Universities, the 1975 appropriations provided 
41 
Elden T. Smith, California State Scholarship 
Program Since 1956, Los Angeles: Association of Indepen-
dent California Colleges and Universities, 1974 (ERIC 
Document Reproduction Service No. 058-853)« 
42 "Congress Ponders Additional Sums for Postsecondary 
Access," Higher Education and National Affairs (October 17, 
1975), Vol. XXIV, No. 41, p. 3. 
43 44 
Ibid. Ibid., p. 127. 
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private institutions with 46% of the scholarship award money 
($40,308,585) in 1975-76. Students at independent insti­
tutions received 80% of fellowship awards, funded at $2 mil­
lion. The independents did not fare so well in occupational 
education, since 51% of first-year awards must be made in 
45 communxty colleges. 
No distinction is made in the distribution of funds 
to church-related and non-church-related institutions. The 
46 schools are generally designated as "independent." 
COLORADO 
The State Bill of Rights of Colorado effectively 
seals off sectarian benefits at the expense of the freedoms 
of the general public. 
. . .  N o  p e r s o n  s h a l l  b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  a t t e n d  o r  s u p ­
port any ministry or place of worship, religious sect 
or denomination against his consent. Nor shall any 
preference be given by law to any religious denomina­
tion or mode of worship.47 
The explicit prohibition of the Constitution for 
support of sectarian schools from public funds offers 
no hope to church-related institutions seeking tax support, 
or state assistance of any form. 
45 Elden T. Smith, "Report of State Legislation and 
Programs Relating to State Aid for Independent Colleges and 
Universities," (Washington, D. C.: National Council of Inde­
pendent Colleges and Universities, 1975), p. 5. 
46 Ibid. Passim. 
47 
Colorado, Constitution, Article II, Sec. 4; also 
Table 6. 
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Neither the General Assembly ... or other public 
corporation shall ever . . . pay from any public funds 
or moneys whatever, anything in aid of any church or 
sectarian society, or for any sectarian purpose ... 
to help support or sustain any school, academy, seminary, 
college, university ... controlled by any church of 
sectarian denomination. . . . ° 
There is a general provision, however, for student 
aid, and Senate bill 39 in 1974 provided for veterans' aid. 
The possibility exists that grant money which pays for space 
contracts outside the compact area, or in other compact states 
might find its way in the form of tuition into a church-
related institution. If such is the case, it is definitely 
49 counter to the statutes. 
The monies involved in student assistance are con­
siderable. M. M. Chambers of Illinois State University 
notes that from 1974 to 1977, there has been a 22% increase 
in student aid, probably as a result of the 1974 special 
session. The present appropriations are $14,615,000, in 
50 addition to $2,069,000 for veterans' assistance. 
CONNECTICUT 
The Constitution of Connecticut is less specific 
with regard to support of religious education than are the 
48 , • Colorado, Constitution, Article IX, Sec. 7; 
Table 6. 
49 
Table 5. 
50 
Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
p. 127. 
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western states. The Bill of Rights concerns itself with 
prevention of inequality of privilege or "public emoluments" 
from the community: Implicit in the statement, however, is 
the suggestion that no religious group or class of society 
51 would be given privileges denied others. 
The article concerning religion spelled out what 
was implicit in the first article: 
. . .  N o  p e r s o n  s h a l l  b y  l a w  b e  c o m p e l l e d  t o  j o i n  
or support, nor be classed with, or associated to, any 
congregation, church, or religious association. No 
preference shall be given, by law, to any religious 
society or denomination in the State.52 
In the article pertaining to the school fund, Con­
necticut lawmakers forbade the passage of any law that would 
divert school monies "to any other use than ... public 
schools. 
The Constitution notwithstanding, recent legislation 
endorsed the policy of public support for private higher edu­
cation. There was no stated exclusion of sectarian colleges. 
The expressed purpose was utilitarian in philosophy: the 
greatest good for the greatest number of people. This was 
to be accomplished through aid to "independent" colleges in 
the same way aid was given to public higher education. A 
complicated formula was derived whereby independent colleges 
51 The Constitution of Connecticut. Art. I, Sec. 1. 
52Ibid., Art. VII, Sec. 1. 
53Ibid., Art. VIII, Sec. 4. 
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which qualified could fill available spaces with an agreed-
upon number of full-time equivalent students. A contract for 
the payment of use of the places would be drawn up and aid 
54 paid to the institution by Connecticut. 
Funding in 1975-76 amounted to $2,968,400. The 
amount received is limited by the association and appro­
priation. Each college matches the state aid with an amount 
55 equal to 80% of contracted funds. The state Health and 
Education Assistance Authority has as its purpose the issu­
ance of "tax exempt bonds for the construction of facilities 
at public or private institutions." Student aid exists in 
the form of: State Scholarships, 1975-76, $1,877,373;^® 
Veterans Scholarships; College Construction Grants, $218,550 
in 1975-76; Work Study and Guaranteed Loan, about $40,267,000 
in 1975-76; and Higher Education grants funded in 1975-76, 
$192,600.57 
The legislature defeated an attempt to require a 
state audit of all public funds allocated to private insti-
5 8 tutions. The desire to provide aid outweighed the tra­
ditional pressures for accountability. 
54 Connecticut Statutes, 1975, Vol. 5a, Part IV, 
Section 10-331a. 
55 
Elden T. Smith, NCICU Report, 1975, p. 9. 
^Chambers, Chronicle of Higher Education, p. 12 7. 
57 
Elden T. Smith, NCICU Report, p. 10. 
5 8 
Connecticut, "Commission for Higher Education, 
Report, 1974, House Bill 5316 (Code annotated, 1974). 
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DELAWARE 
Delaware, the first state to ratify the federal Con­
stitution, took care in its Declaration of Rights to insure 
59 against an establishment of religion. 
The prohibition against tax support of sectarian 
schools is a classical rendition of the Blaine Amendment. 
No portion of any fund now existing or which here­
after be appropriated, or raised by tax, for educational 
purposes, shall be appropriated to or used by, or in aid 
of any sectarian church or denominational school . . . .60 
Yet, in direct contradiction to the above article, 
the General Assembly by majority vote enacted a law provid­
ing tax monies for transportation of non-public primary and 
secondary school children. 
No report exists relative to private college educa­
tion in Delaware, except to note that there is a program 
based on need for those students who are Delaware residents 
and who are undergraduate students. 
GEORGIA 
The Georgia Constitution in its Bill of Rights 
states: 
59 Delaware, Constitution, Article I, Sec. 1. 
°̂Ibid., Article X, Sec. 3. 
Îbid., Article X, Sec. 5. 
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No money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, 
directly, or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, or 
denomination or religionists, or of any sectarian insti­
tution. 62 
The prohibition seems straightforward enough, but 
in 1970, Georgia voters saw no inconsistency in voting for 
the following amendment: 
The General Assembly is authorized to provide by 
law for grants or scholarships to citizens of Georgia 
who are students attending colleges or universities in 
this state which are not branches of the University 
System of Georgia. The General Assembly shall provide 
the procedures under which such grants or scholarships 
shall be made and is authorized to provide appropria­
tions for such purposes. . . . Taxes may be levied and 
public funds expended for such purposes.63 
The definition of an "eligible student" requires 
that one be attending a college "which shall have an aca­
demic program not comprised principally of sectarian instruc-
In 1975, the legislature appropriated about $6 million 
in tuition grants and $800,000 in state incentive scholar­
ships. Poor economic conditions kept the authorized $600 
65 per student level at $400. The incentive scholarships 
increased in 1976-77 to $1,943, but no firm figure is 
Constitution of Georgia, Article 1, Sec. 1, 
Par. XIV. 
63Ibid., Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. II, Subpar. 9; also 
Georgia Law, 1970, p. 1140; Acts 1971, pp. 906, 909. 
64 Ibid., Art. VII, Sec. 32-3903. 
65 Elden T. Smith, NCICU Report, p. 9. 
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available for the tuition grants. The grant program is 
likely hidden within $21,274,000 of "other appropriations."̂  
FLORIDA 
The Declaration of Rights in the Florida Constitu­
tion strictly forbids direct or indirect use of tax money 
6 7 for support of religion. 
The state school fund has as its sole purpose the 
68 "support and maintenance of free public schools." 
Florida has no direct institutional aid programs. 
There is potential, however, for contracts with the private 
sector, and indirect aid through student assistance. The 
Florida program includes scholarship aid for disadvantaged 
69 minorities, Indians, student loans, and grants. 
In terms of tax money paid out in 1976-77, scholar­
ship programs provided $7,308.00 for residents, while "other 
appropriations" were $7,511,000. The Board of Regents was 
70 allotted $3,907,000 for educational contract purposes. 
Those church-related colleges receiving assistance do so 
only in the "laundering process" of aid to the student. 
66 Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
pp. 127, 135. 
6 7 Florida, Constitution, Article I, Sec. 3. 
6 8 Ibid., Article IX, Section 6. 
69 Smith, NCICU Report, p. 8. 
70 Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, p. 127. 
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Aid to students in private institutions was limited 
to "forty percent of general revenue payments to the student 
71 financial aid trust fund." Another limitation was placed 
upon students by making receipt of aid contingent upon their 
attending a Southern Association accredited institution, or 
72 one whose credits may be transferable to such a school. 
HAWAII 
The state constitution quotes the federal Consti­
tution's establishment clause verbatim in the Bill of 
73 Rights. The constitution forbids tax monies used for 
74 anything but a public purpose. In addition, aid to paro­
chial or sectarian education is spelled out: 
. . .  N o r  s h a l l  p u b l i c  f u n d s  b e  a p p r o p r i a t e d  f o r  
the support or benefit of any sectarian or private 
educational institution.̂ 5 
No legislation, at present, permits nor condones 
aid to church-related colleges in Hawaii. There is no indi­
cation that Hawaiian tax monies are utilized directly or 
indirectly by church-related colleges. 
F̂lorida, State Laws: 239: 672 (1975) at 110. 
72Ibid., 239: 715 (1975) at 112. 
73 . . . . Hawaii, Constitution, Article I, Sec. 3. 
74 Ibid., Article V, Sec. 6. 
Îbid., Article IX, Sec. 1. 
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IDAHO 
The state constitution forbids the forced attendance 
*7 ̂  
or taxation for the support of any religious denomination. 
The law also forbids the use of state credit for private 
77 individuals or groups. A carefully-worded section also 
forbids public corporations from assisting institutions 
such as: 
any school, academy, seminary, college, or other 
literary or scientific institution controlled by any 
church, sectarian or religious denomination whatso­
ever. . . .78 
Although in 1976-77 the state provided over $70 
million in student and institutional aid, there is no indi­
cation that any of it was utilizfed in an unconstitutional 
79 manner by church-related colleges. 
ILLINOIS 
The state constitution requires that no one be 
required against his consent to provide support for, or to 
80 attend a religious denomination not of his preference. 
81 Public monies are restricted to public use only. The 
76 Idaho Constitution, Article I, Sec. 4. 
Îbid. , Article VIII, Sec. 2. 
70 
Ibid., Article IX, Sec. 5. 
79 Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, p. 128. 
80 Illinois, Constitution, Article I, Sec. 3. 
81 
Ibid., Article VIII, Sec. 1(a). 
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article on education, almost a carbon copy of the Blaine 
Amendment, forbids public corporations from the use of pub­
lic property or money to support religious education on any 
82 educational level. In 1974, fiscal pressures that affected 
higher education nationally, inspired a report on state 
83 support of private educational institutions. The report 
differed little in its concerns and conclusions from other 
general reports of the period: (1) concern for retention 
of diversity for education through educational choice; 
(2) declining private revenue; and (3) desire for solvency 
and survival of the private sector. Significant in the 
report was expressed the need to maintain independence from 
public control over private education. The report said: 
There must be ... a strong sense of community, 
unity of purpose, freedom to experiment, challenge, 
and innovate ... enhance freedom from political influ­
ence and from self-serving social pressures. At the 
same time, they need to strengthen their capability for 
providing a productive environment for scholars, for 
serving as a catalyst for intellectual freedom in other 
institutions and organizations . . . although some public 
surveillance will properly be necessary if there is to 
be assistance from public funds, the private institu­
tions must be held in their own hands, the essential 
ingredients of final authority. 
82 Illinois, Constitution, Article X, Sec. 3. 
83 
Strengthening Higher Education in Illinois: A 
Report on the State's Role Recommendation for Financial Aid 
from Public Funds, Illinois: Commission to Study Non-Public 
Higher Education in Illinois, 1973 (ERIC Document Reproduc­
tion Service No. 28745). 
®4Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
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The report expressed claims which are echoed in 
arguments supporting state aid. The frequency and similar­
ity of the statements do not always sound convincing. 
The commission has observed that a church rela­
tionship per se does not mean church control, nor 
does the fact that an institution espouses sectarian 
interests necessarily mean that it is under church 
control. In some instances, the institution is owned 
by the church; in others, a majority of the Board of 
Trustees are clerical or lay members of a church body. 
But in still others, the connection is less direct, 
although it may include such aspects as contribution 
to financial support by the religious body or the 
linkage of institutional purposes to a particular denom­
ination. 85 
This and other arguments provided the foundation 
for legislation produced from 1969 through 1973. The orig­
inal act was entitled the "Illinois Financial Assistance Act 
86 for Nonpublic Institutions of Higher Learning." The act 
defines the private institution of higher education as: 
". . . not owned or controlled by the State ... which is 
authorized by law to provide a program of education beyond 
87 the high school level. . . ." 
The effect of the legislation upon the state budget 
in 1975-76 produced appropriations of $13.3 million in 
direct grants to institutions for distribution as scholar-
88 ships for state resident students. More directly than 
85Ibid., p. 15. 
Îllinois Statutes, 144, Sec. 1331 at 219. 
87Ibid., 144, Sec. 1303.07. 
DO 
Smith, NCICU Report, p. 10. 
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grants is the Educational Assistance Authority (established 
in 1970) for the purpose of the issuance of educational 
89 facilities construction at private institutions. The leg­
islation provides $21 million for health-allied education. 
In addition, $58.8 million was appropriated for student 
assistance at either public or private institutions. Also, 
$84,000 in project grants was appropriated for use in public 
90 and private education. Scholarships increased in 1977 to 
$70 million.̂  
INDIANA 
Indiana's constitution, consistent with the federal 
Bill of Rights, forbids the compulsion of church attendance 
92 or support or maintenance of a ministry without consent. 
The Indiana Bill of Rights furthermore denies access of 
religious or theological institutions to the treasury of the 
93 state. A court case having bearing upon parochial educa­
tion also has bearing upon the definition of religious con­
trol. The question as to whether a school is public or 
94 parochial is determined by the source of its control. 
89 90 
Smith, NCICU Report, p. 10. Ibid. 
91 Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
p. 128. 
92 Annotated Indiana Statutes, Art. I, Sec. 4. 
93 Ibid., Art. I, Sec. 6. 
94 Johnson v.Boyd, 217 Ind. 348, 28 N.E. 2d 256 
(1955). 
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Indiana legislation stays close to constitutional 
limitations by avoiding direct aid to private schools. How­
ever, students on the basis of need may qualify for $1,600,000 
in "Freedom of Choice" grants. Tax credits for contribu­
tions to public and private institutions of higher learning 
amounted to $1,044,901 in 1975-76. An educational grant 
program in addition to the above program was funded in the 
95 amount of $2,082,894. The Scholarship Commission was bud­
geted $18,393,000 in 1977-78 and other support not specif­
ically assigned to public institutions amounted to 
$13,426,000.96 
IOWA 
The Iowa Constitution effectively restates the First 
Amendment to the federal Constitution with respect to 
religious establishment and freedom of exercise. It adds a 
97 prohibition of compulsion to support religious enterprise. 
Tied to religious principle is the constitutional 
concern to prohibit easy access to the treasury by private 
concerns, and to restrict state credit from personal or 
. . 98 private use. 
95 Smith, NCICU Report, p. 11. 
96 Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, p. 128. 
97 Iowa, Constitution, Art. I, Sec. I, 3. 
98 
Ibid., Art. Ill, Sec. 31; Art. VII, Sec. 1. 
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In 1965, tuition grants could be awarded to residents 
of Iowa who could demonstrate attendance at a properly 
accredited private institution of higher education. Finan­
cial need must be established, and amounts of tuition aid 
99 awarded vary from $100 to $800 per student. 
There seems to be a distinction in the awarding of 
aid to private and church-related colleges. Clearly, if 
the college is secular, there is no provision to prohibit 
extension of aid. If aid is to serve a church-related col­
lege, it is likely a constitutional challenge would provide 
that such aid would be contrary to the state constitution. 
Funding for scholarships has gone from $300,000 in 1973-74 to 
$350,000 in 1977; tuition grants in 1975-76 were funded in 
the amount of $9 million. 
Rationale for the program resembles arguments ex­
pressed in the North Carolina legislature. The cost of new 
facilities and additional staff at state universities would 
be avoided by diversion of students to independent institu­
tions. 
KANSAS 
Reference to religion and education is stated suc­
cinctly, but the message is clear, nonetheless. The consti­
tution reads: 
99 Iowa Code Annotated, Sec. 261.9; Sec. 261.10. 
"'"̂ Smith, NCICU Report, p. 12. 
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. . .  n o r  s h a l l  a n y  p e r s o n  b e  c o m p e l l e d  o r  s u p p o r t  
any kind of worship. ... No religious sect or sects 
shall control any part of the public education funds, ̂l 
Legislators ignored the clarity of the message, for 
subsidies began to flow in the early 70s to students attend­
ing independent and church-related colleges. Challenges 
in federal court against a tuition grant program failed to 
curtail financial assistance to "needy" students. The consti­
tutionality of the program was upheld, despite five colleges 
102 with required religious programs. The "offenders" modi­
fied their religious mission, and the state Attorney General 
103 recently reinstated them to the program. Student compet­
itive scholarships in 1975-76 amounted to $290,000 in addi-
104 tion to federal SSIG funds allocated to the state. A 
student budget contribution of $450 must be paid before 
tuition grants are paid. Funding of this program in 1975-76 
was $2.9 million.It reached $3,400,000 in 1976-77."̂ ® 
Modification of the five colleges' religious role 
provides the pattern for other colleges to follow in assum­
ing a receptive posture for receipt of public tax assistance. 
^̂ K̂ansas, Constitution, Bill of Rights, Sec. 7; 
Art. VI, Sec. 6(c). 
102 Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State v. Bubb, 379 F. Supplement 872-875 (D. Kansas, 1974). 
103 
Smith, NCICU Report, p. 13. 
104T, . , 105T, . , Ibid. Ibid. 
p. 135. 
106 Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
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KENTUCKY 
The Kentucky Bill of Rights allows no payment of 
tax money to anyone "except in consideration of public 
107 services." That is followed by absence of compulsion of 
anyone to attend any place of worship: erection, (of any 
place of worship), maintenance, its upkeep, or salary or 
108 support of the clergy. In addition to the requirements 
that the state's money be levied for public purposes only, 
the article on education requires that: 
No portion of any tax or fund now existing, or 
that hereafter may be raised or levied for educational 
purposes, shall be appropriated to or used by, or in 
aid of, any church, sectarian or denominational 
school.109 
The Kentucky legislature has created a Higher Edu­
cation Assistance Authority under which the Board of Direc­
tors may provide loans, grants, scholarships, and enter 
into contracts with financial institutions. The money may 
be received from any source, and is to be utilized by Ken­
tucky citizens who attend eligible institutions."'""'"̂  Under 
the rules and regulations it is significant to note that 
those individuals excluded from assistance are those who: 
107 Kentucky, Constitution, Bill of Rights, 
Sec. 3. 
"̂ ®Ibid., Sec. 5. "'"̂ Ibid., Education, Sec. 189. 
"'"''̂ Kentucky Revised Statutes, Vol. 7, Chapter 164.740, 
164.748. 
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. . .  a r e  n o t  p l a n n i n g  t o  e n r o l l  o r  a r e  n o t  e n r o l l e d  
in a course of study leading to a certificate, diploma 
or degree in theology, divinity or religious educa­
tion. . . .m 
The Authority, however, does encourage the utiliza­
tion of tuition or fees granted as a supplement to needy 
112 students who attend private colleges and universities. 
However, limits imposed on private institutions require that: 
The maximum amount shall not exceed 50 per cent 
of the average state appropriation per full-time equiv­
alent student enrolled in all public institutions of 
higher education. Such tuition grants are to be calcu­
lated annually by the Kentucky Higher Education Assis­
tance Authority.113 
Funding by the Authority in 1975-76 provided stu­
dents attending private, nonprofit institutions $500,000 
for tuition grants. Through a comprehensive grant program 
$1 million in taxes was funded for aid to public, private 
and proprietary institutions. The federally insured loan 
program was funded in the amount of $3 million. In order 
to qualify for insured loans the student must have pre­
viously been denied a loan from other sources before consid-
114 eration will be given him for a state loan. More recent 
funding shows an increase of 265% in the funding of the 
Assistance Authority in the amount of $3,941,000, while 
^̂ Kentucky Revised Statutes, Vol. 7, Chapter 164.749. 
112 
Ibid., 164.780? Enact. Acts 1972, Ch. 114, Sec. 1. 
113 Ibid., 785; Enact. Acts 1972, Ch. 114, Sec. 2. 
114 Smith, NCICU Report, p. 14. 
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115 there is no change in other appropriations for 1976-77. 
State scholarship grants increased overall from $500,000 
in 1974-75 to $2,622,000 in 1976-77. 
LOUISIANA 
Although ranked fiftieth in amount of state appro­
priations for higher education, Louisiana still provides 
substantial aid in the form of loans and direct subsidies 
to non-public, church-related colleges. Those named in the 
statutes to receive such aid are: Centenary College, Dillard 
University, St. Mary's Dominican College, Holy Cross Col­
lege, Louisiana College, Loyola University, Tulane Univer­
sity, and Xavier University. In a majority of cases, the 
names suggest a strongly sectarian flavor to the origin of 
these institutions. 
Administration of the funds provided in the bill 
will be effected by the Louisiana Higher Education Assis-
tance Commission.117 
The above enactments occurred despite the possi­
bility of there being brought litigation challenging the 
115 Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
p. 128. 
116 Louisiana Revised Statutes, Subpart D, State 
Loans to Students, Sec. 1731: "Colleges and Universities— 
Nonpublic Institutions-Payments for Residents, Act No. 562: 
R.S. 17: 2053 (1975). 
117 Ibid., Act. No. 599, Sec. R.S. 3023.6. 
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constitutionality of such legislation. The constitution 
does not specifically prohibit expenditure of funds for 
private educational institutions. In the Declaration of 
Rights is stated: "No law shall be enacted respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof. 
Concerning revenue and finance, it is stated that: 
"The power of taxation ... shall be exercised for public 
119 purposes only." There does not appear to be a current 
feeling within the state of concern over religious estab­
lishment by way of direct institutional aid. 
Smith notes that in 1975-76, private colleges were 
funded for $1.6 million, excluding divinity students. In 
addition, Tulane absorbed the overflow of medical students 
from Louisiana State University and was subsidized with 
120 
$315,000, or $5,000 per student. 1976-77 figures reveal 
121 that there was no change in the appropriation. 
MAINE 
In terms of constitutional prohibition of state aid 
to church-related higher education, the article on religion 
H8 Louisiana Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8. 
119 
Ibid., Art. VII, Sec. lr Art. VII, Sec. 6: 
Art. VII, Sec. 10(D). 
120 Smith, NCICU Report, p. 15. 
121 Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, p. 128. 
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declares that "no subordination nor preference of one sect 
or denomination to another shall ever be established by 
122 law. ..." If all denominational schools and colleges 
are treated "equally" then no constitutional affront is com­
mitted. Instead of prohibitions, the constitution authorizes 
the legislature to "encourage and suitably endow ... all 
academies, colleges, and seminaries of learning within the 
123 state. ..." Furthermore, provision is to be made to 
make loans to Maine students attending colleges outside the 
4. 4. 124 state. 
125 A state scholarship program was repealed in 1971. 
Students may utilize the loan program provided they attend a 
"regionally accredited" college, or if they are approved by the 
state board of education in their state. No limits seem to 
be placed on private or church-related institutions. The 
public policy statement on higher education in Maine supports 
the concept that: 
. . .  e a c h  h i g h e r  e d u c a t i o n  i n s t i t u t i o n  i n  t h e  
State of Maine, public and private, shall have con­
trol over its education program and related activities 
within its board of control, and that its faculty shall 
enjoy the freedoms traditionally accorded higher education 
122 Maine, Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 3. 
123 
Ibid., Art. VIII, Par. 1, Sec. 1. 
124 Ibid., Art. VIII, Par. 1, Sec. 1. 
125 Maine, Revised Statutes, 20, Sec. 2215-2224. 
126Ibid., 20, Sec. 2208. 
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institutions in teaching, research and expression of 
opinions and that such faculty shall be consulted in 
the formulation of academic policies pertaining to 
it.127 
Aid to disadvantaged minorities (Indians) was funded 
in 1974-75 in the amount of $60,000 in scholarships. In 
1975-76, the Tuition Equalization Program for students 
attending private schools was funded at $432,000. The pro­
gram, based on need, allowed up to $900.00 per year, per 
student, from families with incomes under $13,000. Schol­
arships for families of deceased or disabled veterans was 
funded in 1975-76 at $50,000. The limit was placed at 
TOP 
$300 per student, per year. 1976-77 noted no substantial 
129 change m the funding. 
MARYLAND 
The Constitution of Maryland forbids the compulsion 
of attendance at or financial support of any place or minis­
try. Religious establishment and freedom from sectarian 
control over a person's conscience or personal fortune seems 
130 to coincide with the First Amendment. 
127 Maine, Revised Statutes, "Education," 20, 
Sec. 2251 (2). 
T9ft 
Smith, NCICU Report, p. 16. 
129 Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
p. 128. 
130 Maryland Constitution, Declaration of Rights. 
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The constitution refers also to the state retention 
of its credit, and other obligations, resting the power of 
131 the General Assembly. The article on education places 
tight control over the state school fund and the purposes 
of education."1"32 
The Board of Public Works of Maryland in 1974 
administered and approved a broad scope of aid to private, 
church-related colleges. This includes direct institutional 
aid, student assistance, and authority to provide facilities 
133 assistance to such institutions. 
Direct aid to state-accredited private institutions 
was funded in 1974-75 in the amount of $3 million. The 
plan involved the distribution of 15% of the state general 
fund per FTE (full-time student equivalent) at public col­
leges and universities, based on the previous enroll-
, 134 ment. 
Student aid involved a number of programs, among 
which are general state scholarships, war orphan grants, 
and Senatorial scholarships/ all totalling $4,093,400 in 
135 1974-75. Students attending public or private schools 
131 Maryland Constitution, Art. Ill, Sec. 34; Sec. 54. 
132 Ibid., Art. VIII, Sec. 3. 
133 
Annotated Code of Maryland (1975), Art. 77A, 
Sec. 14-61A. 
134 Smith, NCICU Report, p. 17. 
135Ibid. 
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are entitled to the assistance. Following Roemer in May, 
1976, aid to private colleges increased 101% to $5,500,000, 
and state scholarships rose 11% in the 1976-77 budget. 
MASSACHUSETTS 
The Massachusetts Constitution contains amendments 
which forbid the establishment of religion and permit its 
free exercise: 
. . .  N o  s u b o r d i n a t i o n  o f  a n y  o n e  s e c t  o r  d e n o m i n a ­
tion to another shall ever be established by law. ... 
No law shall be passed prohibiting the free exercise of 
religion.137 
However, the constitution, in November, 1974, was 
amended to allow grants in aid by the state to "private 
higher educational institutions or to students or parents 
138 or guardians of students attending such institutions." 
The amendment opened the doors for direct financial aid to 
both students and institutions. The Legislature created 
the Massachusetts Educational and Health Facilities Author­
ity for the purpose of issuance of tax-exempt construction 
bonds for private institutions. Health-related scholarships 
and contracts with private colleges and universities were 
136 Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, p. 128. 
137 Massachusetts, Constitution, Art. XI (Articles of 
Amendment) •, Art. XLVI, SecTI I (Articles of Amendment). 
138 
Ibid., Art. XLVI, Sec. 2 (Articles of Amendment). 
247 
139 
funded at $1,150,000 in 1975-76. For general education, 
including graduate study, the state allotted to the private 
sector 80% of a $10.5 million scholarship fund. Massachu­
setts students may use the scholarships anywhere in the 
140 United States at regionally accredited institutions. The 
reason for this unusual ratio rests with the fact that Massa­
chusetts is the only state in the United States where pri­
vate higher educational institutions outnumber public insti-
141 tutions. 
The scholarship fund increased to $12,425,000 in 
1976-77. Among these are the more prestigious institutions 
in America, whose sectarian ties have long been sublimated 
142 to a more independent, scientific academic posture. How­
ever, some institutions of the private sector remain closely 
tied to religious foundations and purpose to promote a sec-
143 tarian heritage. The change in the constitution would not 
have been required if all the private sector had abandoned 
the sectarian mission. The question persists, therefore: 
139 Smith, NCICU Report, p. 18. 
140 
Ibid., p. 18. 
141 Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
p. 128. 
142 John S. Brubacher and Willis Rudy, Higher Edu­
cation in Transition: A History of American Colleges and 
Universities, 1636-1976 (New York: Harper & Row, Publish­
ers , 1976), pp. 8-10. 
143 
Ibid., p. 145. 
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does the Massachusetts State Constitution contain within it 
a contradiction of its own establishment clause, as well as 
that of the national Constitution? 
The question does not necessarily apply to the pri­
vate secular institutions, because governmental intrusion 
does not involve religious establishment, nor neutralize 
academic freedom. The question becomes viable with those 
colleges that still consider themselves church-related, with 
a mission to Christianize society, and yet to maintain 
a vitality without sacrificing autonomy and neutralizing 
their Christian influence. 
MICHIGAN 
Compulsion to attend or contribute to religion is 
unconstitutional in Michigan. In addition, "no money shall 
be appropriated or drawn from the treasury for the benefit 
of any religious sect or society, theological or religious 
144 seminary. ..." A two-thirds vote in the legislature, 
145 however, can provide money for "local or private purposes." 
At this time, however, the constitution still forbids exten-
146 sion of credit to private or public corporations. 
144 Michigan, Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 4 (Bill of 
Rights). 
145 
Ibid., Art. IV, Sec. 30. 
146 
Ibid., Art. IX, Sec. 18. 
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Despite the above constitutional prohibitions the 
State Legislature enacted a student scholarship program in 
147 1964. Another piece of legislation enacted in 1966 pro­
vided for specific grants to Michigan residents enrolled 
full-time at private, non-profit institutions. Limitations 
as to the religious character of the institution were placed 
in the act: 
. . .  w h o s e  i n s t r u c t i o n a l  p r o g r a m s  a r e  n o t  c o m ­
prised solely of instructional programs in sectarian 
or religious worship and which otherwise approved 
by the state board of education.148 
Despite the above prohibitions, the State Legislature 
enacted the Higher Education Loan Authority in 1975, which 
does the following: 
. . .  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  p r o v i d i n g  l o a n s  t o  e l i g i b l e  
students; to prescribe its powers and duties: to authorize 
the authority to borrow money and issue bonds and to 
provide for the disposition of those funds; to exempt 
the bonds from taxation; and to authorize persons, corpo­
rations, and associations to make gifts to the author­
ity. 149 
The loans to students apply to those enrolled at 
150 either a public or private institution. 
147 Michigan Statutes Annotated (Act 208, 1964), 
Sec. 15.2097 (31). 
148Ibid. (Act 313, 1966), Sec. 152097 (81); 
Sec. 15.2097 (83). 
1 4Q 
Ibid. (Act 222, 1975), Cum. Supp., Sec. 15.20961 
(1). 
1 t;n 
Ibid., Sec. 15.2096(12). 
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The language determining the amount of grant and 
placing limits on the nature of religious studies leaves 
room for ambiguous conclusions concerning eligibility. The 
act states: 
No grant shall be made under this act to any stu­
dent who is enrolled in a course of study leading to a 
degree in theology, divinity, or religious education, 
or who is a religious aspirant.̂ 51 
The 1974 Legislature approved a funding of direct 
grants to private institutions based on the number of grad-
152 uates they produced. The amount budgeted was $1.97 million 
in 1975-76. One of the specific requirements for reimburse­
ment was to "maintain and make available for inspection 
153 records necessary for administration of this act." The 
provision simply drives one more nail into the construct of 
accountability which accompanies any receipt of tax funds. 
Appropriations for health-related student assistance 
involving contracts and reimbursements for degrees earned at 
private colleges and universities totalled $843,000 in 
154 1974-75. Student assistance involved both tuition grants 
and competitive scholarships. From a funding of $11 million 
in 1975-76, private college students qualified for 22% of the 
1 51 
Michigan Statutes Annotated (Act 222, 1975), 
Cum. Supp., Sec. 15.2097(84) (2). 
1 59 
Ibid., Sec. 15.2097(202). 
153 Smith, NCICU Report, p. 19. 
154 Michigan Statutes Annotated (Act 222, 1975), 
Cum. Supp., Sec. 15.2097(202). 
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scholarships and 44% of the funds. Tuition grant funding 
was based entirely upon need, and the budget for grants was 
155 $9,850,000. Chambers reports no change over the two-year 
period of 1976-77, under the totals of "student aid" at 
$27 million. He reports scholarships at $13 million and 
156 tuition grants at $12,200,000. 
MINNESOTA 
The Minnesota Constitution is more explicit than most 
state constitutions in its concern that the public treasury 
not be drawn upon to further religious societies or educa-
157 tional institutions. 
However, Stanley Weinberg noted in 1969 that changes 
were taking place in terms of attitude toward aid to higher 
education in the Minnesota Legislature. Weinberg says: 
As recently as the 1955 and 1957 sessions of the 
Minnesota State Legislature, state scholarship bills 
were killed in committee because, it was argued, such 
legislation represented a deliberate attempt to bypass 
constitutional requirements separating church and state. 
We had advanced to the point in 1967 that, without dis­
senting vote, the Minnesota legislature adopted a state 
scholarship program that not only excludes disadvanta­
geous distinctions between public and private education, 
but also includes accelerated subsidies for students 
attending private institutions.158 
155 Smith, NCICU Report, p. 19. 
Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, pp. 129, 
136. 
157 . Minnesota, Constitution, Arts. I, Sec. 16: VIII, Sec. 2: 
IX, Sec. 10. 
158 Stanley J. Weinberg, "Private Higher Education in 
America Today," School & Society, Nov. 1969, pp. 439-441. 
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The issuance of tax-exempt bonds for the purpose of 
refinancing debt-ridden private church-related colleges that 
were building secular educational facilities did not contra­
vene the State Constitution, according to a 1975 case, 
159 Minnesota v. Hawk. However, it is clearly stated that 
such funds are not to be used to construct: 
. . .  a n y  f a c i l i t y  u s e d  o r  t o  b e  u s e d  f o r  s e c t a r i a n  
instruction or as a place of religious worship nor any 
facility which is used or to be used primarily in con­
nection with any part of a school or department of 
divinity for any religious denomination.160 
The point has been raised, however, that such aid 
releases other funds for the construction of such facili­
ties, which can be construed as indirect subsidization of 
n. . 161 religion. 
Under contractual arrangements for education of 
Minnesota residents, private colleges must not require sec­
tarian Bible study, or be specifically preparatory for the 
ministry or religious education. 
Contracts in 1976 were funded at $3.2 million, and 
in 1977 at $4 million. Health education assistance totalled 
$1,200,000 in 1976, and $1,224,000 for 1977. The medical 
student loan program was funded through revenue bonds at 
159 . ... Minnesota Higher Education Facilities Authority 
v. Hawk, 1975, 232 N.W. 2d. 106. 
M̂innesota Statutes Annotated, Sec„ 136A.28. 
"̂ T̂ilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 676 (1971). 
16 2 Minnesota Statutes Annotated, Sec. 136A.19, Subd. 4. 
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$17,550 in 1976, with $27,300 in reserve for 1977. General 
student assistance, of which one half was based on need, 
provided a total of $10,750,000 in 1976-77, which was reserved 
I 
for the top 25% academically. 
The Grant-in-Aid program is based on needs and applies 
in either public or private institutions. The amount totalled 
$17,900,000 in 1976-77. The state student loan program is 
financed up to $90 million in revenue bonds for attendance 
at either public or private institutions. In 1976, $500,000 
was funded for work-study, and $1,250,000 has been allotted 
for 1977.164 
MISSISSIPPI 
Six articles in the constitution of Mississippi apply 
to the prohibition of financial aid to religion and the use 
of tax monies for other than public purposes.The article 
on education specifically states that: 
No religious or other sect or sects shall ever 
control any part of the school or other educational 
funds be appropriated toward the support of any sec­
tarian schools. . . .166 
Attempts to provide tuition equalization have died 
in committee in past legislative sessions. No state money 
"̂ 3Chambers, NCICU Report, pp. 20-21. 
164x, . , Ibid. 
1 6 5  . . .  Mississippi, Constitution, Arts. Ill, Sec. 18; 
IV, Sec. 66; IV, Sec. 90; IV, Sec. 95. 
"*"̂ Ibid. , Art. VIII (Education), Sec. 208. 
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is presently utilized by private colleges, either through 
direct loans or grants, nor indirectly through aid to students 
attending private colleges. 
MISSOURI 
Under Missouri's Bill of Rights, religious freedom 
is guaranteed through the prohibition of state establish­
ment or financial support of sectarian traditions or institu­
tions. According to the revised January, 1976, Constitution, 
public support of denominational schools was clearly uncon­
stitutional. The article entitled "Education" says: 
Neither the General Assembly, nor any county, city, 
town, township, school district, or other municipal 
corporation, shall ever make an appropriation or pay 
from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any 
religious creed, church, or sectarian purpose, or to 
help to support or sustain any private or public school, 
academy, seminary, college, university, or other insti­
tution of learning controlled by any religious creed, 
church or sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall 
any grant or donation of personal property or real 
estate ever be made by the state or any county, city, 
town, or other municipal corporation for any religious 
creed, church, or sectarian purpose whatever.I®8 
The state legislature, however, ignored the consti­
tution and established the Student Tuition Awards Program in 
169 1972. The program proposed that assistance be given to 
"full-time students to receive nonreligious educational 
16 7 
Missouri, Constitution, Article I (Bill of Rights), 
Sec. 6. 
168 Ibid., Art. IX (Education), Sec. 8. 
169 . ... Missouri Citations, Vol. II, 173.200. 
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services in a public or private institution of higher educa-
170 tion of their choice." 
United States Law Week summarized the program which 
171 passed muster in the Missouri Supreme Court in July, 1976. 
The program's main features are as follows: 
. . . payments are made by individual checks payable 
solely to student recipients. The checks are sent to 
the institutions, and they, in turn notify the students 
that their checks are available. At the time the checks 
are received by the students, they are expected to take 
care of . . .educational expenses. . . . Students attend­
ing public or private institutions of higher education 
are eligible, but no grants are permitted to students 
who enroll in courses leading to theology or divinity 
degrees.-*-̂  
The tuition assistance program provided in 1974-75 
a funding of $3.5 million. Awards are based on academic 
ability and needs, and provide up to half of tuition and 
173 fees, or up to $900.00 per year. Chambers reported no 
174 increase or decrease in funding for 1976-77. 
170 Missouri Citations, Laws 1972, p. 763, Sec. 1. 
171 Americans United v. Rogers , 538 S.W. 2d 711 
(1976). 
172 "First Amendment No Bar to Missouri's Tuition 
Aid Program," U. S. Law Week, 45 (August 3, 1976) 1019. 
Also: Americans United v. Rogers, 7/26/76, LW 2056. 
173 Smith, NCICU Report, p. 23. 
174 Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
p. 129. 
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MONTANA 
Montana's constitution clearly states that there 
175 will be no forced attendance or support of religion. In 
addition, the constitution expressly forbids direct or indi­
rect support or aid of any: 
. . .  c h u r c h ,  a c a d e m y ,  s e m i n a r y ,  c o l l e g e ,  u n i v e r s i t y ,  
or other literary or scientific institution controlled 
in whole or in part by any church, sect or denomina­
tion. 1*76 
There is no program, thus prohibited, in the state 
of Montana, and the legislature is prohibited by the onsti-
177 tution from appropriation of funds for such a program. 
NEBRASKA 
The Bill of Rights in the Nebraska Constitution 
178 rules out any establishment of religion. Under Education, 
the onstitution specifically denies financial aid to any 
educational institution "not exclusively owned and controlled 
179 by the State or a governmental division thereof. ..." 
A program of tuition aid grants to assist full-time 
student residents at Nebraska private colleges was declared 
175 
176 Ibid., Art. X (Education and Public Lands), Sec. 6. 
177 Ibid., Art. V (legislative department), Sec. 11 (5). 
178 
179 
Ibid., Art. VII (Education), Sec. 11. 
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unconstitutional by the State Supreme Court, and has been 
discontinued. 
NEVADA 
Although the constitution has no reference to relig­
ious freedom or establishment, it states the following con­
cerning education: 
No public funds of any kind or character whatever, 
State, county, or municipal, shall be used for sectar­
ian purposes.181 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
Consistent with other early colonial constitutions, 
the state has a strong statement concerning religious estab-
182 lishment. The constitution provides a very strong state­
ment in support of educational institutions of all kinds. 
However, it provides: 
. . .  nevertheless, that no money raised by tax­
ation shall ever be granted or applied for the use 
of the schools of any religious sect or denomina­
tion. . . .183 
The constitution seems to be working, for currently, 
no money, such as is forbidden by the state document, is 
presently utilized in assistance to such institutions. 
1 RO 
Smith, NCICU Reports, p. 25. 
181 Nevada, Constitution, Art. XI (Education), Sec. 10. 
182 New Hampshire, Constitution, Part I (Bill of 
Rights), Art. 6. 
1 ft*} 
Ibid., Part III, Art. 83. 
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NEW JERSEY 
The constitution deals with religious freedom, and 
states that, "there shall be no establishment of one relig-
184 
ious sect in preference to another." Under taxation and 
finance, money for public schools is designated for that 
purpose alone. However, the constitution does presently 
permit transportation of children between the ages of five 
185 
and eighteen to and from "any school." 
The state legislature in 1968 provided for tuitional 
186 
aid grants. The New Jersey program for educational assis­
tance to higher education is comprehensive. A portion of 
funding goes toward contracts with independent colleges and 
universities. This was funded in 1975 at $6 million, with a 
consideration of $8 million in 1976. Direct institutional 
aid was funded that same period at $3.3 million. New Jersey 
devised a program to aid disadvantaged students providing 
$1.3 million for students in private institutions. In addi­
tion the private sector received a $2.5 million share of the 
state scholarship program, a large portion of the $2.2 million 
incentive grants, and an additional $2.8 million of grants 
184 
New Jersey, Constitution, Article I, Par. 3, 
Par. 4. 
185Ibid., Art. VIII, Sec. 4, Par. 2 and 3. 
186 New Jersey Statutes Annotated, 1976, Education, 
Subtitle 12. Financial Assistance for Higher Education, 
Chapter 71, Art. 5, State Tuition Grants (new) 18A:71-41. 
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187 
based on student financial need. Private college con­
tracts dropped back to $6 million, while an increase of 10% 
in student grants raised the total to about $28 million in 
all student aid in 1976-77.^®^ 
NEW MEXICO 
The New Mexico Constitution provides for religious free­
dom, and requires that no preference be given any denomina-
189 
txon or mode of worship. Concerning education, the state 
constitution places public schools and colleges under control 
of the state and excludes utilization of public tax monies 
or land from "support of any sectarian, denominational, or 
190 private school college, or university." 
New Mexico has no plan of financial assistance to stu­
dents within private colleges in the state. However, by 
virtue of its membership in the western regional educational 
program, New Mexico indirectly assists private institutions 
191 
in other states. No other program has emerged from the 
legislature. 
187 
Smith, NCICU Report, p. 25. 
188 
Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
p. 129. 
189 
New Mexico, Constitution, Article II (Bill of 
Rights), Sec. 11. 
190 
Ibid., Art. XII (Education), Sec. 3. 
191 
Smith, NCICU Report, p. 26. 
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NEW YORK 
Free exercise of religion is guaranteed by the state 
192 constitution. A very strong amendment exists with regard 
to education. But despite it, the state has devised a way 
to assist private, church-related higher education. The 
article reads: 
Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall 
use its property or credit or any public money, or 
authorize or permit either to be used directly or in­
directly, in aid or maintenance, other than for examina­
tion or inspection, of any school or institution wholly 
or in part under the control or direction of any reli­
gious denomination, or in which any denominational tenet 
or doctrine is taught.193 
A dissertation by Michael B. Freedman examined the 
development of a state policy toward financial aid of the 
state1s private and independent institutions of higher 
learning. The beginning of indirect aid in New York goes 
back to the Heald Report of 1960. Freedman notes that sup­
port for private colleges must come from a Republican legis­
lature, since New York Democrats historically lean toward 
194 
public higher education. 
In June, 1972, New York legislators received a report 
entitled: 1972 Statewide Master Plan for Private Colleges 
l Q? 
New York, Constitution, Article I (Bill of 
Rights), Sec. 3. 
1 9*3 
Ibid., Art. XI (Education), Sec. 3. 
194 
Michael B. Friedman,"Public Support for Private 
Higher Education in New York State: A Study of Strategies 
Employed," Dissertation Abstracts International, State Uni­
versity of New York at Albany (1971), 1876-A. 
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and Universities. It reaffirmed that the state system of 
indirect institutional aid, called the "Bundy Plan" be reaf­
firmed so as to see the private sector through its financial 
crisis. The report asked that private junior colleges also 
be included in the Bund program. The Legislature listened 
and continues to utilize the system of indirect assistance 
to the private sector. A Higher Education Omnibus Bill pro­
vided for the needs of the private sector in a comprehensive 
manner that disregards any concern about constitutional con­
flict. Indeed, most of the aid plans in the states utiliz­
ing indirect aid received inspiration from the Bundy mech-
195 
anism. 
The private sector became the beneficiary of direct 
institutional aid in 1975-76 at the level of $57.4 million, 
and Polytechnic Institute of New York was granted emergency 
aid of $750,000 in 1974-75. Disadvantaged minorities at New 
York private colleges in 1975-76 received $7.6 million in aid. 
The New York Legislature provided medical-related scholar­
ships, stipends, and grants at the level of $14,650,000. 
Student aid was allotted the lion's share of the budget in 
the form of scholarships, grants, and guaranteed loans. The 
budgeted figure was $301 million. Private institutions 
196 benefited through the conduit of their students' needs. 
195 
John W. Chandler, Statewide Master Plan for Col­
leges and Universities, New York: Commission on Independent 
Colleges and Universities, State of New York, 1972 (ERIC 
Document Reproduction Service No. ED078-757), Passim. 
196 
Smith, NCICU Report, pp. 27, 28. 
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The amounts for aid to private colleges during 1976-77 in­
creased to $59,880,000; to private medical and dental schools, 
$18,916,000 or 113%; and private college SEEK, $7,591,000 
197 
(a new program of aid); tuition assistance $172,400,000. 
The state of New York continues to enlarge its appropriations 
toward aid to private colleges. In no other state is there 
such a huge public commitment to support of the private 
198 sector. The question emerges, with such huge fiscal com-
'mitments to the private sector, how much actual academic and 
religious autonomy do the schools enjoy? The push toward 
accountability may eventually prove to be an unbearable con­
striction on the private sector, especially toward the church-
199 
related college. 
NORTH CAROLINA 
Instructions to constitutional conventions in North 
Carolina included positions against the establishment of 
religion or support of denominations by taxes or duties. In 
December, 1776, the North Carolina Provincial Congress adopted 
and placed in its constitution the following: 
197 Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
p. 129. 
198, ., 
Ibid. 
199 The Carnegie Foundation, The States and Higher 
Education: A Proud Past and a Vital Future (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1976), p. 19. 
^°Stephen Beauregard Weeks, "Church and State in North 
Carolina," in Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical 
and Political Science, ed. Herbert Adams (1893; rpt. New York: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 56. 
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That there shall be no Establishment of any one 
religious Church or Denomination in this State in pref­
erence to any other, neither shall any person, on any 
pretence whatsoever, be compelled to attend any place 
of worship contrary to his own Faith or Judgment, or be 
obliged to pay for the purchase of any Glebe, or the 
building of any House of Worship, or for the Mainte­
nance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he 
believes right, or has voluntarily and personally en­
gaged to perform, but all persons shall be at liberty 
to exercise their own mode of worship. Provided that 
nothing herein contained shall be construed to exempt 
preachers of treasonable and seditious Discourses, from 
legal trials and Punishment.201 
North Carolina's present constitution is not 
concerned with the specifics of the earlier version. More 
recently, lawmakers were contented with a guarantee for lib-
202 
erty of conscience. However, the state still falls under 
the umbrella of the First Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States. The present constitution does not forbid 
the utilization of tax monies for private schools and col­
leges. However, limits are placed upon the use of revenues 
of the public treasury for public benefit only, unless 
directly voted by a majority of qualified voters of the 
203 
state. The constitution provides one of the weakest argu­
ments for separation of church and state within the fifty 
states. Any challenge to state aid plans must base its primary 
case upon the Federal Constitution, not the State constitution. 
201 
North Carolina Constitution, Art. XXXIV. 
202 
North Carolina Statutes, Constitution, Art. I 
(Declaration of Rights), Sec. 13. 
203 
North Carolina Constitution, Art. V, Sec. 2, 
Part I; Sec. 2, Part 7; Sec. 3, Part 2. 
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The article on education simply establishes in the 
state "a system of free public schools" financed by money 
204 collected for the purposes of education. The article 
does not exclude the possibility of using state money for 
support of private education so long as the public schools 
are maintained. This interpretation does not, however, 
answer the question of competition? i.e., where the drain of 
tax monies becomes so large that it deprives the constitu­
tionally mandated public sector from badly needed revenues. 
All members of the North Carolina Association of Indepen­
dent Colleges and Universities are, to some degree, church-
, . , 205 
related. 
Much of the North Carolina program of state aid is 
discussed in a previous chapter. The program involves con­
tracts to allow private church-related colleges to adminis­
ter state scholarships to state students on the basis of need. 
The funding in 1975-76 was $9.2 million, and in 1976-77, was 
projected at $18 million. Contracts between the State and 
the schools provide tax money at the budget level of over 
204 North Carolina, Constitution, Art. IX, Sec. 6. 
205 Constant H. Jacquet, Jr., Editor, Yearbook of 
American and Canadian Churches 1975 (New York: Abingdon 
Press, 1975), pp. 188-201. Note: The listing of church-
related colleges and universities is derived from a variety 
of official sources. "Of the 635 colleges and universities 
listed ... approximately 80 per cent were identified as 
church-related in reports to the U. S. Office of Education. 
The remaining 20 per cent did not report it but have been 
identified as church-related in varying degrees." 
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$4 million annually in grants and loans. In general educa­
tion, state incentive grants amount to a half million dol­
lars, matched by federal funds. College Foundation, Inc. 
administers $6 million in a guaranteed loan program which 
supports itself through sale of revenue bonds. The most 
controversial of the aid plans are the State Education Assis­
tance Authority Tuition offset grants, which were funded in 
1975-76 in the amount of $4.2 million. 
These plans were the subject of recent federal liti­
gation, Smith v. Board of Governors, which was recently 
207 appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The next 
chapter will deal with the suit in detail. 
NORTH DAKOTA 
Like North Carolina, North Dakota does not deal with 
freedom of religion in its constitution. Concerned with 
lands provided by the Morrill Acts, the lawmakers restricted 
208 
such monies to public education. Another article restricted 
209 public debt to public welfare and purpose. 
206Smith, NCICU Report, p. 29. 
207 
Smith v. Board of Governors, US, No. C-C-76-131 
(March 1977). 
208 
North Dakota, Constitution, Art. VIII (Education), 
Sec. 152. 
209 
Ibid., Art. XII (Public Debt and Public Works), 
Sec. 185. 
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A limited program of financial aid provided that 
students with established need could receive aid of about 
$300 per student at any accredited post-secondary insti-
210 
tution in the state. In 1974-75, funds were provided in 
the amount of $248,000, and in 1976-77, approximately 
?11 
$297,000 was provided. 
OHIO 
The state constitution insures the individual free­
dom against religious constraint through forced worship or 
212 
financial support. Although the legislature is enjoined 
to "provide a system of common schools throughout the state, 
access to, or control of any part of the school funds of the 
213 state is denied to religious sect, or sects." 
Ohio, however, has made provision within the consti­
tution to allow the state to guarantee loans made to students 
214 
in higher education. Under the Ohio Student Loan Commis­
sion, loans to students were made available under the above 
constitutional provision. The law became effective in 
210 
Smith, NCICU Report, p. 30; North Dakota Century 
Code Annotated, Chap. 15-10, Higher Education. 
211 Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
p. 136. 
212 
Ohio, Constitution, Art. I (Bill of Rights), Sec. 7. 
213 
Ibid., Art. VI, Sec. 2. 
214 
Ibid.,  Art.  VI,  Sec.  5.  
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215 
November, 1973. Under the Higher Educational Facility 
Commission, the private sector may seek assistance in con­
struction of new facilities except for structures "used for 
sectarian instruction or study or as a place for devotional 
216 activities or religious worship." No limits are placed on 
the nature of the education gained by the loans, other than 
the student is to be an Ohio resident enrolled full-time at 
an eligible institution. No mention is made as to his 
217 religious intent or "aspirations" to study religion. Fund­
ing for health-related education in 1974-75 went to Case 
Western University in the amount of $10,465,779. Student 
assistance under the Guaranteed Loan Program for 1975 totalled 
$27,859,542. Grants for in-state private institutions were 
O "| Q 
funded at $40 million. 
OKLAHOMA 
The Oklahoma Constitution forbids in its Bill of 
Rights the utilization of public money or property, directly 
or indirectly for support of a sect or religious teacher, or 
219 sectarian institution. 
215 
Ohio Revised Code Annotated, Title 33, Ch. 3351: 
Sec. 3351.05; H207, eff. 6-1-73. 
2"L6Ibid. , Ch. 3377: Sec. 3377.01. 
?17 
^ Ibid., Ch. 3377: Sec. 3351.08(A) (1), (2), (3). 
IIO 
Smith, NCICU Report, p. 31. 
219 
Oklahoma, Constitution, Sec. 3206: Art. II (Bill 
of Rights), Sec. 5. 
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Another article agrees with the above statement and 
requires that no sale of public lands, or income be utilized 
for the support of any religious or sectarian school, col-
220 
lege, or university. But a new amendment allows the coor­
dination of "private, denominational, and other institutions 
of higher learning," with the state system, under the Okla-
221 homa State Regents for higher education. 
Within the Higher Education Code, it is clear that 
"no such institution, however, shall receive any financial 
aid out of any appropriations made by the Legislature and 
222 over which the State Regents may have control." 
Private in-state institutions benefit indirectly from 
tuition aid grants given to full-time Oklahoma student resi­
dents. Allowance and distribution is made on the basis of 
need. The plan was funded in 1974-75 at $300,000, and in 
1976-77 at $1,196,000. The maximum grant is $500, but 
225 cannot exceed 50% of tuition and/or fees. The Regents are 
220 
Oklahoma, Constitution, Sec. 3206; Art. XI, Sec. 5. 
221 
Ibid., Art. XIII—A, Sec. 4. 
222 
Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, Div. 5, Higher Edu­
cation, Ch. 70, Sec. 3212; Laws, 1965, C. 396, Sec. 212. 
223 
Smith, NCICU Report, p. 32. 
224 Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
p. 136. 
225 Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, Higher Education 
Code 70, Sec^ 3211 (a), (b). 
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authorized to oversee the "Revolving Loan Fund of the Okla­
homa State Regents for Higher Education." The fund is to 
provide loans ". . .to any of the State institutions or 
Educational institutions under their jurisdiction. ..." 
Disbursement of the money is placed under the control of the 
president of each receiving institution. The fund is restric­
ted by statute to expenditure only for the purpose "said 
227 fund was specifically collected." 
The ambiguity of the statutes allows for loans, 
direct and indirect, which have the potential of collision 
with the constitution, especially in terms of "indirect aid" 
to a religious sect, or sectarian institution. 
OREGON 
The Oregon Bill of Rights appears to effectively 
close off withdrawal of money for religious or theological 
228 
institutions, or payment of a legislative chaplain. How­
ever, constitutional provision was made for higher education 
building projects up to, and not in excess of $25 million, 
to construct, improve, repair, equip, and to pur­
chase or improve sites therefore ... for higher 
225 
Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, Higher Education 
Code 70, SecZ 3210 (g). 
228 Oregon,Constitution, Art. I (Bill of Rights), 
Sec. 5. 
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higher education institutions and activities: and 
(b) $5 million ... for Community Colleges.^29 
The building project supersedes the restriction in 
the article on taxation and finance which sets the state 
?30 
debt limit at $50,000. 
Ostensibly, the changes merely bring the constitution 
in line with inflation, but in reality, precedent has been 
established which could allow direct payments and assistance 
to private, church-related institutions. There has not been 
any activity relative to the financing of building projects 
on private college campuses. Instead, the legislature stud­
ied their policy toward private institutions. 
The policy takes note of the significant part private 
higher education takes in contributing to post-secondary 
education in Oregon. In addition, it is considered an obli­
gation of the state to support "nonsectarian educational" 
objectives achieved through nonpublic post-secondary insti­
tutions. Encouraging the formulation of such policy, it was 
noted that many private and independent institutions faced 
serious financial difficulties, which could shift a heavy 
burden to the state institutions. They concluded: 
Such hazards may be substantially reduced and all 
education in the state improved through the purchase of 
229 Oregon# Constitution, Art. XI-G (Higher Education 
Building Project), Sec. I, Par. 1, XI.F (1), Higher Educa­
tion Building Project), Sec. 1. 
230 
Ibid., Art. XI (Taxation and Finance), Sec. 7. 
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nonsectarian educational services from Oregon's private 
and independent institutions.231 
In the attempt to be consistent with the First Amend­
ment, the State Scholarship Commission could only purchase 
instruction in secular subjects. The statutes define "sec­
ular subjects" as: 
. . .  a n y  c o u r s e  w h i c h  i s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  c u r r i c u l u m  
of a private and independent institution of higher edu­
cation and which does not advocate the religious teach­
ings or the morals or forms of worship of any sect.232 
The plan provides for the entering into contracts 
for nonsectarian educational services for Oregon students. 
No mention is made of tax monies being utilized for this 
purpose. However, 
The commission may accept grants, gifts, bequests, 
and devises of real and personal property to carry out 
the purposes of ORS 352.710 to 352.760.233 
It is also noted that if funds are not adequate, 
then the dollar amount utilized will be reduced in propor-
234 
txon, so as to satisfy the contracts committed for. The 
contracts in 1975-77 were funded substantially at $4.3 mil­
lion. Under the contract in 1975-76, the state paid the 
private colleges $425 for every forty-five quarter hours 
235 
completed, and it was increased to $500 for 1976-77* 
231 
Oregon Revised Statutes, Vol. 3, Sec. 352.710. 
Ibid., ORS 352.720 (4). JIbid., ORS 352.730. 
234Ibid., ORS 352.740. 
235 
Smith, NCICU Report, p. 33. 
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Under another program, need grant awards based on 
financial need and academic achievement were provided to stu­
dents attending any qualified institution in Oregon. Need 
grants only were funded at $4,574,080 in 1975-77, while 
awards based on need and academic achievement were funded 
236 
at $689,256. The Scholarship Commission was funded at 
?37 
$5,194,000 in 1976-77, an increase of 32%. 
PENNSYLVANIA 
Constitutional provisions concerning freedom of 
religion and prevention of establishment are stated by the 
Declaration of Rights of Pennsylvania. 
. . .  n o  m a n  c a n  o f  r i g h t  b e  c o m p e l l e d  t o  a t t e n d ,  
erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain 
any ministry against his consent ... and no preference 
shall ever be given by law to any religious establish­
ments or modes of worship.238 
But more on point was the constitutional prohibi­
tion directed at the legislative branch: 
No money raised for the support of the public 
schools of the commonwealth shall be appropriated 
or used for the support of any sectarian school.239 
Further commentary is made by the constitution which 
appears to allow some assistance to private education: 
236Smith, NCICU Report, p. 33. 
237 
Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, p. 130. 
238 
Pennsylvania, Constitution, Art. I (Declaration), 
Sec. 3. 
Ibid., Art. Ill (Legislative), Sec. 15. 
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. . .  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  m a y  b e  m a d e  .  .  .  
in the form of scholarship grants or loans for- higher 
educational purposes to residents of the Commonwealth 
enrolled in institutions of higher learning except 
that no scholarship, grants, or loans for higher edu­
cational purposes shall be given to persons enrolled 
in a theological seminary or school of theology.240 
In 1971, a Master Plan for Higher Education pro­
vided a number of programs of student aid, direct institu­
tional aid and contracts for the awarding of equal oppor­
tunity program grants. As of 1976, there was no funding of 
241 the contract program. 
Direct institutional aid, traditional and medical-
related programs are provided to twelve private and church-
related institutions. The funding in 1974-75 was 
? AO 
$31,380,000, and increased to $36,716,000 in 1976-77, a 
243 growth of 17%. Institutional aid to the private sector 
was also provided for disadvantaged minorities, by a funding 
in 1975-76 of $2,995,000.244 
The Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency 
in 1974-75 funded a state scholarship program for use at 
in-state or out-of-state public or private institutions and 
^4<^Pennsylvania, Constitution, Art. Ill (Legislative) , 
Sec. 30. 
241 Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated, Educa­
tion, 1976-77, Title 24, Sec. 2510-302, 304, 305. 
24? 
Smith, NCICU Report, p. 34. 
243 Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
p. 130. 
244 
Ibid. 
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trade schools. The program was based on need with a maximum 
award of $1,200 in-state, and $800 out-of-state. The formula 
requires that 50% of need is met for families with less 
than $8,000 annual income, while one-third of the need is 
met if income exceeds $8,000. Of the total $68.4 million 
allotted in 1974-75 , students utilized $24.5 million at pri-
245 vate schools. Total funding for the scholarship program 
advanced to $77,056,000 in 1976-77, as institutional grants 
246 rose to $12,000,000 in the same period. 
RHODE ISLAND 
The State Constitution complies with the Federal 
establishment clause in that: 
. . .  n o  m a n  s h a l l  b e  c o m p e l l e d  t o  f r e q u e n t  o r  t o  
support any religious worship, place, or ministry, 
except in fulfillment of his own voluntary con­
tract .247 
Other constitutional articles provide for a two-
thirds majority of the General Assembly on money bills and 
the setting up of a permanent public school fund, to be used 
248 
exclusively for that purpose. Rhode Island is not reported 
as having a plan to provide aid to private, or church-
related higher education. 
245 . 246 
Smith, NCICU Report, p. 34. Ibid. 
247 
Rhode Island, Constitution, Art. I (Declaration of 
Certain Constitutional Rights and Privileges), Sec. 3. 
248 
Ibid., Art. IV (Legislative Department), Sec. 14; 
Art. XII (Education), Sees. 2 and 4. 
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SOUTH CAROLINA 
Apparently utilizing the First Amendment of the fed­
eral Constitution as a model, the South Carolina Constitution 
includes in its Bill of Rights the following: 
The General Assembly shall make no law establish­
ing religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof. . . .249 
The article on finance and taxation prohibits the 
use of the credit of the state for the benefit of other than 
^ 4.- n 250 educational purposes. 
The article on education denies the utilization of 
the property or credit of the state, or other public corpo­
ration, or any public money for direct aid or maintenance of 
any college, school, hospital, orphan house, etc., "which is 
wholly or in part under the direction or control of any 
church or of any religious or sectarian denomination, soci-
251 ety, or organization.11 The original reading of the 
article was "directly or indirectly", but following a hard-
fought court case (Durham v. McLeod) the constitution was 
252 amended and "indirectly" was struck from the article. 
Thus, the state was permitted to go ahead with its assistance 
249 
South Carolina, Constitution, Art. I (Bill of 
Rights), Sec. 4. 
250 
Ibid., Art. X (Finance and Taxation), Sec. 6. 
251 
Ibid., Art. XI (Education), Sec. 9. 
252 
Durham v. McLeod, 192 S.E. 2d 202 (1972). 
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of institutions and student aid through the process of 
using the state's credit to market revenue bonds. 
In 1974-75, funding for teacher training under state 
contract was provided for private colleges. Direct institu­
tional aid in the form of practice teaching fees to compen-
253 sate supervisors of teacher practicurns amounted to $87,870. 
The Educational Facilities Authority provided the occasion 
for a landmark case regarding construction of private church-
254 related college facilities through state-backed bonds. 
Student assistance through a tuition grants program 
based on merit and need was funded in 1975-77 at $7,341,047. 
The State Education Assistance Authority also survived liti­
gation, thus enabling the state to provide guaranteed loans 
at all schools. A further prerequisite allotted private 
higher education is the authority granted the schools to 
purchase on state contract, thus providing another means 
255 
of indirect support of church-related colleges. 
SOUTH DAKOTA 
In the Bill of Rights, South Dakota's constitution 
effectively covers freedom of worship, establishment and in 
253 
Smith, NCICU Report, p. 35. 
254 
Hunt v. McNair, 258 S.C. 97, 197 S.E. 2d645 
(1972), aff'd., 413 U.S. 734.93 S. Ct. 2868, 37 L.Ed. 2d 
923 (1973). 
255 
Smith, NCICU Report, p. 35. 
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the same article precludes any utilization of state money 
for the benefit of any sectarian or religious society or 
•  > • >  .  .  2 5 6  institution. 
The article on education also forbids the 
. . .  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  o f  l a n d s ,  m o n e y  o r  o t h e r  p r o p ­
erty or credits to aid any sectarian school . . . and 
no sectarian instruction shall be allowed in any school 
in the state.^57 
The. Board of Regents, within the restraints of South 
Dakota's constitution, is charged to administrate such funds 
as are necessary to facilitate the education of state citi-
258 zens at any public or private colleges. 
The Student Incentive Grants program was found by 
259 the Legislature to be "in the public interest." Based on 
"financial need," qualified students enrolled at eligible 
institutions, including private colleges, could receive aid 
up to $1,000.260 
The health professions presently enjoy strong public 
support. Loans for medical training can be obtained easier 
than for other professions. The funding in South Dakota in 
1974-75 amounted to $350,000. The state incentive grant 
O C /r  
South Dakota, Constitution, Art. VI (Bill of 
Rights), Sec. 3. 
2 57 
Ibid., Art. VIII (Education and School Lands), 
Sec. 16. 
258 
South Dakota Compiled Laws, Vol. 5, 1975, Revised 
Edition, 13-56A-1. 
259 260 
SDCL, 13-55A-1. SDCL, 13-ffA-2. 
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program in 1975-76 was funded at $250,000 and was limited to 
26X 
first year South Dakota resident students. 
TENNESSEE 
The Tennessee Constitution pinpoints the consent of 
the citizen as the crux of religious freedom, and that no 
262 semblance of establishment will be made legal in the state. 
No mention is made of education, but loaning state credit or 
entering into corporate business ventures is outside the pur-
view of state legislative responsibility. 
In 1974-75, Vanderbilt University and Meharry Medi­
cal College were recipients of $229,100 in contract funds in 
order to increase Tennessee medical student enrollment. A 
loan-scholarship program was instituted in order to draw 
graduates into shortage areas. This was funded at $300,000. 
Students may borrow a maximum of $15,000 during their medi-
^ i 264 cal school career. 
The controversial tuition grant program, which applied 
to public or private institutions, was funded in 1974-75 at 
$3.4 million. Students could receive grants in aid up to 
$1,000 each, which were limited in application to payment of 
265 
tuxtxon and fees. In 1976-77, Chambers reports the total 
2^"*"Smith, NCICU Report, p. 36. 
262 Tennessee, Constitution, Art. I (Declaration of 
Rights), Sec. 3. 
p/to 
Ibid., Art. II (Distribution of Powers), Sec. 31. 
264Smith, NCICU Report, p. 37. 265Ibid. 
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of all aid programs as $1,500,000, and of that, no funding 
for grants is listed. 
In 1974, a three-judge federal court found the tuition 
2 7 
grant program unconstitutional. The state appealed to the 
Supreme Court and continued to dispense monies. The case 
is discussed in Chapter V. 
TEXAS 
The Bill of Rights of Texas forbids the compulsion 
of church attendance or support, and guarantees against pref­
erence by the state of any particular denomination or mode 
of worship. Furthermore, money from the state's treasury 
cannot be used to benefit theological or religious educa-
26 7 
tion. The legislative article forbids the lending of 
268 credit of the state to individuals or corporations. How­
ever, the sub-article which follows amends the prohibition 
by making possible student loans provided for through the 
sale of general obligation bonds with a debt limit of $85 
million at a 4% interest. The utilization of money thus 
raised is as follows: 
. . .  d e p o s i t e d  i n  a  f u n d  h e r e b y  c r e a t e d  i n  t h e  
State Treasury to be known as the Texas Opportunity Plan 
Fund to be administered by the Coordinating Board, 
Texas College and University System, or its successor 
266 
Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
p. 137. 
Americans United v. Dunn, 384 F. Supp. 714 (M. D. 
Tenn. 1974). 
268Texas, Constitution, Art. I (Bill of Rights), 
Sec. 6; Art. Ill (Legislative), Sec. 50. 
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or successors to make loans to students who have been 
admitted to attend any institution of higher education 
within the State of Texas, public or private.269 
In the 1971 legislative session, a bill was passed 
authorizing a Coordinating Board which would make tuition 
equalization grants, not to exceed $600 annually to Texas 
resident students attending non-public colleges in the state. 
The program was the result of a strong lobbying on the part 
of the Independent Colleges and Universities of Texas (ICUT). 
The effort had the support of the governor and other key 
270 
figures. The program continued, but was repealed in 
271 1975 to make way for new legislation. The 1975 plan 
included contracts, facilities assistance, and a new tuition 
272 equalization grant program. 
The Texas policy is based on the argument that the 
economic and social potential of the state can be sustained 
only by removal of social and educational barriers. The 
legislature therefore acted to establish financial programs 
that would enable qualified students to receive a higher 
273 education. The program is entitled the Texas Assistance 
269 
Texas, Constitution, Art. Ill, Sec. 50-b(b). 
270 
Vernon's Texas Codes Annotated, Vol. 2, Educa­
tion Code, Chapter 55. 
271 Vernon's Texas Codes Annotated, Vol. 2, Education 
Code, Chap. 55, Sub-Chap. C, Tuition Scholarships (Repealed), 
Sees. 54.101, 54.102. Repealed by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., 
p. 2326, Ch. 720, Sec. 2, eff. Sect. 1, 1975. 
Ibid., Chapter 56, Sees. 56.001-56.038; Acts 1975, 
64th Leg., p. 2323, Ch. 720, Sec. 1. 
273 Ibid., Sec. 56.002, Declaration of Policy. 
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274 
Grants Program, and the purpose is "to provide a program 
to supply grants of money enabling students to attend post-
secondary educational institutions, public or private, of 
275 
their choice in Texas." Among limitations placed on the 
new program was that the student ". . .be enrolled in an 
approved post-secondary educational institution in other than 
276 
a theology or religious degree program." The Texas Assis­
tance Grant is based on need, and cannot exceed $600 per 
277 
fiscal year, and it is to be paid to the student through 
278 the enrolling institution. 
The program was funded in 1975-76 at $7.5 million 
and in 1976-77 at $9 million. In addition, contracts with 
Baylor (Baptist) University for medical and dental training 
were funded at $16 million per year in 1975-77. Texas College 
of Osteopathic Medicine also received funding of $3 million 
?7q 
for 1975-76, and $3.3 million for 1976-77. The same leg­
islature provided for higher education authorities in Texas 
which may issue tax exempt bonds for federal guaranteed 
student loans.2®^ 
274 Vernon's Texas Codes Annotated, Sub-Chap. B, 
Texas Assistance Grants, Sec. 56.010. 
275 Ibid., Sec. 56.011, Purpose. 
. 276Ibid., Sec. 56.013(b). 277Ibid., Sec. 61.227. 
278Ibid., Sec. 56.015(a), (1): (b). 
279 Smith, NCICU Report, p. 38; Vernon's Texas Codes, 
Sec. 61.096; Sec. 105.80. 
28<^Smith, Ibid. 
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The note regarding constitutional validity follows 
as an opinion of the attorney general of Texas: 
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 2654h(repealed), pro­
viding for tuition equalization grants, states a primary 
purpose to provide the maximum possible use of existing 
resources and facilities in this state and therefore 
does not violate the separation of church and state 
doctrine of Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7 or of the prohibition 
of grants of public funds to individuals of Const. Art. 3, 
Sec. 51.281 
The note continues, drawing upon federal interpre­
tations : 
The Establishment Clause of the U. S. Constitution 
as recently interpreted by the United States Supreme 
Court will not bar all aid to church-sponsored insti­
tutions and their students, so long as the aid has a 
proper secular purpose, does not significantly advance 
or hinder religion, and does not result in excessive 
entanglements of government in religion.282 
The appropriation made for tuition equalization 
grants which appears as item 16 of the appropriations to the 
Coordinating Board, Texas College and University System, and 
based upon Acts 1971, 62nd Leg., p. 2529, Ch. 828, is con­
stitutional .283 
In general: 
Where an institution of higher education requires 
an established fixed policy that all of its trustees, 
officers, faculty and staff members acknowledge belief 
in and adhere to particular and detailed religious doc­
trines and refuses to hire a person as a staff member 
because of the person's religious beliefs, it would be 
p Q1 
Op. Atty. Gen., 1971, No. M-861. 
pop 
Op. Atty. Gen., 1973, No. H-66. 
poo 
Op. Atty. Gen., 1973, No. LA-47S 
283 
an abuse of discretion for the Coordinating Board, 
Texas College and University System, to find the insti­
tution qualified to participate in the tuition equaliza­
tion grant program as a non-sectarian institution.284 
The new legislation did not differ substantially 
from that which was repealed, and it has not faced court 
test other than attorney general opinion. 
UTAH 
The Utah State Constitution effectively provides 
for the prevention of the use of public money and property 
285 
for the support of religious institutions. It is espe­
cially strong in its education article as it denies appro­
priations or aid in support of "any school, seminary, col­
lege, university, or other institutions controlled in whole, 
or in part by any church, sect, or denomination whatever."^®® 
Although the state could very well have announced 
for an established church (Mormon) in years past, there does 
not appear to be any move toward utilization of tax money 
for support of Mormon or other religious institutions of 
higher education. 
284 
Op. Atty. Gen., 1974, No. H-203. 
285 
Utah, Constitution, Art. I (Bill of Rights), 
Sec. 4. 
^^Ibid. , Art. X (Education), Sec. 13. 
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VERMONT 
Vermont echoes the New England concern with relig­
ious freedom and ties it with freedom of conscience in 
opposition to the establishment of a particular denomina-
287 tion. 
No plan of state support of private higher education 
presently exists. 
VIRGINIA 
In previous narrative it is reported that the pri­
mary influence for the First Amendment's "establishment-free 
exercise" couplet is derived from Thomas Jefferson's interest 
in freedom of expression by an enlightened electorate. It 
is not surprising, therefore, to read in the Virginia Bill 
of Rights that: 
No man shall be compelled to frequent or support 
any religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever. . . . 
And the General Assembly shall not ... confer any 
The early constitutionalists most likely felt they 
had adequately blocked further inroads of sectarianism into 
government through the denial of powers to the General Assem­
bly to: 
287 
Vermont^ Constitution, Art. I. 
288 
Virginia, Constitution, Art. I (Bill of Rights), 
Sec . 16 . 
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make any appropriation of public funds, or per­
sonal property, or of any real estate, to any church, 
or sectarian society, association or institution of any 
kind whatever, which is entirely or partly directly, or 
indirectly controlled by any church or sectarian society; 
nor shall the General Assembly make any like appropria­
tion to any charitable institution which is not owned 
or controlled by the Commonwealth.289 
The Articles on Education 
The articles on education reflect the changing con­
ditions and attitudes of the people of Virginia since 
Jefferson's time. The founder concerned himself with the 
notion that education should be pursued in an atmosphere of 
free scientific inquiry unlimited by sectarian interfer-
290 ence. 
Before 1956, the constitution was considered to for­
bid the appropriation for tuition and fees at private 
291 
schools. The changes came about because of an attempt 
to prevent integration in Virginia schools through the with-
292 
holding of public funds, which was found unconstitutional. 
In 1956, the constitution was amended by the state to aid 
students to go to schools other than public through the 
293 
appropriation of funds for that purpose. However, it was 
289 ... Virginia, Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 16. 
290 Brubacher and Rudy, Higher Education m Transi­
tion, p. 149. 
291 . Virginia, Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 10. 
292 
Ibid., Art. VIII, Sec. 1; Harrison v. Day, 200 Va. 
439,106 S.E. 2d 636(1959). 
Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 419, 89 S.E. 2d 851(1955), 
Virginia Law Review 42 (1956), 1157. 
286 
ruled that direct institutional aid was contrary to the 
294 
Constitution of the United States. 
The constitutional limitations proved to be too 
restrictive in the face of straitened circumstances within 
the church-related college community. A series of proposals 
passed the legislature in 1973 and 1974. The following 
words, upon being accepted in 1974 by popular vote, became 
a constitutional amendment: 
The General Assembly may provide for loans to stu­
dents attending nonprofit institutions of higher edu­
cation in the Commonwealth whose primary purpose is to 
provide collegiate or graduate education and not to 
provide religious training or theological education. 
The General Assembly may also provide for a State 
agency or authority to assist in borrowing money for 
construction of educational facilities at such institu­
tions, provided that the Commonwealth shall not be 
liable for any debt created by such borrowing.295 
Under the College Scholarship Assistance Act, which 
passage of the above amendment made possible, assistance was 
allowed any Virginia resident freshman attending public or 
private colleges, who could demonstrate financial need. On 
November 5, 1974, an amendment was ratified to this section 
which inserted "and grants to or on behalf of" following 
"loans to" near the beginning of the first sentence and 
296 
added to the last sentence of the section. 
294 
Griffin v. State Bd. of Education, 296 P. Supp. 
1178 (E.D. Va., 1969). 
295 Code of Virginia, 1976 Cumulative Supplement, 
Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 11, At 17. 
296Ibid., At. 18. 
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The program now reads: 
There is hereby established, from funds provided by 
law, a program of tuition assistance in the form of 
grants and loans, as hereinafter provided, to or on 
behalf of bonafide residents of Virginia who attend 
private, accredited and nonprofit institutions of col­
legiate education in the Commonwealth whose primary 
purpose is to provide collegiate or graduate education 
and not to provide religious education or theological 
education. Unless otherwise indicated, as used in this 
chapter "accredited" means any institution approved to 
confer degrees pursuant to Sec. 23-9 of the Code of 
Virginia. (1972, c.18; 1973, c.2; 1975, c.400)297 
Financial aid has subsequently been budgeted for 
health-related purposes at $205,500 in 1974-75. State 
teacher scholarships are primarily allotted to public insti 
tutions, while about 5% goes to private "nonsectarian" col­
lege students. The Tuition Assistance Program for private 
institutions of higher learning was funded in 1974-75 at 
?98 
$4,071,200. The category of "student aid" in Virginia 
299 
dropped 35% in 1976-77 appropriations. The need-based 
College Scholarship Assistance Program was funded at 
$1,425,000,300 and paid out $1,897,000 in 1976-77, which 
301 
was matched by Federal SSIG funds. 
297 Code of Virginia, 1976 Cumulative Supplement, 
Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 23-38.12. 
298 
Smith, NCICU Report, p. 39. 
299 Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
p. 131. 
300Smith, NCICU Report, p. 39. 
301 Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
p. 137. 
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The wall of separation in terms of the Virginia 
Constitution was not breached, according to a series of 
court decisions, which are discussed in the following 
chapter. 
WASHINGTON 
The constitution of the state of Washington has 
effectively limited distribution of tax money to private 
higher education. The three related articles in the Consti­
tution read as follows: 
First: ... No public money or property shall be 
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, 
exercise or instruction, or the support of any relig­
ious establishment. . . .302 
Second: . . . The credit of the State shall not, in 
any manner be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any 
individual, association, company or corporation. . . .303 
Third: All schools maintained or supported wholly 
or in part by the public funds shall be forever free 
from sectarian control or influence.304 
In an attempt to circumvent the above requirements 
and to provide assistance to students in attendance at private 
church-related institutions the Legislature enacted a pro­
gram of assistance which included: 
(1) a need-based student aid program, which was 
funded in 1973-75 at $4,600,000, part of which was transferred 
302 
Washxngton, Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 11. 
303 304 
Ibid., Art. VIII, Sec. 5. Ibid., IX, Sec. 4. 
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from the tuition supplement, declared unconstitutional 
M_ 10-70 305 m May, 1973. 
(2) The establishment of the Higher Education Assis­
tance Authority, which was devised to purchase student 
loans in private and public universities. It was funded in 
1973-74 at $250,000 for an initial administrative start-up 
, , , 306 
budget. 
(3) A work-study program, similar to one in Cali­
fornia, provides that half-time students in any accredited 
higher education institution will receive aid the same as 
307 
full-time students. 
Clarifying legislation was enacted in 1973, to fur­
ther define tax-exempt status of private, non-profit colleges 
and universities. One county tax assessor had attempted to 
collect taxes from two private colleges, on student housing, 
food services, student unions, athletic field houses, etc. 
Had the move been successful, millions of dollars in taxes 
would have begun to flow from the colleges to all levels of 
4. 308 government. 
305 
Smith, NCICU Report, p. 41. 
306 
Washington, Revised Statutes, Chap. 28B.17. 
307Ibid., Chap. 28B.12. 
308 
Alternatives in State Government Financing 
of Higher Education Wash., D. C.: Academy for Educational 
Development, Inc., Feb., 1973 (ERIC Document Reproduction 
Service No. 077 406), p. 46. 
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The Biennial Appropriations of 1975-77 show that 
student aid was increased by 37% to $7,052,000 and the grant 
309 
program was funded at $3,010,000. 
On November 4, 1975, the citizens of the State of 
Washington voted down an amendment which would have allowed 
unlimited tax aid for private church-related education on all 
levels. House Joint Resolution 19 was defeated in a 60-40 
vote. 
The proposed amendment read: 
To the extent permitted by the Constitution of the 
United States and notwithstanding any other provision of 
the Constitution of the State of Washington to the con­
trary, the legislature may provide assistance for stu­
dents of public and private schools, and for students of 
public and private institutions for post-secondary or 
higher education for the purpose of advancing their edu­
cation, regardless of the creed or religious affiliation, 
influence, or nature of the educational entity which 
they attend.310 
Strong appeals for passage of the amendment were 
made by political leaders in the state, as well as Roman 
Catholic support and strong media encouragement. Opponents 
clearly fought an uphill battle against what had appeared 
311 certain victory for the amendment1s supporters. 
In July, 1974, the Washington State Supreme Court, 
in a 5-3 decision, ruled that the state cannot be forced to 
309 
Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
pp. 131 and 137. 
310 
"Washington Voters Trounce Parochiaid," Church 
and State, Vol. 28, No. 11, p. 8(192). 
311Ibid., pp. 3-11. 
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recover $845,455 which had been received by ten church-
colleges and universities in tuition supplements, later 
declared unconstitutional. The case turned on the point that 
at the time the money was distributed, the law was assumed 
to be constitutional, and although no more money could be 
317 
paid through the program, no recovery could be made. 
WEST VIRGINIA 
West Virginians may not, according to their consti­
tution, be compelled to attend or to support any religion 
or ministry, nor may the state legislature tax the people to 
313 
support the establishment of religion. The founding 
fathers of West Virginia also prohibited the extension of 
credit to extra-governmental bodies, individuals, private 
corporations or companies "for any purpose whatever.""^"1'4 
The 1975-76 Budget provided $1,650,000 for a state 
scholarship program for undergraduate students, based on the 
nebulous requirement of ". . . satisfactory academic stand­
ing ... normal progress toward completion of the course of 
study and continued eligibility, as determined by the com-
315 
mission." in addition, the legislature provides that 
312 
"Washington's Religious Liberty Referendum," 
Church and State, 28, 4 (April 1975), pp. 3; 12; Washington 
State Higher Education Assistance Authority v. Graham, 
529 P. 2d 1051, 1054 (1974). " 
313west Virginia, Constitution, Art. Ill, Sec. 15. 
314 
Ibid., Art. X, Sec. 6. • 
315 
West Virginia Code. 1975 Cum. Supp. 7, Art. 22B; 
Sec. 18-22B6. 
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payment of the scholarship must be made directly to the 
institution, a practice that has been studiously avoided in 
most all recent financial aid legislation due to the possi-
316 
bility of excessive entanglement with religion. 
The legislature in 1974 voted to extend state aid 
to students attending Greenbrier College of Osteopathic 
Medicine. But according to the Attorney General, the plan 
was in violation of Article X, Sec. 6 of the West Virginia 
Constitution, in that the program provided state funds for 
. . 317 a private purpose. 
WISCONSIN 
The Constitution of Wisconsin clearly prohibits the 
coerced support of its citizenry of religion through either 
attendance or taxation. Neither is money permitted to be 
drawn from the treasury of the state to support or benefit 
318 religious institutions. 
Constitutional foundations do not permit the credit 
of the state to be given or utilized in the assistance of 
319 any individual association or corporation. Almost all 
the fifty state constitutions forbid this practice, yet it 
is almost universally true that both state and federal credit 
O] 
West Virginia Code, 1975 Cum. Supp. 7, Art. 22B; 
Sec. 18-22B6. 
317Ibid., Art. 22 c. 
318 
Wisconsin. Constitution, Art. I., Sec. 18. 
319 
Ibid., Art. VIII., Sec. 3. 
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is extended in the loan programs administered on college 
campuses in Wisconsin and the other 49 states. It is to be 
noted that contrary to the majority approach, Wisconsin only 
administers federal loans, and provides direct grants in all 
320 cases of aid administered to students and to institutions. 
The Wisconsin Higher Education Aids Board has the 
power under the constitution and by statute to distribute 
the state's tax money in the form of grants within a number 
of separate categories. Indian students who are able to 
321 demonstrate need are aided from a budget of $1.7 million. 
A talent incentive grant program to provide for the dis­
advantaged was funded at $1,600,000, and provides matching 
funds for the federal-state scholarship incentive grant 
322 program. 
Health programs involve both direct grants to the 
Medical College of Wisconsin, a non-public institution, and 
for contracts in dental education for state residents at 
Marquette University. The program at M.C.W. was funded in 
1975 at $2,247,600, and in 1977 it increased to 
324 
$3,194,000. Marquette's dental school received $2,667,000 
(or $3,000 for each student resident enrolled) in 1973-75. A 
tuition offset program, based on need, is the largest single 
320 . 
Wisconsin, Constitution, Art. VIII., Sec. 3. 
^^"'"Smith, NCICU Report, p. 44. 322Ibid. 323Ibid. 
324 Chambers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
p. 131. 
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funding provided by the Board. In 1973-75 it was funded at 
325 
$9.9 million. The honor scholarship award program provides 
financial scholarships to the top 10% of high school graduat­
ing classes, and students have the choice of using the grants 
at either public or private church-related institutions in 
Wisconsin. Funding in 1973-75 was $1.1 million for this last 
326 program. Education Manpower grants in 1973—75 were funded 
at $600,000 for courses leading to employment in a "critical" 
327 occupation within the state. The total money funded for 
O O Q 
the Higher Education Aids Board in 1976-77 was $20,429,000. 
WYOMING 
The constitution of Wyoming provides for freedom of 
religion, and non-establishment through its Bill of Rights 
which forbids extension of state money to any sectarian 
329 
society or institution. Forbidden by the same document 
are appropriations for any organization not under absolute 
control of the state, and this includes denominational or 
330 sectarian organizations, institutions and associations. 
325Smith, NCICU Report, p. 44. 326Ibid. 
327 
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No part of 
. . .  a n y  p u b l i c  s c h o o l  f u n d  [ m i g h t ]  e v e r  b e  u s e d  
to support or assist any private school ... college 
or other institution of learning controlled by any . . . 
religious denomination whatsoever.331 
In addition, the credit of the state is restricted to pur­
poses for the state, and not to be used on behalf of asso-
332 ciations or individuals. 
The research reveals no unconstitutional plan to 
assist church-related institutions as are forbidden in the 
Wyoming constitution, the statutes, nor is there any such 
plan being contemplated by the legislature. 
The constitutional base in the fifty states has 
proved decisive in a number of court cases dealing with the 
attempt to breach the wall of separation. In recent cases 
the Supreme Court of the United States has permitted a num­
ber of states to provide tax monies, under certain circum­
stances, to church-related colleges. The first line of 
defense has historically been the state's own constitution as 
it was viewed in the light of the First and Fourteenth Amend­
ments of the Federal Constitution. Consistency of legal 
opinion has not characterized this question in the past two 
hundred years of the Republic, nor have recent court decisions 
done very much toward clarifying for institutional adminis­
trators constitutional delimitations regarding the incursion 
331 
Wyoming, Constitution, Art. VII (Education), 
Sec. 8. 
332 
Ibid., Art. XVI (Public Indebtedness), Sec. 6. 
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of state and federal money into the fiscal processes of the 
church-related campus. 
In order that state laws might not be in conflict 
with the constitutions, some legislators have succeeded 
in persuading citizens to change their constitutions to per­
mit the aid. In 1973-74 the attempt was made in the state 
333 
of Washington, unsuccessfully. The same attempts at 
change have been turned back in New York (1967); in Nebraska 
334 
in 1966 and in 1970; and in Oregon and Idaho m 1972. 
•a-ao 
Weiss v. 0'Brien, 509 P. 2d 973 (1973); Washington 
State Higher Education Assistance Authority v. Graham, 529, 
P*2d 1051, 1054 (1974). 
O OA 
Church and State, 28, 4 (April 1975), p. 12. 
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CHAPTER V 
LITIGATION: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 
FEDERAL, AND STATE 
Financial aid to all levels of education must stand 
or fall before the historic measure of state and federal 
constitutions. Aid plans which scar the landscape as fail­
ures of the past: others which are contemplated for the 
future; and those that are presently operative must have the 
sanction of the courts in order to begin or continue. Court 
decisions are not made in a vacuum. The historical narrative 
in the preceding chapters comprises a necessary background 
if recent and current aid controversies are to be viewed 
properly in their context. 
A dearth of higher education precedent forced the 
attention of lawmakers to look to lower-level education cases 
for benchmarks upon which to refer in higher education ques­
tions . A plethora of twentieth century litigation at primary 
and secondary school levels provided a rich data base for 
jurists on all levels of adjudication. A summary of the most 
influential cases will be presented, in order that selected 
higher education litigation might be presented in a wider 
context. 
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SELECTED INFLUENTIAL EDUCATION DECISIONS1 
2 (1) Bradfield v. Roberts, although frequently 
mentioned as a precedent in educational cases, was not 
directly concerned with the question of public support of 
religious schools. Rather, the question arose as to whether 
the District of Columbia could use tax funds to assist a 
3 
Catholic hospital m the construction of a facility. Brad-
field, the plaintiff, brought a taxpayer suit against the 
United States Treasurer, Roberts. 
Bradfield argued that such public assistance was 
unconstitutional in that it consisted of direct tax support 
of a religious society and would therefore be an establishment 
4 
of religion. The United States Supreme Court held, however, 
Edward C. Bolmeier, School in the Legal Structure, 
2nd Ed. (Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson Co., 1973), pp. 54-80; 
Richard E. Morgan, The Supreme Court and Religion (New York: 
The Free Press, 1972), pp. 60-107; Leo Pfeffer, God, Caesar, 
and the Constitution: The Court as Referee in Church-State 
Confrontation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), pp. 182-296; 
Leo Pfeffer, Church, State and Freedom, Revised Edition 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 514-603; Michael R. Smith 
and Joseph E. Bryson, Church-State Relations: The Legality 
of Using Public Funds for Religious Schools, No. 1, Legal 
Aspects of School Administration (Topeka: National Organiza­
tion on Legal Problems of Education, 1972), pp. 39-40; 
Frank J. Sorauf, The Wall of Separation: The Constitutional 
Politics of Church and State (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1976), pp. 231-276, 274, 341, 371-380. 
^Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899). 
^Bradfield v. Roberts. at 293. 
^Ibid., at 297. 
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that Providence Hospital was a legal secular, non-sectarian 
5 
corporation. Leo Pfeffer says of Bradfield: 
If the only rationale ... was the fact of legal 
incorporation, ... parochial schools could easily [use] 
the same device. ... There is, however, a major dif­
ference between hospitals and schools. Providence 
Hospital, the beneficiary of federal funds in the 
Bradfield case, neither taught nor practiced religion; 
it taught nothing and practiced only medicine.6 
Religious motivation is not a consideration which 
relates to the establishment of religion, but education "is 
inherently more closely related to the propagation and prac-
7 tice of religion." Pfeffer concludes: 
. . .  a  g o v e r n m e n t a l  s u b s i d y  t o  a  r e l i g i o u s  e d u c a ­
tional institution is a use of tax money which directly 
s u p p o r t s  a n  i n s t i t u t i o n  f o r m e d  a n d  o p e r a t i n g  f o r  . . .  
religious education rather than merely for the secular 
function of healing the sick.® 
(2) Quick Bear v. Leupp (1908)^ was the first educa­
tion case regarding federal funds to reach the Supreme Court. 
The question revolved around a trust fund which was being man­
aged by the government for the Indians. The money was in 
reality a private fund, and 
. . . the question was whether these monies could be 
disbursed to pay for the education of Indians at schools 
run by the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions. The answer 
was an easy yes, since the money was in law and fact, 
private.^ 
^Bradfield v. Roberts, at 291. 
g 
Pfeffer, God, Caesar, and the Constitution, p. 318. 
^Ibid., p. 318. 8Ibid. 
^Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50(1908). 
"^Morgan, The Supreme Court and Religion, p. 79. 
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Smith and Bryson note that despite the facts and outcome 
of the case, Quick Bear continues to be used "as a precedent 
for the legal use of public funds for religious purposes.""1'1 
12 
(3) Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) pivoted about a state 
statute which read in part: 
No person, individually or as a teacher, shall in any 
private denominational, parochial or public school, teach 
any subject to any person in any language other than the 
English language. . . . Languages, other than the English 
language, may be taught as languages only after a pupil 
shall have attained and successfully passed the eighth 
grade. . . .13 
The statute had emerged from the dual context of anti 
German feeling following World War I and anti-Catholic prejudice 
during the same period. The age limitation was directed at the 
very existence of parochial and catechical instruction. German 
Lutherans and Catholics took great pride in learning the 
Catechism in German. To Meyer, his freedom to teach was at 
stake, and he contended the statute was undue interference 
14 upon his First Amendment liberties. Meyer, a teacher in an 
Evangelical Lutheran Parochial school, was arrested, tried, and 
convicted for the "crime" of teaching a juvenile a non-English 
language. The Nebraska State Supreme Court upheld Meyer's 
conviction, but his appeal to the United States Supreme Court 
15 vindicated his stand. 
^Smith and Bryson, Church-State Relations, p. 42. 
"^Mever v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390(1923). 
13Ibid., at 397. 14Ibid. 15Ibid., at 400. 
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Morgan noted, however, that Meyer was decided upon 
the question of "due process" rather than First Amendment 
16 grounds. He reports that Justice John McReynolds in his 
opinion: 
. . .  d i d  n o t  a t t a c k  w h a t  t h e  s t a t e s  h a d  d o n e  o n  
First Amendment grounds. It was neither speech nor 
religion which was being constitutionally interfered 
with. . . but the freedom to contract. ... Property 
was the value which McReynolds saw at stake; . . . the 
teacher-plaintiff had a property interest in his capac­
ity to teach German ... to interfere with the right 
of educators to sell their services and parents to buy 
them was an unacceptable restriction on economic 
activity. 
It is Morgan's contention that neither Meyer, nor 
the case which follows, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, is 
proper precedent for the "Constitutional right" to establish 
18 
church-related schools. Also he casts doubt upon a second 
"logical" conclusion that: 
. . .  i f  t h e  e c o n o m i c s  o f  r u n n i n g  s u c h  s c h o o l s  
become so difficult that survival is in doubt, then 
governmental support must be forthcoming or government 
is operationally depriving persons of the right ... 
to use Meyer and Pierce to support [the argument] . . . 
radically mistakes their meaning. These decisions are 
prime examples of what Philip Kurland has called the 
"apocrypha" of church-state law. 
Apocryphal or not, the utilization of the cases by 
the courts in subsequent decisions justify their inclusion 
in a history of the state-aid controversy. 
16U. S., Constitution, Amendment XIV. 
17 
Morgan, The Supreme Court and Religion, pp. 77-78. 
18Ibid., p. 78. 19Ibid., 
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(4) In Oregon, a move by the Scottish Rite Masons 
to have outlawed Catholic parochial education failed to get 
past the United States Supreme Court. The occasion was the 
20 case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters. The late Dr. Edward 
C. Bolmeier of Duke called the case "one of the most influen­
tial decisions in perpetuating nonpublic schools that was 
21 handed down by the United States Supreme Court." 
At issue was an Oregon statute requiring all chil­
dren between the ages of eight and sixteen to be sent to public 
22 school. The Society of Sisters successfully argued that 
the statute interfered with parental freedom of choice and 
with the private school1s right to continue the enterprise 
of education. The Court emphasized the second right, that 
of the maintenance of the school as a corporation. As with 
Meyer, above, the Court stressed the "due process" aspect 
more than the First Amendment in its conclusion. However, 
Bolmeier correctly concludes that the historical value of the 
decision lies in the "classic statement of the Court" which 
23 allows freedom of choice. Mr. Justice McReynolds wrote 
in Pierce; 
The fundamental theory of liberty ... excludes 
any general power of the state to standardize its chil­
dren by forcing them to accept instruction from public 
20 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 262 U.S. 510(1925). 
21 Edward C. Bolmeier, School in the Legal Structure, 
p. 62. 
22 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, at 530. 
23 
Bolmeier, School in the Legal Structure, p. 62. 
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teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of 
the state: those who nurture him and direct his destiny 
have the right . . . to . . . prepare him for addi­
tional obligations.24 
(5) Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education2 
was occasioned by a 1928 law whereby textbooks on secular 
subjects were supplied free to all children, including those 
2 6 attending parochial schools. The case was not challenged 
on establishment grounds, rather that the purchase of text­
books for non-public schools was without a public purpose. 
Dr. Bolmeier ties Cochran to Borden v. Louisiana State Board 
27 of Education, and the Cochran decision applied to both 
cases. The United States Supreme Court agreed with the State 
of Louisiana which argued: (a) purchase and ownership of 
the textbooks by church schools was not in the law; (b) be­
cause all children of the state were loaned textbooks it 
benefitted the state: (c) the state and the students benefit­
ted by the law. The state decision was upheld by the 
28 
United States Supreme Court. 
The Court1s opinion expressed what has been known as 
29 
"the child benefit theory.11 It concludes: 
24 . 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, at 510. 
25 
Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 
281 U.S. 370(1930) . 
26Ibid., at 374. 
27 
Borden v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 
123 So 655(1930) N. Bolmeier, School in the Legal Structure, 
p. 63. 
28Ibid. 29Ibid. 
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The taxing power of the state is exerted for a public 
purpose. The legislature does not segregate private 
schools or their pupils, as its beneficiaries. ... 
Its interest is education, .... Individual interests 
are aided only as the common interest is safeguarded.30 
Richard Morgan notes that the question of establish­
ment of religion is not confronted by the Court. He says: 
All the Court said in Cochran was that to provide 
textbooks was in aid of public purpose; it did not 
speak, in any way to the question of whether Louisiana's 
arrangement constituted an establishment of religion. 
(6) In 1947 the first case concerning state aid to 
education as related to the First Amendment reached the 
United States Supreme Court. Everson v. Board of Educa-
32 
tion (1947) was concerned with a New Jersey statute which 
provided for reimbursement of parents for expenses incurred 
in the transportation of their children to and from school. 
The plan did not exclude parochial school children in its 
consideration. Ewing School District in the form of a reso­
lution put the plan into effect which authorized a reimburse­
ment of parents for fares paid for transportation by public 
buses of students who were attending both public and Catholic 
schools. 33 
The plaintiff took the Board of Education of Ewing Town­
ship to court and argued that the Statute utilized his property 
30 
Cochran v. Louisiana, at 374. 
31 
Morgan, The Supreme Court and Religion, p. 80. 
32Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1(1947). 
33Ibid., at 15. 
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(taxes) without his consent, and thereby violated due pro­
cess: also, such use of tax monies effectively established 
religion. Thus, he argued that both the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments were violated. The United States Supreme Court 
34 upheld the defendants in a 5-4 decision. 
The Supreme Court relied on Cochran's child benefit 
theory to dispense with Everson's first concern, the viola­
tion of due process. The Court contended that the aid bene­
fitted the public because it provided safety for the children 
of the public. Mr. Justice Hugo Black continued the majority 
opinion by recalling what Sorauf calls "the language of the 
most absolute doctrine of the separation of church and 
state. 
Any account of EVerson is incomplete without the 
eloquence of Justice Black., who for the first time in the 
Court's history recalled the words of Thomas Jefferson, and 
thus drew the metaphorical concept of the founders into the 
context of twentieth century jurisprudence. Justice Black wrote: 
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First 
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor 
the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither 
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, 
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force 
nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from 
church against his will or force him to profess a belief 
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished 
34 Everson v. Board of Education, at 15(see Note 36). 
35 Sorauf, The Wall of Separation, p. 19. 
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for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or 
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. 
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to 
support any religious activities or institutions, what­
ever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt 
to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the 
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate 
in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups 
and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause 
against establishment of religion by law was intended 
to erect "a wall of separation between Church and 
State."36 
However, in the New Jersey case, the Court did not 
consider the "wall" breached. The decision was to allow the 
37 . . transportation reimbursement. Although the decision went 
against the separationists, the above opinion provides a 
telling constitutional argument against the levying of 
taxes to aid church-related schools on any level. 
38 
(7) Cantwell v. Connecticut is significant in 
that for the first time in history the religious aspects of 
the First Amendment are held binding on the states through 
39 the absorption mechanism of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Newton Cantwell, a Jehovah Witness, was convicted 
in New Haven, Connecticut, in violation of the state statute 
forbidding public solicitation for a religious or philan­
thropic cause without a state license. The playing of 
36 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 at 15 
(1947). 
OQ 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
39 Morgan, The Supreme Court and Religion, p. 62. 
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phonograph records critical of Catholicism had aroused Cath­
olics against them. One of Newton's sons, Jesse, had been 
convicted of disturbing the peace. Once the cases were taken 
to the Supreme Court, the convictions were overturned on the 
basis of the First Amendment clause on free exercise. Jus­
tice Forst Roberts, in speaking for the majority, enunciated 
the principle that not only freedom of speech, but freedom 
of religion, operated through the Fourteenth Amendment. He 
wrote: 
. . .  T h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  C o n g r e s s  
shall make no laws respecting an establishment of 
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 
The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legisla­
tures of the States as incompetent as Congress to enact 
such laws. . . . Thus the amendment embraces two con­
c e p t s — f r e e d o m  t o  b e l i e v e  a n d  f r e e d o m  t o  a c t .  . . .  
In every case the power to regulate must be so exer­
cised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly 
to infringe the protected freedom.40 
(8) Following hard upon Cantwell was McCollum v. 
41 Board of Education, "released time" case. The case revolved 
around the question of whether the Champaign County, Illinois, 
Board of Education could constitutionally allow religious 
42 education to take place in public school buildings. The 
plan allowed students who so desired opportunity to attend 
religious instruction, while those who did not take 
40 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, at 303-304. 
41 
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 
333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
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advantage of the sectarian training to continue their secu­
lar pursuits. 
Pfeffer describes the plan and its effects: 
In 1940, an interfaith council ... was formed. . . 
At the beginning of each term the public school teach­
ers distributed to the children cards on which parents 
could indicate their consent to the enrollment of their 
children in the religious instruction classes. Children 
who obtained such consent were released ... for a per­
iod of thirty minutes each week in the elementary school 
and forty-five minutes in the junior high school. ... 
Theoretically, enrollment ... was to be entirely volun­
tary but both teacher and peer pressures operated to 
assure 100% enrollment in many classes . . . Terry 
McCollum, an 11-year-old fifth-grader was placed at a 
desk in the hall outside the classroom. ... Passing 
schoolmates teased him, believing he was being punished 
for being an atheist. . . .^3 
The youth was shuttled from place to place until his 
mother, Vashti McCollum, entered suit to halt the plan in 
the Champaign public school system. The state courts ruled 
against Mrs. McCollum, but in 1948 the United States Supreme 
Court ruled with the plaintiff. The case is considered a 
"landmark" in both American constitutional history and public 
44 education. 
In the Supreme Court, Mrs. McCollum overcame three 
major arguments advanced by the Board of Education: (1) that 
she had no case as the First Amendment applied only to Con­
gress, not to a school board; but the Everson precedent 
allowed that through the action of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The First Amendment could apply to the states as well as to 
43 Pfeffer, God, Caesar, and the Constitution, pp. 182 
44Ibid., p. 184. 
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Congress; (2) that this case showed no preferential treatment 
of one faith over another, but the Court relied on the Everson 
precedent which ruled that the Establishment Clause outlawed 
aid to all religions: (3) that free exercise was not infringed 
upon because of the voluntary characteristics within the plan. 
Once more, the Court relied upon Everson to point out that 
coercive or not, religion was aided, and therefore forbidden 
45 under the First Amendment. The decision was 8 to 1. 
Mr. Justice Hugo Black wrote the concurring opinion, 
the heart of which follows: 
Pupils compelled by law to go to school for secular 
education are released in part from their legal duty upon 
the condition that they attend the religious classes. This 
is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established 
and tax-supported public school system to aid religious 
groups to spread their faiths. And it falls squarely 
under the ban of the First Amendment (made applicable to 
the States by the Fourteenth) as we interpreted in Ever­
son v. Board of Education. ... Here not only are the 
State's tax supported public school buildings used for the 
dissemination of religious doctrines. The State also 
affords sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that it 
helps to provide pupils for their religious classes 
through the use of the State1s compulsory public school 
machinery. This is not separation of Church and 
State.46 
Sorauf suggests the reasons behind the Supreme Court1s 
approach to McCollum might go beyond the obvious Constitu­
tional establishment causes. He recalls that: 
The Court struck down the released-time religious 
education program in the cities of Champaign and Urbana, 
Illinois, because they drew too directly and heavily on 
the resources of the public schools. The classes were 
held in the public schools, teachers were certified by 
45 
Pfeffer, God, Caesar, and the Constitution, pp. 184-5. 
^McCollum v. Board of Education, at 210. 
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the schools, and most of the administrative details were 
handled by public school personnel.47 
It remained for a later Supreme Court decision to 
provide the term "excessive entanglement11 for what Sorauf 
so effectively describes as drainage on public resources. 
48 
(9) Zorach v. Clausen provided the answer to those 
who asked for students to be released during school hours to 
49 attend off-campus religious instruction. The New York plan 
allowed students who were not released to remain in their class­
rooms for secular instruction. Attendance reports were kept 
by the churches and regular reporting was done in order that 
50 
truancy did not occur. The plan seemingly answered the 
chief objections expressed in McCollum. There were no state 
buildings or personnel involved, and students were released 
51 upon written request by their parents. 
The Supreme Court in a 6 to 3 decision, and with 
Justice William 0. Douglas writing the majority opinion, 
affirmed that released-time programs are constitutional so 
long as no coercion is used, that school personnel and build­
ings are not utilized. Leo Pfeffer continues to question the 
practice on the basis that "releasing children to enroll for 
religious instruction and not other children would seem to 
serve no purpose other than to advance religion. Mr. Justice 
47 Sorauf, The Wall of Separation, p. 316. 
48 
Zorach et al. v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
49t, . , 50x, . , 51_, . , Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 
52 
Pfeffer, God, Caesar, and the Constitution, p. 193. 
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Jackson viewed the retention of those children not released 
to a church as temporarily in "jail", or as "governmental 
53 
constraint in support of religion." 
5 4  (10) Engel v. Vitale. In an attempt to inculcate 
a higher view of ethics and patriotism, the New York Board of 
Regents in the early sixties produced the following prescribed 
prayer for use in the public schools: 
Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon 
thee, and we beg thy blessings upon us, our parents, 
our teachers and our country.55 
The use of the prayer was challenged in Hyde Park by parents 
and the New York Civil Liberties Union. In New York courts, 
the plaintiffs had no success, but when placed before the 
United States Supreme Court, the majority held that the 
5 6 prayer's use was unconstitutional as advancement of religion. 
In June 1962 Justice Hugo Black handed down the major­
ity opinion in favor of the plaintiffs. Leo Pfeffer comments: 
. . .  T h e  o n l y  i s s u e  b e f o r e  t h e  C o u r t  w a s  w h e t h e r  t h e  
invocation of God's blessings as prescribed in the reg­
ents' prayer was a religious activity. As to this 
there could be no question; it was a solemn avowal of 
divine faith and supplication for the blessings of the 
Almighty. Caesar may not involve himself in God's 
affairs.57 
Justice Black continued by recounting that the First Amend­
ment strictly forbids religious establishment: 
53 
Pfeffer, God, Caesar, and the Constitution, p. 324. 
54 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
55Ibid., at 422. 56Ibid. 
57 Pfeffer, God, Caesar, and the Constitution, p. 20 
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. . .  T h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o h i b i t i o n  a g a i n s t  l a w s  
respecting an establishment of religion must at least 
mean that in this country it is no part of the business 
of government to compose official prayers for any group 
of the American people to recite as part of a religious 
program carried on by the government.^® 
The decision went against the grain of popular American feel­
ing, but it has never been overturned, nor has Congress 
enacted legislation which would require or allow prayer in 
schools as a prescribed order or ceremony. 
(11) Abinqton School District v. SchemppS9 and a com­
panion case, Murray v. Curlett,^ dealt with Bible reading 
and the Lord's Prayer as a prescribed daily activity. Stu­
dents were not required by law to participate. Schempp was 
the Pennsylvania case, while Murray was brought in Maryland. 
The issues were similar in each case. 
The Supreme Court (8-1) found the Pennsylvania 
statute to be unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Brennan said: 
. . o The exercises are held in public school build­
ings., conducted by and under the authority of local 
school officials. Since the law requires the reading 
of the Holy Bible, it prefers the Christian religion.®1 
The value which Schempp has for higher education 
decisions yet to come rests upon the term, "primary effect," 
which emerged in the Court's comments which refer to a "test" 
of constitutionality: 
C O  
Engel v0 Vitale, at 431. 
59 
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 
(1963). 
6QMurray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d 698 (1962). 
^Abington School District v. Schempp, at 222. 
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The test may be stated as follows: What are the 
purposes and the primary effect of the enactment? If 
either is the advancement or inhibition of religion 
then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative 
power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is 
to say that to withstand the strictures of the Estab­
lishment Clause there must be a secular legislative 
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion. 
The Schempp case effectively concluded Mrs. Murray's 
litigation. The conclusion in both cases was that: Bible 
reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer as prescribed 
school exercises are unconstitutional violations of the First 
Amendment. The decision was reached 8-1, with Justice Potter 
Stewart in the minority. 
Engel, Schempp and Murray reflected the Warren 
Court's concern for minority rights, as well as the preser­
vation of liberties in the First Amendment. Minority oppres­
sion by the majority was a danger foreseen by James Madison 
during the critical days of constitutional formulation.®4 
The Jewish, atheist, or nonconformist minority need not be 
required to undergo embarrassment or coercion because of 
religious coercion in the context of public education. The 
Court places, through the above decisions, religion and gov­
ernment in a respectful but distinct relati onship. 
6 2 Abington School District v. Schempp, at 222. 
63 
Ibid. 
®4Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder: Sources 
of the Political Thought of James Madison (New York: The 
Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1973), p. xxxii. 
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65 
(12) Flast et al. v. Cohen. The passage of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) pre­
sented a thorny set of constitutional problems. Although 
legislation was being considered to allow taxpayers to test 
federal programs in court, "it was universally taken for 
granted that there was no way to challenge the constitu­
tionality of a Federal law, other than by a suit brought 
66 initially in a Federal court." 
However, a long list of taxpayers sponsored by the 
American Jewish Congress, The American Civil Liberties Union, 
and others sought an injunction in New York for judgment 
against the section of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965 which included financial aid to parochial schools. 
6 7 The New York Court used Frothingham v. Mellon as a precedent 
and ruled that the plaintiffs had no standing to sue. The case 
then went to the United States Supreme Court and in June, 1968, 
vindicated, through a favorable landmark decision, the 
68 taxpayer's right to challenge federal and state laws. 
The older Frothingham case had involved a taxpayer 
who claimed that a federal law establishing a maternity care 
program injured her because of a resulting higher tax bill. 
65 
Flast et al. v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
66 
Pfeffer, God, Caesar, and the Constitution, p. 266. 
^Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
^8Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
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The Court had ruled against her because there was no legal 
protection of citizens against higher taxes. The logic of 
Frothinqham escaped the Court. There appeared to be no means 
of connecting taxes a person paid into a vast treasury with 
the use made of that money, and as a result: 
. . .  T h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  t h r e w  h e r  c a s e  o u t  o n  t h e  
ground that while a person who was directly affected by 
a law could sue to have it declared unconstitutional, 
such a suit could not be brought by one whose only rela-
tionship to the law lay in the fact she paid taxes. . . . 
In Flast a relationship was expressed directly 
between taxpayer and legislation, allowing one to bring suit 
in the federal courts to challenge expenditure of federal tax 
70 
revenues which may be xn violation of the First Amendment. 
The Supreme Court said: 
We hold that a taxpayer will have standing . . . 
to invoke judicial power when he alleges that Congres­
sional action under the taxing and spending clause is 
in derogation of those Constitutional provisions which 
operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and 
spending power.71 
The trigger which provides control over legislative 
spending power in Flast was the religious clause of the 
First Amendment. The Flast decision became the occasion for 
Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas to express views concerning aid 
to parochial schools which carried beyond Flast and which 
included a challenge to the child benefit theory. 
69 
Pfeffer, God, Caesar and the Constitution, p. 265. 
70 
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
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Justice Douglas said of tuition grants: 
The idea here is that the parent receives the money, 
carries it to the school, and gives it to the priest. 
Since the money pauses a moment with the parent before 
going to the priest, it is argued that this evades the 
Constitutional prohibition against government money 
for religion. . . . Another ... [subterfuge] is the 
"authority." The state may not grant aid directly to 
church schools. But ... the state could give the money 
to the authority which . . . could channel it into the 
church schools. Yet another ... is "child benefit." 
Government may not aid church schools, but it may aid 
the children in the schools. . . . Government could 
even build church school classrooms, under this theory, 
because it would benefit the children to have nice 
rooms. . . .72 
Despite their being branded "subterfuges" by the 
Court, as was presented in Chapter IV, states have utilized 
higher education assistance plans based on grants adminis­
tered by higher education authorities for the "benefit" of 
the student. 
73 (13) Walz v. Tax Commissioner. The First Amendment 
was central in a very important New York tax case. A property 
owner, Frederick Walz, had purchased some property for $25.00. 
The city valued the property at $100.00, or four times what 
Walz paid for it. The $5.24 tax bill so aroused Mr. Walz 
that Walz sued the city on the basis of the First Amendment. 
The plaintiff maintained that because the city exempted 
churches from paying property taxes, this had the effect of 
causing his taxes to increase, thereby making him an unwilling 
72Flast v. Cohen, at 113. 
73 
Walz v. Tax Commissioner of New York City, 397 U.S. 
664 (1970). 
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supporter of the establishment of religion. The test claimed 
the attention of the three major religions who filed amicus curia 
briefs to maintain their exemption on the basis of the Free 
74 Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 
The Court made the point that churches were exempt 
not as a matter of "right," but as a matter of "grace." The 
point does not escape Pfeffer that "what the state gives, the 
state can take away. . . the First Amendment will not stand 
75 
in the way (to limit exemptionj. ..." Walz lost his battle 
in the New York courts in 1969, but the United States Supreme 
76 Court agreed to hear his appeal. Out of Walz came the 
term "excessive entanglement." The term was used by Chief 
Justice Warren Burger who, in speaking for the majority in 
the Walz case, explained that for the government to involve 
itself by placing value upon church property for tax purposes 
would create a situation of governmental involvement in reli­
gious matters. Mr. Justice Burger observed: 
. . .[T]he questions are whether the involvement is 
excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling 
for official and continuing surveillance leading to an 
impermissible degree of entanglement. Obviously a direct 
money subsidy would be a relationship pregnant with 
involvement and, as with most governmental grant pro­
grams, could encompass sustained ana detailed administra­
tive relationships for enforcement. . „ .77 
74 Pfeffer, God, Caesar, and the Constitution, p. 68. 
^Ibid. , p. 70. 
76 Walz v. Tax Commissioner of New York City, 397 U.S. 
664 (1970). 
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Chief Justice Burger maintained in Walz that absolute 
separation of church and state is not possible. The twin 
clauses of Free Exercise and Establishment are extremes 
between which "there is room for play in the joints produc-
78 
tive of a benevolent neutrality.11 The Chief Justice sug­
gests that "the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an 
involvement of sorts—one that seeks to mark, boundaries to 
79 avoid excessive entanglement." Justice Burger tied the 
concept of excessive entanglement to tax exemptions: 
The legislative purpose of tax exemptions is not aimed 
at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion |~; it] 
does not end the inquiry, however. We must also be sure 
that the end result—the effect—is not an excessive 
government entanglement with religion. The test is 
inescapably one of degree. Either course, taxation of 
churches or exemption, occasions some degree of involve­
ment with religion. Elimination of exemptions would 
tend to expand the involvement of government by giving 
rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, 
tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations that 
follow in the train of these legal processes.®® 
THE TRIPARTITE TEST 
With the Walz decision the Supreme Court conceived 
the third of what is known as the tripartite test. The three 
indices now applied to First Amendment cases are: (1) the 
legislative purpose; (2) primary effect; and (3) excessive 
78 
Walz v. Tax Commissioner of New York City, at 669. 
79 
Ibid., at 670. 
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entanglement. The tripartite test figured prominently in 
81 82 
Lemon v. Kurtman and Tilton v. Richardson. 
The Lemon decision actually consisted of three cases: 
Lemon, Earley v. Di Censo, and Robinson v. Pi Censo. Lemon 
involved a Pennsylvania statute which provided for state 
purchase of secular educational services from church schools. 
Contracts called for payment for teachers' salaries, texts, 
O O 
and other educational materials. 
Efforts were made by the Pennsylvania legislature to 
insure a strict limitation of religious expression upon the 
subjects involved in the aid. The plan passed the test 
84 before a three-judge federal court. 
Salary supplements were utilized as a device with 
which teachers in religious schools, who taught secular sub­
jects, were paid with tax monies. Although the teachers were 
restricted from teaching religion, salary supplements were 
85 paid only to Roman Catholic school teachers. 
On the basis of "excessive entanglement," a three-
86 judge federal court ruled that the law was unconstitutional. 
The United States Supreme Court agreed with the decision of 
the District Court. Declaring the "cumulative criteria," 
O I 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
82 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). 
Q O 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The contract 
scheme amounted to one of Justice Douglas' "subterfuges." 
The purpose and effect were secular. 
84Ibido, at 611. 85Ibid., at 607-609. 85Ibid0 
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(tripartite test) as the starting point for the examination 
of the Establishment Clause, Chief Justice Burger, writing 
the majority opinion, effectively declared "excessive entan-
87 
glement" to be central in all such cases. "Entanglement", 
as defined by the Chief Justice, contains three basics: 
(1) the nature and purpose of recipient institutions; (2) the 
nature of state aid; and (3) the ensuing afiiliation between 
church and state. The tripartite test developed out of a 
conscious attempt to draw together "criteria with which to 
88 give concrete meaning to the establishment clause." The 
prayer cases discussed above marked the beginning of the early 
89 development of the so-called "Tripartite Test." 
Schempp provided the source of "purpose-primary 
effect" of governmental legislation. For the measure to be 
considered Constitutional in view of the Establishment 
Clause, "there must be a secular legislative purpose and a 
90 primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." 
The Walz case added a somewhat arbitrary test which attempted 
to determine whether the final outcome of the legislation, 
regardless of the level of purpose, produced "excessive 
91 government entanglement with religion." Sorauf emphasizes 
87 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, at 607-609. 
88 89 
Sorauf, The Wall of Separation, p. 24. Ibid. 
90 
Schempp v. School District of Abingdon Township, 
at 222. 
91 
Walz v. Tax Commission, at 674. 
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that the entanglement must exceed "mere aid; it must include 
a range of possible effects as marked as the setting of state 
standards in religious schools or the exacerbation of church-
92 state conflict m American politics." 
The Court utilized the two tests until Tilton v. 
Richardson, where Chief Justice Warren Burger combined them 
into the tripartite test, and added another as a bonus. The 
Chief Justice summarized the test in this order: 
. . . First, does the Act reflect a secular legisla­
tive purpose? Second, is the primary effect of the Act 
to advance or inhibit religion? Third, does the Adminis­
tration of the Act foster an excessive entanglement with 
religion? Fourth, does the implementation of the Act 
inhibit the free exercise of religion?93 
The tests had emerged from a period of uncertainty 
and confusion on the Court concerning the meaning of the 
establishment clause. Sorauf speaks of the decade of the 
60's as "full of judicial hand-wringing over the difficul-
94 ties of giving concrete meaning to the clause." 
Beginning with the 70's the tripartite test is 
applied to higher education legislation with mixed results. 
The following cases from the United States Supreme Court, 
the United States District Courts, and the state courts dem­
onstrate the seriousness of the questions which remain with 
regard to the meaning of state aid and the First Amendment. 
92 
Sorauf, The Wall of Separation, p. 24. 
93 
Tilton v. Richardson, at 678. 
94 
Sorauf, The Wall of Separation, p. 25. 
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THE HIGHER EDUCATION CASES 
95 
Tilton v. Richardson 
Though Tilton v. Richardson was decided on the same 
day as Lemon, the case forms a line of demarcation by its 
being the first to be decided on the basis of the tripartite 
test, and because it was the first higher education aid case 
to reach the United States Supreme Court. 
Tilton challenged Title I of the 1963 Higher Educa­
tion Facilities Act which provided federal construction 
96 grants for college and university facilities. The grant 
had explicitly forbidden such facilities to be used for 
religious or sectarian activities for a period of 20 years. 
The appellants argued that four Connecticut, church-related 
colleges were sectarian and therefore were in violation of 
the legislation on the basis of the First Amendment. The col­
leges responded by claiming they were in compliance with the 
statute on the basis of evidence that purported to demonstrate 
how their religious ties did not hinder their secular educa­
tional functions. The Court found the act to be constitu­
tional, and that the church-related schools could receive the 
grants provided there was no religious use of the facilities 
97 constructed by the tax funds for 20 years. The Court 
rescinded its own decision by stating that the facilities 
95 
Tilton et al. v. Richardson, at 675. 
96 97 
Ibid., at 672. Ibid. 
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98 could never be used for religious purposes. The limita­
tion of the "federal interest" in the facilities to 20 years 
would violate the religious clauses of the First Amendment 
because, they concluded, the unrestricted use of valuable 
property by church colleges would in effect be a contribu-
99 tion to a religious body. 
The suit was brought by taxpayers and residents of 
Connecticut against Mr. Elliot Richardson, Secretary of 
Health, Education and Welfare, and the four defendant col­
leges: Sacred Heart University, Annhurst College, Fair­
field University, and Albertus Magnus College. The projects 
included a library building, a fine arts building, a science 
building, and a language laboratory.Science buildings 
are neutral, the use of them can be changed from their orig­
inal intent over time. The issue turned on the possibility 
that the present secular interest might ultimately become 
sectarian in use. 
Chief Justice Burger wrote: 
We are satisfied that Congress intended the Act to 
include all colleges and universities regardless of 
any affiliation with or sponsorship by a religious 
body. Congress defined "institutions of higher edu­
cation," which are eligible to receive aid under the 
Act, in broad and inclusive terms. ... But the Act 
makes no reference to religious affiliation or non-
affiliation. Under these circumstances "institutions 
of higher education" must be taken to include church-
related colleges and universities. 
98 
Tilton v. Richardson, at 682-684. 
"ibid. 100Ibid., at 676. 101Ibid., at 677. 
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Justice Burger acknowledged the "risks" of 
treating criteria for judgment as "tests" since constitu-
102 
tzonal law is not mathematically precise. The four 
"guidelines" were outlined above (p. 321). Applying the 
four tests to Tilton, Justice Burger concludes the fol­
lowing: the stated legislative purpose appears in the pre­
amble , in which it is stated that because of the security 
and welfare of the United States, higher education should be 
103 
supported and encouraged. Bradfield was cited as the 
precedent which removes the primary effect of assistance to 
church-related institutions from conflict with the First 
104 
Amendment. "The crucial question is not whether some 
benefit accrues to a religious institution as a consequence 
of the legislative program, but whether its principal or 
105 primary effect advances religion." 
The purpose of the act was not to advance religion 
and Justice Burger emphasized that academic facili­
ties would be for specific secular usage and the measure 
prohibited use of the loans for religious training and 
worship. One undesirable by-product was mentioned in 
passing, its importance quietly ignored in the face of 
increased financial demand. 
102 
Tilton v. Richardson, at 678. 
103Ibid. N. 20 U.S.C. § 701. 104Ibid., at 679. 
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The Court noted that - the record shows that some 
church-related institutions have been required to disgorge 
benefits for failure to obey them."'"^ 
The process of "secularization" of church-related 
institutions is reported as far back as 1966. A number of 
church-related colleges sought to divest themselves of sec­
tarian attributes. Sorauf reports: 
The major activity came in New' York State, as 
religious schools attempted to qualify for state grants 
under the state's strict constitutional limitations. 
The U. S. and New York Catholic Conferences hosted 
conferences for their officials and officers of Cath­
olic colleges and universities on the problems of qual­
ifying for the grants.107 
Catholic columnist William Buckley was critical of 
108 
the clergy in a New Yorker article. Fordham University 
did such a good job that the school was certified by the 
state commission as "nonsectarian" and was therefore eligi-
109 ble for state aid. 
Tilton was not excluded from the discussion, 
and perhaps Justice Berger was made aware of the proce­
dures alleged to have been suggested by Attorney Edward 
Bennett Williams. Sorauf says "there were signs that 
the attorney for the four defendant colleges . . . put them 
through some process of secularization as he prepared from 
106 
Tilton v. Richardson, at 670. 
107 
Sorauf, The Wall of Separation, p. 319. 
108 
William Buckley, "Cruising Speed," 
August 21, 1977, as noted by Sorauf, The Wall of Separation, 
p. 319 n. 
109Sorauf, The Wall of Separation, pp. 319-320. 
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that case."^'''^ The process included removal of crucifixes 
111 from classrooms, for example. The aftershock of the lit­
igation continued to force schools away from traditional 
religious ties. Sorauf notes: 
The changes in Catholic higher education continued 
long past the litigation. . . . Indeed the claims of 
nonreligious control made by the defendants in the 
Tilton case were authenticated less than half a year 
after its decision in the Supreme Court. The board 
of trustees of Fairfield University . . . overruled 
the Catholic president's attempt to dismiss a faculty 
member who had left both the Jesuit order and the 
Roman Catholic faith. 
Testimony from the above Fairfield incident was 
also quoted in Tilton. In Tilton there was some disagree-
113 ment as to the degree of academic freedom in the schools. 
The Court felt there was evidence to justify the statement: 
"That the schools were characterized by an atmosphere of 
114 
academic freedom rather than religious indoctrination." 
The appellants drew a "composite profile" of a 
"typical sectarian" institution of higher education. Such 
an institution was said to impose religious restrictions on 
admissions, required attendance at religious activities 
(chapel, etc.), uses compulsion to obedience to tenets of 
faith, required religious instruction in theological doctrine, 
"'"'^Sorauf, The Wall of Separation, p. 320. 
111T, 112T, . , 113 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 320n. 
114 . 
Tilton v. Richardson, at 681. 
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and expends a great deal of effort in the propagation of a 
particular religion. 
The Court was not persuaded that the four defendant 
colleges fit the mold. It was also suggested that proper 
evaluation in such cases must be based on evidence that: 
"the institution does in fact possess these characteris-
116 
tics." The Court concluded that they could not, however, 
strike down an Act of Congress on the basis of a hypothet­
ical "profile. 
Continuing the argument the Court wished to clarify 
that advancement of religion could occur ". . . if a recip­
ient violates any of the statutory restrictions on the use 
118 
of a federally financed facility." Violation of this 
aspect, however, did not require the Court to invalidate the 
entire act. As proof, the Court cited two previous cases 
in which partial judgment was rendered: 
" . . .  T h e  u n c o n s t i t u i o n a l i t y  o f  a  p a r t  o f  a n  a c t  
does not necessarily defeat ... the validity of its 
remaining provisions. Unless it is evident that the 
legislature would not have enacted those provisions 
which are within its power, independently of that 
which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what 
is left is fully operative as a law."119 
120 The Court found no such problems with the 
115Tilton 
116_, . , 117_, . , 118t, . , . ca~ Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., at 682. 
119 120 
Ibid., at 684. uIbid. 
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The question of excessive entanglements in the act 
provided the Court with a more subtle problem. Referring 
to Walz, Lemon, and Robinson v. DiCenso, the question of 
excessive entanglement was elevated to an independent measure 
of constitutionality under the First Amendment. 
In DiCenso and Lemon, the Court found strong evi­
dence of excessive entanglement. It is at this point 
Chief Justice Burger injects a list of educational philosophy 
regarding the levels of religious influence on different levels 
of education. Justice Burger says: "There are generally signif­
icant differences between the religious aspects of church-
related institutions of higher learning and parochial elemen-
121 tary and secondary schools." 
In this case, there is not provided evidence of the 
accuracy of the above concept beyond "common observation" 
and the fact that Professor Paul A. Freund of the Harvard 
Law School said it first: "Institutions of higher learning 
present quite a different question, mainly because church 
support is likely to involve indoctrination and conformity 
122 
at that level of instruction." 
From Freund1s brief observation in a 1968 address, 
Chief Justice Burger initiated a judicial principle with 
121 
Tilton et al. v. Richardson, at 685 n. 2; see 
Freund, Comments, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, Harvard 
Law Review 82 (1969), 1680, 1691. 
122 
Paul A. Freund, Comments, Public Aid to Parochial 
Schools, Harvard Law Review 82 (1969), 1680. 
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far-reaching implications. The Court argued that it is the 
"policy" of "pre-college" church schools "to assure future 
adherents to a particular faith by having control of their 
123 total education at an early age. . . ." College students 
are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious 
indoctrination. 
Justice Burger said: 
Common observation would seem to support that view, 
and Congress may well have entertained it. The skepti­
cism of the college student is not an inconsiderable 
barrier to any attempt or tendency to subvert the Con­
gressional objectives and limitations. ... The record 
here would not support a conclusion that any of these 
four institutions departed from this general pattern.124 
The strongest point made by the Court was that the 
schools subscribed to a "well-established set of principles 
of academic freedom," and there was no proof in the record 
125 to the contrary. 
Once the above concept is assumed, it follows that 
danger of religious indoctrination is lessened at church-
related colleges and universities and the risk is correspond­
ingly reduced that taxes will support religion. The next 
step in the Court's progression of logic produces the claim: 
The necessity for intensive government surveillance 
is diminished and the resulting entanglements between 
government and religion lessened. Such inspection as 
123 
Freund,"Comments, Public Aid to Parochial Schools," 
p. 1691. 
124 
Tilton v. Richardson, at 686. 
^•^Ibid., at 687. 
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may be necessary to ascertain that the facilities are 
devoted to secular education is minimal.126 
"Entanglement" is lessened also because of the form 
of aid: "secular, neutral, or non-ideological services, 
127 facilities or materials that are supplied to all students." 
The question of free exercise was raised by taxpay­
ers because they are compelled to pay taxes for a program 
with which they disagree because it finances and supports a 
religion alien to their own theology. The Court denied, 
however, that the appellants are unable to identify any 
coercion directed at the practice or exercise of their 
religious beliefs. 
The decision was a 6-3 decision, with Justices Doug­
las, Black, and Marshall dissenting from the decision. 
The counter-opinion was written by Mr. Justice 
William 0. Douglas, who argued that: 
The Federal Government is giving religious schools 
a block grant to build certain facilities. . . it is 
hardly impressive that rather than giving a smaller 
amount of money annually over a long period of years, 
Congress ... gives a large amount all at once. The 
plurality's distinction is in effect that small viola­
tions of the First Amendment over a period of years are 
unconstitutional (see Lemon and DiCenso) while a huge 
violation occurring only once is de minimis. I cannot 
agree with such sophistry.129 
Counter to Justice Burger1s distinction between 
Lemon and Tilton, Justice Douglas sees no distinction between 
"*"2^Tilton v. Richardson, at 688. 
127Ibid., at 688. 128Ibid., at 689. 
129 
Ibid., at 693. 
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higher and lower levels of education. The principle is 
130 parochial education supported by tax money. Justice 
Douglas said: 
A parochial school operates on one budget. Money 
not spent for one purpose becomes available for other 
purposes. Thus the fact that there are no religious 
observances in federally financed facilities is not 
controlling because required religious observances will 
take place in other buildings.131 
Federal funding of any part of the school would 
mean a conclusion to required religious exercises. To 
insure the nonsectarian nature of a college would require 
strict surveillance and control which would become "obnox-
132 
ious" to the clergy. 
Mr. Justice Douglas declares that such surveillance 
"creates an entanglement of government and religion which 
133 the First Amendment was designed to avoid." 
The spectre of an ever-present government agent 
hovering in the background to insure satisfactory course 
content was raised by Mr. Justice Douglas. He pictured it 
this way: 
The price of the subsidy under the Act is a viola­
tion of the Free Exercise Clause. Could a course in 
the History of Methodism be taught in a federally-
financed building? Would a religiously slanted version 
of the Reformation or Quebec politics under Duplessis 
be permissible? How can the Government know what is 
taught in the federally-financed building without a 
continuous auditing of classroom instruction? Yet both 
the Free Exercise Clause and academic freedom are vio­
lated when the Government agent must be present.1^4 
130 
Tilton v. Richardson, at 688. 
131 132 133 
Ibid. Ibid., at 694. J""lbid. 
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The decision has been designated one of "landmark" 
proportions. Whether the landmark bodes good or ill depends 
upon one's point of view. 
Mr. Justice Douglas closed by explaining that his 
dissent was "not because of any lack of respect for paro­
chial schools but out of a feeling of despair that the 
respect which through history has been accorded the First 
135 Amendment is this day lost. 
The attention given Tilton has been necessary because 
of the precedents and principles expressed in the case. The 
tripartite test was expressed and applied with emphasis upon 
"excessive entanglement." The sharp distinction which was 
drawn between the vulnerability of lower-level students to 
religious indoctrination and the "skepticism" of the college 
student, introduced a philosophical element into the deci­
sion. It was upon that philosophical distinction that the 
majority based its case. The minority missed an opportunity 
in its dissent to challenge the source of the concept. It 
appears to be an assumption based upon what the Chief Jus-
136 tice called "common observation." 
Tilton marks the beginning of the higher education 
cases which reach the United States Supreme Court. It is 
upon the principles and conclusions of this case that 
135 
Tilton v. Richardson, at 697. 
136Ibid., at 686. 
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subsequent cases have been decided. The Tilton case was the 
opening battle of the higher education controversy in Wash­
ington. Federal funds were the issue, and the federal Con­
stitution alone was interpreted. Subsequent tests before 
the Court involve state as well as federal constitutional 
issues. 
Hunt v. McNair"*"^ 
A bond program at Baptist College, Charleston, South 
Carolina, was the instrument by which principles expressed 
138 
by the Supreme Court in Tilton were extended. The ques­
tion revolved about a South Carolina law which allowed the 
Educational Facilities Authority to issue tax exempt bonds 
139 to church-related colleges for construction of buildings. 
One portion of the law, as in the Higher Education Facilities 
Act, prohibited the new buildings from being used for sec-
140 
tarian xnstruction or worship. The state was not involved 
in the sale of the bonds and their credit was not directly 
involved. The Authority loaned the money raised by bond 
sales to the college. The college conveyed title of the 
buildings to the Authority, and the Authority leased the 
1 ̂ 7 
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); 403 U.S. 
945 (1971): 177 S. E. 2d 362 (1966). 
138Ibid., 413 U.S. 734 (1973). 
139S. C. Code Ann. §§ 22-41 (Supp. 1973). 
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facilities back to the college. The lease is to continue 
until the bonds or loan is paid in full. The college will 
141 then regain full title to the facility. 
The Supreme Court first considered Hunt in 1971, and 
returned it to the South Carolina Supreme Court for consid-
142 eration in the light of Tilton and Lemon I. The case was 
a "friendly" case staged to determine the constitutionality 
of the statute. Sorauf explains: 
. . .  I t  w a s  t h e  b o n d i n g  a t t o r n e y s  w h o  o r d e r e d  t h e  
litigation so that they could certify the legality and 
constitutionality of the bond issues. Without that 
certification, of course, a bond issue will not sell. 
The bonding attorneys not only dictate the need for 
constitutional clarification, but they dictate as well 
the extent of clarification necessary.143 
On a split decision, 6 to 3, the Supreme Court found 
that the primary purpose of the state plan was secular. The 
application of the tripartite tests of purpose, effect and 
entanglement failed to convince the Court of the plan's 
144 unconstitutionality. 
The plan had provided safeguards against unconsti­
tutional use of the building as well as for inspection of 
the premises to insure compliance. In commenting upon 
141 oc 
S. C. Code Ann. SS 22-41 (Supp. 1973). 
142 
Hunt v. McNair. 403 U.S. 945 (1971). 
143 
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primary effect the Court came near to defining pervasive 
sectarian activity: 
. . ,[A]id normally may be thought to have a pri­
mary effect of advancing religion when it flows to an 
institution in which religion is so pervasive that 
a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed 
in the religious mission or when it funds a specif­
ically religious activity in an otherwise substan­
tially secular setting.1^5 
The Court did not find the South Carolina plan guilty of 
providing aid in a pervasively-religious setting. 
In order to emphasize the Court's stand, the Tilton 
tests were applied, not only to the state plan, but to the 
context in which the plan would be put into effect. Baptist 
College, in Charleston, South Carolina, was analyzed to 
determine if the plan would involve excessive entanglement 
of government with religion. 
Information provided the Court revealed the follow­
ing: 
(1) Despite the Baptist relationship of the college, 
only 60 percent of the student body were of that denomina­
tion (roughly reflecting the religious composition of the 
area served by the institution). 
(2) Neither student enrollment nor faculty-staff 
146 qualifications revealed sectarian bias. 
Sorauf interprets the Court's analysis as placing 
emphasis upon the "religious nature of the college rather 
145 
Hunt v. McNair, at 743. 
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147 than the force of the policy.11 He concludes, "... with 
colleges and universities becoming less and less religious 
in fact, it seemed more and more doubtful that aid to them 
(the colleges] might advance the cause of religion."'^® 
Dr. James L. Underwood, Professor of Lav/ at the Uni­
versity of South Carolina, was dissatisfied with the cursory 
examination of Baptist College. He could not agree with the 
findings that no impermissible entanglement existed at the 
school. He suggested the reasoning behind the Court's con­
clusion made in Hunt was due to a new direction by the 
Supreme Court: 
The Court appears to be testing the waters of a 
new standard under which it would find that the like­
lihood of excessive entanglement ... is sharply 
reduced when government assistance ... does not in­
volve the use of government funds. ... This readiness 
of the Court to find that religion does not permeate 
college level institutions, compared with its more 
careful scrutiny of lower-level schools is one of the 
peculiarities of this tentative new standard.149 
Underwood's view of the Supreme Court's bi-polar 
use of the entanglement doctrine appears worth repeating, 
in that higher education cases of recent vintage usually 
stand or fall on findings relative to the religious nature 
of the college. Dr. Underwood suggests the reluctance on 
the part of the Court to discover excessive entanglement 
appears when: 
147 148 
Sorauf, The Wall of Separation, p. 367. Ibid. 
149 
James L. Underwood, "Permissible Entanglements 
under the Establishment Clause," Emory Law Journal, 25 (1976), 
17. 
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(1) the recipient of the aid, usually a college level 
school, is found to be not pervasively religious 
though it is sponsored by a religious organization; 
(2) state funds are not transferred to the recipient 
and the program is designed to help the institution 
help itself rather than as a mass subsidy; and 
(3) the absence of state funds supposedly results in 
a reduced need for surveillance.150 
Underwood does not imply that elimination of one of 
these factors automatically results in impermissible entan­
glement. However, when the factors are present it is diffi­
cult to charge an institution with the level of deficiency 
necessary to place it outside the pale of constitutional-
Professor Underwood is supported in his opinion by the 
eminent attorney, Leo Pfeffer, who says of Hunt and Tilton: 
. . .  t h e  p r e s e n t  p o s t u r e  o f  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  s e e m s  
to indicate that it will strike down any law granting 
aid to parochial elementary and secondary schools 
beyond the narrow confines of bus transportation and 
book loans, but will require proof of sectarianism in 
each particular case in which a challenge is made to 
aid, at least in the form of construction grants or 
loans, to a church-related college or university. The 
difference in treatment is based on the assumption that 
there is not much difference between parochial schools, 
but that church-related colleges and universities vary 
substantially among themselves and each must be judged 
individually in determining whether it is sufficiently 
secular to qualify for governmental aid under the Es­
tablishment Clause.152 
The possibility still exists, however, that when 
colleges and universities are scrutinized on an individual 
150 
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 736-49 (1973). 
151 Underwood, "Permxssible Entanglements," p. 25. 
152 Pfeffer, God, Caesar, and the Constitution, 
pp. 296-297, 
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basis, that there are cases where pervasive sectarianism 
exists and can be proven. The Duke Law Journal warns state 
legislators against assuming that the "effect" and "entangle­
ment" portions of the Tilton test "do not pose a threat to 
153 the constitutionality of aid to higher education statutes." 
154 The tripartite test is not a "mechanical formula." Reso­
lution of "aid-to-private education plans" is a "delicate" 
155 
task. It is with this knowledge that higher education 
cases' have recently made their way to the Supreme Court. 
One Catholic writer, Mary Mullaney, sees Hunt as a realis­
tic recognition that religious schools, particularly col­
leges and universities, are able to and do in fact separate 
secular academics from sectarian indoctrination.''"^ On the 
other hand, institutions which, in their eagerness to comply 
for government money, in divesting themselves of their relig­
ious identity may save their existence but may face "per-
. . ,,157 
nicious consequences." 
153 Franklin T. Caudell, Keith Hunsaker, and Francis 
H. Morrison III, Eds., Note and Comment, "Private Colleges, 
State Aid, and the Establishment Clause," Duke Law Journal 
(1975), 976-989. 
154. 155 
Ibid., p. 985. Ibid. 
"'"^Mary Mullaney, "Religious Discrimination and Higher 
Education: A Continuing Dilemma,11 Notre Dams Lawyer, 152, 
(1976), 159. 
157Ibid., p. 165. 
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Roemer v. Maryland"*"^ 
In 1971 the Maryland Legislature enacted a college aid 
program designed to provide $5.3 million a year in noncategor-
159 
ical grants. The law requires the school to meet certain 
minimum criteria. The money must be applied to non-religious 
education, and colleges are ineligible that offer "only semi­
narian or theological degrees.The money was to be admin­
istered by the Maryland Council for Higher Education, which 
would determine the eligibility and verify compliance of par­
ticipating institutions. Four of the participating institu­
tions were church-related, Roman Catholic colleges. A tax­
payer suit of four Maryland citizens challenged the statute 
as "violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
16 i ment," and therefore not eligible to receive the grants. 
The United States Supreme Court, in a split, 5-4 deci-
162 sion, ruled in favor of the Maryland plan. Mr. Justice 
Blackmun wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice 
Burger and Powell joined. A concurring opinion was filed 
16 3 
by Mr. Justice White, in which Mr. Justice Rhenquist joined. 
158 
Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland, 
96 S. Ct. 2337 (1976) Fed. Supp. 1282 (D. Md. 1974). 
^"^Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland, 
at 2341. Also: Md. Ann. Code Art. 11 A, SS 65-69 (1975). 
161Ibid., at 2337. 162Ibid., at 2340. 163Ibid. 
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Dissenting opinions were by Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
164 Stewart and Stevens. 
The plan possessed a number of restrictive require­
ments designed to insure identification of funds from the 
point of receipt throughout their application in the insti­
tution: 
The Council performs ... a "two-step screening pro­
cess to insure compliance. . . ."First, it determines 
whether an institution applying for aid is eligible 
at all. ... Several applicants have been disqualified 
at this stage of the process. Second, the Council re­
quires that those institutions that are eligible for 
funds not put them to any sectarian use. ... By the 
end of the fiscal year the institution must file a "uti­
lization of funds report" describing and itemizing the 
use of the funds. The chief executive officer must cer­
tify the report and also file his own "Post-expenditure 
Affidavit."165 
The institution must provide identifiable separate 
bank accounts for the funds received, as well as to itemize 
in the budget the application of the funds. The plan re­
quires the institution: 
. . .  t o  r e t a i n  " s u f f i c i e n t  d o c u m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  
State funds expended to permit verification by the 
Council that funds were not spent for sectarian 
purposes."166 
If there is a question regarding the accuracy of the 
accounting procedure, an audit may be taken, involving a day 
, 167 or less. 
164 
Roemer v. Maryland, at 2340. 
165Ibid., at 2343-2344. 166Ibid., at 2344. 
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The colleges involved in the suit were Western 
Maryland College, College of Notre Dame, Mount Saint Mary's 
168 
College, Saint Joseph College, and Loyola College. Wes­
tern Maryland divested itself of all Methodist ties and the 
169 four remainxng schools were Roman Catholic affiliated. 
Mr. Justice Herbert Blackmun does not agree with Jef­
ferson's wall of separation. He contends: 
. . .  a  h e r m e t i c  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  t h e  t w o  i s  a n  i m p o s ­
sibility it [the CourtJ has never required. ... The 
Court has permitted the state to supply transportation 
for children to . . . church-related schools. Ever-
son . . . .170 
He argues further that: 
The Court has not been blind to the fact that in 
aiding a religious institution to perform a secular 
task, the state frees the institution's resources to be 
put to sectarian ends. . . .171 
This leads to the concept of neutrality: 
The Court has taken the view that a secular purpose 
and a facial neutrality may not be enough, if in fact 
the State is lending direct support to a religious activ­
ity. The State may not, for example, pay for what is 
actually a religious education, even though it purports 
to be paying for a secular one, and even though it makes 
its aid available to secular and religious institutions 
alike.172 
In Tilton, the Court noted that it was possible to 
separate the religious and secular functions of the defendant 
168 
Roemer v. Maryland, at 2346. 
169Ibid., at 2346. 170Ibid., at 2348. 171Ibid. 
172Ibid., at 2349. 
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colleges in such a way as to prevent sectarian use of facil-
173 
ities constructed with federal money. 
As Roemer faced the question of excessive entangle­
ment, the Court considered the character of the institutions 
in question. Once more, "general differences" between col­
lege and pre-college education remove higher education from 
susceptibility to previous parochial school decisions. The 
character of the colleges in Roemer were considered to be 
not different from those in Tilton and Hunt• using the same 
criteria of evaluation, the Court found no excessive entangle-
174 
ment in Roemer. 
The Court was in no mood to innovate nor to set new 
directions in Roemer. If anything, it could only see the 
Maryland case as an opportunity to apply the judicial patterns 
175 
of the recent past. The Justices stated: 
So the slate we write on is anything but clean. In­
stead, there is little room for further refinement of 
the principles governing public aid to church-affiliated 
private schools. Our purpose is not to unsettle those 
principles ... or to expand upon them substantially, 
but merely to insure that they are faithfully applied in 
this case.176 
The focus of the debate in Roemer was upon "the pri­
mary effect of advancing religion, and excessive church-state 
177 
entanglement." The District Court's findings were 
173 
Roemer et al. v. Board of Public Works of Maryland 
et al.. at 2352. 
174 175 
Ibid., at 2353. Ibid., at 2356. 
1 7 6 .  ,  1 7 7  ,  .  ,  Ibid. Ibid. 
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convincing enough to the majority in the Court to find no 
"pervasive sectarianism" in the schools and it chose not to 
178 "second guess" the District Court on that point. 
Another concern "posed by Hunt": whether aid was in 
179 fact extended only to "the secular side." The question 
posed no problem because much emphasis was placed upon the 
180 
delimitation concerning "secular use." 
The question of entanglement exposed the thinnest 
support of the legislation. The way with which the statute 
must assure the government of proper primary effect depends 
181 upon an annual audit. The District Court had found that 
"excessive-entanglement" did not result from the annual 
182 
audit. The Court concluded that the annual audits "are 
not likely to be any more entangling than the inspections 
and audits incident to the normal process of the colleges' 
183 
accreditation by the State." 
The Court defined what is necessary for a "nonentang-
ling" aid program: 
. . .  T h e  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  S t a t e  t o  i d e n t i f y  a n d  s u b ­
sidize separate secular functions carried out at the 
school, without on-the-site inspections being necessary 
to prevent diversion of the funds to sectarian purposes. 
The Court did not claim perfection with regard to 
its application of the Tilton tests. The conclusion of the 
178 
Roemer et al. v. Board of Public Works of Maryland 
et al., at 2360. 
179Ibid., at 2361. 180Ibid. 181Ibid., at 2363. 
182Ibid., at 2365. 183Ibid., at 2366. 184Ibid. 
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majority was based upon the character of the institutions in 
question, which found them capable of discerning between sec-
185 ular and religious functions in the process of education. 
Roemer was not a unanimous decision. Mr. Justice 
Brennan insisted the plan "offended" the Constitution by 
using state money for the advancement of religion despite 
the "vigilance to avoid it.""'"8^ 
Another objection was that the act provides for pay­
ment of general subsidies (non-categorical) to religious 
institutions. Justice Brennan recalled from his Walz opinion 
that general subsidies of religious activities "constitute 
187 
impermissible state involvement with religion." The 
general subsidy, he maintains, "promotes" the kind of "inter­
dependence between religion and state which the First Amend­
ment was designed to prevent. 
Mr. Justice Brennan sees in Roemer an example of 
"a direct subsidy from public funds for activities carried 
188 on by sectarian educational institutions." He quoted 
himself in Lemon I, where he stated: 
I believe that the Establishment Clause forbids ... 
government to provide funds to sectarian universities 
in which the propagation and advancement of a particular 
religion are a function or purpose of the institution. . . . 
I reach this conclusion for these ["reasons] . . .: 
the necessarily deep involvement of government in the 
religious activities of such an institution through the 
policing of restrictions, and the fact that subsidies 
185 
Roemer et al. v. Board of Public Works of Maryland 
et al., at 2368. 
186Ibid., at 2373. 187Ibid. 188Ibid., at 2374. 
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of tax monies directly to a sectarian institution 
necessarily aid the proselytizing function of the insti­
tution. ... 
I do not believe that [direct] grants to such a sec­
tarian institution are permissible. The reason is not 
that religion "permeates" the secular education that is 
provided. Rather, it is that the secular education is 
provided with the environment of religion; the institu­
tion is dedicated to two goals, secular education and 
religious instruction. When aid flows directly to the 
institution, both functions benefit. (Emphasis in 
original) 
Justice Brennan depended a great deal upon Lemon I 
190 for his dissenting opinion. He also drew upon Lemon II 
for support of the appellant's motion that the institutions be 
made to refund all payments made to them. He quoted Justice 
William O. Douglas, who wrote: 
There is as much a violation of the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment whether the payment from 
public funds to sectarian schools involves last year, 
the current year or next year. ... 
Whether the grant is for ... last year or at the 
present time, taxpayers are forced to contribute to 
sectarian schools as a part of their tax dollars.191 
Additional dissent was expressed from Mr. Justice 
Potter Stewart who perceived a "decisive" difference between 
192 Roemer and Tilton. The problem lies in the nature of the 
required theology courses taught at the dependent colleges. 
"In Tilton the Court emphasized that the theology courses 
189 
Roemer et al. v. Board of Public Works of Mary-
land et al., at 23474-2375; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 
659-660 (1971). 
1Q0 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 209 (1973). 
191 Roemer et al. v. Board of Public Works of Maryland 
et al., at 2375; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411, 192, 209 (1973). 
192 
Ibid., at 2377; Tilton v. Richardson 403 U.S. 672 
(1971). 
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193 
were taught as academic subjects." In Roemer, however, 
there was no evidence that theology was being taught as an 
194 
"academic discipline." 
Justice Brennan does not agree that there is "no 
constitutionally significant distinction" between the colleges 
1 Q1! 
in Tilton and those in Roemer. 
In the present case, by contrast, the compulsory 
theology courses may be "devoted to deepening religious 
experiences in the particular faith rather than to teaching 
196 theology as an academic discipline." 
The majority did not provide evidence to the contrary, 
and the Brennan dissent on the above and other counts did 
not weigh heavily enough to sway the Court's decision. 
Mr. Justice Stevens had little to add to the dissent 
expressed by Mr. Justice Brennan, except for the following 
emphatic expression of concern for the "turn" such assistance 
197 
gives to religious commitment of the recipient schools. 
He stated: 
I would add emphasis to the pernicious tendency of 
a state subsidy to tempt religious schools to compromise 
their religious mission without wholly abandoning it. 
The disease of entanglement may infect a law discourag­
ing wholesome religious activity as well as a law encour­
aging the propagation of a given faith.198 
1QO 
Roemer et al. v. Board of Public Works of Maryland 
et al., at 2377: Tilton v. Richardson , at 686, 687. 
194Ibid., at 2378. 195Ibid., at 2378. 196Ibid. 
197Ibid., at 2380. 198Ibid. Note: It should be 
noted that the Court's concern over excessive entanglement 
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With the Roemer decision of 1976, New York Univer­
sity law professor James C. Kirby, Jr. acknowledged the 
Supreme Court's completion of "a process of validating sub­
stantial state financial aid to church-related higher educa-
199 
txon." In an attempt to write a conclusion to the con­
tinuing controversy, the professor suggests that a "practical 
detente" .may have become possible through Roemer and Meek v. 
Pittinger,a lower education case.^^ His conclusions 
concerning Roemer are of interest in view of the lack of suc­
cess of subsequent, similar appeals to the United States 
Supreme Court. He says: 
Taken with Roemer1s approval of more substantial aid 
to higher education, the detente appears not to be 
ungenerous to religious education as a whole. Detente 
is not defeat. 
The result is a mosaic of inconsistencies, but a 
net combination that permits some aid to religion, but 
not too much. Along with other positive involvements 
lies with the possibility that government could eventually 
control operations of church-related schools. Excessive 
entanglement caused by financial aid to religious groups was 
a possibility noted by French historian Alexis de Tocque-
ville who said: "In America religion is perhaps less power­
ful than it has been at certain periods and among certain 
nations, but its influence is more lasting. It restricts 
itself to its own resources, but of these none can deprive 
itj its circle is limited, but it pervades it and holds it 
under undisputed control." Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy 
in America, ed. Phillips Bradley, trans. Henry Reeve (New 
York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1966), I, 323. 
199 
James C. Kxrby, "Everson to Meek and Roemer: 
Prom Separation to Detente in Church-State Relations." 
55 N.C.L.R. 563 (1977). 
^^Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
348 
of government with religion, this detente should help 
to preserve our religiously pluralistic society. . . . 
It is hoped that excessive concern for entanglement 
will not endanger this pluralism, in which both division 
and divisiveness must necessarily inhere. . . .202 
Kirby's concept of First Amendment detente is an 
attempt to reconcile the historic contributions of Roger 
Williams, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison to the early 
203 formulation of the Constitution. In the professor's 
opinion: 
Walz, Meek and Roemer may prove to be major achieve­
ments of the Burger Court and key elements in our new 
wall of separation, which has come more to resemble 
an artful latticework.204 
Kirby's "latticework" is intriguing. However, as 
the present study demonstrates, there is much more complexity 
to the history of college aid and the First Amendment. Roemer 
is important because it has applied the Tilton and Lemon tests 
to non-categorical grants furnished church-affiliated col­
leges . Knowledgeable observers, such as attorney-newsman 
Carl Stern, suggested that results of Roemer would "open the 
flood gates" of schools moving away from their religious iden­
tities, to comply, thus opening a new "round" of legislation 
205 
and litigation. Mr. Stern summed up the constitutional 
20? 20*3 
Meek v. Pittinqer, at 575. Ibid. 
204Ibid. 
205 
Carl Stern, N.B.C. T.V. News. Notes made by 
researcher from the news analysis, June 21, 1976. 
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effect upon the First Amendment "Wall of Separation," as a 
"reduction" in the amount of separation. 
207 
Smith v. Board of Governors 
Smith v. Board of Governors has been working its way 
2 08 
through the federal courts since April, 1976. Dr. Michael 
Smith, a former professor at Pfeiffer College and a North 
Carolina resident, entered suit challenging the constitu­
tionality of the use of state tax money in support of church-
209 
related colleges. The two named colleges were considered 
representative of a total of 38 independent church-related 
colleges which are licensed to grant degrees by the Board of 
210 
Governors of the University of North Carolina. Belmont Abbey 
was founded, and is still closely associated with Benedic­
tine Monks and the Roman Catholic Church. Pfeiffer is a 
211 United Methodist-related institution. 
The case initially was presented before a three-judge 
212 federal Court in Charlotte, North Carolina. Smith con­
tended that the First Amendment Establishment Clause was 
(March 1977). 
0 C)fi 
Carl Stern, N.B.C. T.V. News. 
207U.S.L.W., 77-84 at 3162 (1977). 
208 
Smith v. Board of Governors, NO. C-C-76-131 
209Ibid. 210Ibid. 211Ibid., at 2. 
212Ibid. 
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violated through utilization of public funds "for sectarian 
213 purposes" at the two campuses. 
Three state programs of aid were challenged as to 
their constitutionality, on grounds of religious establish-
. 214 ment: 
(1) A $300 credit for in-state students attending 
private colleges, exclusive of public or proprietary colleges. 
Known as the North Carolina Legislative Tuition Grant Pro­
gram, students, regardless of need receive the $300 tuition 
offset grant. Students attending public or proprietary 
215 colleges are not eligible to receive the subsidy. 
(2) Needy students who qualified otherwise would 
receive a maximum of $200 per year under a contract arrange-
? 1 fi 
ment with the state and institution. 
(3) The North Carolina student incentive grants did 
not exclude public and proprietary schools. However, monies 
217 also were directed toward church-related college students. 
Smith, referring to Lemon and Tilton, held that the 
defendant colleges, as well as 36 private colleges and 
213 
Smith v. Board of Governors, at p. 3. 
214 
North Carolina 1975 Session Laws, Ch. 875 Sec. 30; 
Second Sess. Ch. 983, Sec. 54; North Carolina G.S. 116-201— 
116-209.23. 
215 tv* • j Ibid. 
2X6 North Carolina Gen. Stats. Sec. 116-119, et seq. 
217 
North Carolina, 1975 Session Laws, Ch. 875, Sec. 30, 
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218 
and universities in the state, are church-related. Smith's 
brief said that to provide students with state money who 
attend such colleges, provides the college with students that 
might go elsewhere, and therefore the school receives support 
219 it might not obtain otherwise. The primary effect, he 
argued, is to encourage "students to attend colleges where 
220 they wxll be influenced to become or remain religious." 
The requirement of religion as a subject presence of religious 
symbols, clerical garb, and the holding of worship services 
in the buildings to which students must attend, were used 
as evidence to prove that the schools are "pervasively sec-
221 
tarian." 
Smith's argument that the funneling of such aid to 
the schools would result in "entanglement" of religion and 
government, met with little success. 
The Western District Court in Charlotte regarded 
Smith and the question of primary effect in the light of 
Hunt v. McNair: 
That aid normally may be thought to have a primary 
effect of advancing religion when it flows to an insti­
tution in which religion is so pervasive that a sub­
stantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the 
religious mission. . . .222 
918 
North Carolina 1975 Session Laws, Ch. 875, Sec. 30, 
p. 2. 
219Ibid. 220Ibid. 
221 
Smith v. Board of Governors, NO. C-C-76-131 
(March 1977), at p. 8. 
222 
Ibid.,  at 14. 
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Furthermore, the Court said: "the colleges here seem 
223 to be indistinguishable from . . . Roemer." Despite the 
fact that two of the three federal judges held the personal 
opinion that the state plans were in violation, Roemer 
224 weighed heavily in their consideration of Smith. 
Justice Woodrow Jones, Chief Judge wrote: 
As I have advised you heretofore, I was of the per­
sonal opinion that the North Carolina statutes violate 
the establishment clause but in view of the recent 
Supreme Court decisions of Hunt v. McNair [sic] and 
particularly of Romer [sic]] v. Board of Public Works of 
Maryland, we have no choice other than to hold the 
statutes v a l i d . 2 2 5  
Judge James B. McMillan sustained similar private 
misgivings concerning the North Carolina statutes, and 
prefaced his concurring opinion with the following: 
If we were writing on a clean slate, I would hold 
the challenged programs to be invalid as contrary to 
the First Amendment . . . , unfortunately the Roemer 
decision requires lower courts to make adjustments as 
to how much religion a school actually practices; if 
the school atmosphere is essentially secular, i.e., not 
"pervasively sectarian," the state can subsidize its 
students at will.226 
Of considerable significance was the appellation 
227 "landmark" designated to Roemer by Mr. Justice McMillan. 
He elaborated by saying: 
223 Smith v. Board of Governors of University of 
North Carolina, NO C-C-86-131, at 14. 
224 Woodrow W. Jones, U. S. District Court, Western 
District of North Carolina, Smith v. Board of Governors, 
U.S.D.C. UNC C-C-76-131 (1977). 
225_,., , 226_, . , 227 Ibid., at 1. Ibid. Ibid. 
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Whether state aid tends to establish or disestablish 
religion is not material. The far-sighted framers of 
the First Amendment were fresh witnesses to the dangers 
of dominion of church over state or of state over church, 
and wanted America to have none of either. 
In other words, Justice McMillan has said that in 
consideration of church-state aid to church colleges, the 
First Amendment no longer applies except when religious 
practices exceed the as yet undefined standards alluded to 
• r, 228 in Roemer. 
The decision of the federal district court was 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court by Dr. Michael 
Smith and Americans United for Separation of Church and 
ooq 230 
State. The Court consented to consider Smith and the 
231 
Tennessee case (Americans United v. Dunn) together. The 
232 
appeal was filed in July, 1977. The brief to the Supreme 
Court asked the following: 
(1) Are tuition and scholarship grants to students 
under North Carolina tuition and scholarship assistance 
programs aid to college? (2) If so, does such aid have 
primary effect of advancing religion in following 
respects: (a) State's failure to guarantee that state 
and federal funds will not be used for sectarian pur­
poses by student, and (b) State's failure to guarantee 
that state and federal funds will not be used for sec­
tarian purposes after becoming part of general funds of 
228 
Smith v. Board of Governors, at 1. 
P2Q 
Smith et al. v. Board of Governors University of 
North Carolina, 77-84, 46 U.S.L.W. at 3162 (1977). 
230 , . , 
Ibid. 
231 Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State v. Dunn, 384 F. Supp. 714 (M.D. Tenn. 1974). 
232 Smith v. Board of Governors, U.S.L.W., at 3162. 
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college? (3) May state make tuition funds available to 
private non-public college students without making same 
funds available to public college students?233 
At the time the suit was instituted (1976), the state 
was providing $9 million in aid to private colleges, but by 
the October 1977 decision, the amount had increased to 
$11 million for the 38 church-related colleges and univer-
234 
sities. The ruling by the Court of the 1977 Smith decision 
was 6-3, while the Roemer case in 1976 drew a 5-4 decision. 
Smith lost the support of Justice Potter Stewart, and retained 
that of Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, who main-
tained the case merited review before the final decision. 
A summary of the opinion follows: 
North Carolina's free scholarship and tuition assis­
tance programs, which have admitted secular purpose, do 
not violate First Amentment [sic] as applied to Belmont 
Abbey College and Pfeiffer College, which are not per­
vasively sectarian in actual operation, being liberal 
arts colleges functioning in liberal arts tradition 
and not engaged in proselytizing students or anyone 
else.237 
238 
Americans United v. Dunn 
Americans United for the Separation of Church and 
State v. Dunn was appealed to the Supreme Court 
233 
Smith v. Board of Governors, U.S.L.W., at 3162. 
234 
Greensboro Daily News, p. 1 (October 4, 1977). 
235_,., 236_,., 
Ibid. Ibid. 
237 
Smith v. Board of Governors, 46 U.S.L.W. at 3162 
(1977). 
238 
Americans United for the Separation of Church and 
State v. Dunn, 384 P. Supp. 714 (M.D. Tenn. 19^4). 
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simultaneously with the Smith v. Board of Governors deci-
239 sion. Dunn was brought to the United States Supreme Court 
on appeal from a decision by the District Court for the 
240 
Middle District of Tennessee. The District Court had 
found a student aid plan to be unconstitutional because of 
241 the primary effect of establishment of religion. Dunn 
claims special attention because the district judges ignored 
the Burger Court's Lemon criteria because they "obfuscated, 
rather than sharpened" the consideration of the Tennessee 
242 aid plan. 
The District Court formulated its own "tripartite 
test," based on previous Establishment Clause decisions by 
243 
the Supreme Court. The three considerations followed by 
the Court were: (1) who actually receives the money?; 
(2) can the aid be applied only to the secular function of 
244 
the institutions in question; (3) the third is similar to 
the second, in that the substance of the aid program is 
245 critical. Since the question of primary effect and the 
consideration of entanglement were included, "purpose" was 
unquestioned. 
239 
Smith v. Board of Governors, 46 U.S.L.W. at 3162 
(1977) . 
240 241 
Ibid. ^ ^Ibid., at 720-21. 
242 
Ibid.,at 721; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U„S. 602, 
612-613 (1971). 
^^^Ibid. , at 719. ^^Ibid. , at 721. ^ Ibid. 
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Smith and Dunn were identical in that, although stu­
dents did not actually see the aid money, students" were the 
246 assigned beneficiaries. Concern also was expressed by 
Americans United in both the Tennessee case and the North 
Carolina case, that it was not the student who benefit 
247 
so much as the institution. The District Court m Dunn 
stated: 
The sovereign may not con er a "special benefit on 
any group of students who have chosen to support relig­
ious schools . . . ; financial assistance to students 
must not provide an incentive for attendance at church-
related schools . . . ; and direct aid in whatever form, 
to church-related schools is invalid if no restrictions 
are placed thereon.248 
The problem of effect, therefore, was dealt with, 
for there were no restrictions mentioned. Instead all 
Tennessee students would benefit, public and church-related 
i • v  2 4 9  a1ike. 
The problem of entanglement was considered by the 
Court on the basis of the ability of the parties involved to 
discern and separate the secular from the sectarian functions 
within the operation of the schools. The Court wrote: 
Direct ... aid to church-related schools is not 
unconstitutional if the aid is exclusively restricted 
to the secular function of those schools, provided 
246 Smith v. Board of Governors, at 717; Smith v. 
Board of Governors, 46 U.S.L.W. at 3162 (1977). 
?47 
Ibid., at 720-21; Smith et al. v. Board of Gov­
ernors 46 U.S.L.W. at 3162 (1977). 
248Ibid., at 720. 249Ibid., at 717. 
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that the two functions can be separated and that enforce­
ment of the restrictions does not "involve" or "entanglo" 
the sovereign in religious activity.2^0 
The United States Supreme Court found no cause to 
agree with Americans United in either Smith or Dunn. In a 
6-3 vote in October 1977 the respective state plans were val-
251 
idated by the Court. 
252 
Americans United v. Rogers 
A Missouri statute permitting direct financial aid 
to students attending private church-related institutions 
253 
was upheld by the Missouri Supreme Court in 1977. The 
justices looked to Roemer for precedent, and "could find no 
First Amendment problems with Missouri's tuition grant pro-
? 54. 
gram (Americans United v. Rogers 7/26/76)." 
The plan included payment by individual checks made 
255 
payable directly to the "student recipient." In much the 
same pattern as under the G. I. Bill, the checks are sent in 
bulk to the financial aid offices of the college, who in turn 
notifies the student. The college or university has first 
claim against the check for any balance outstanding against 
250 
Smith v. Board of Governors, at 721. 
251 
Greensboro Daily News, p. 1 (October 4, 1977). 
252 
Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State v. Roqers, MO Sup. Ct., 538 S.W. 2d 711, 45 L.W. 2056 
(1977). 
253Ibid. 25445 U.S.L.W. 1019 (1976). 
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the student. If the ledger is clear, the student may walk 
256 
away with the entire check. There was no restriction on 
the nature of the college involved, only to those students 
257 who were considered pre-theological or divinity students. 
The State Supreme Court noted that "excessive entangle­
ment is avoided" because the Missouri plan requires only 
258 of the institution that it verify student attendance. 
"This, the Missouri court concludes, entangles state and church 
less than the reporting requirements of the Maryland Statute 
(Page 2056)." y 
The United States Supreme Court was presented with an 
appeal by Americans United, which asked: 
Does Missouri statutory scheme that provides college 
tuition grants to students attending sectarian colleges 
and contains no restrictions on sectarian use of such 
funds by colleges violate First and Fourteenth Amend­
ments ?260 
The ruling was simply in agreement with the State 
Supreme Court of Missouri, that the statute did not violate 
261 
the Establishment Clause. 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CASES 
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Flast v. Cohen (1968), standing to sue and direct access 
25645 U.S.L.W. 1019 (1976). 257Ibid. 
258 259 
Ibid., at 1020. ^DyIbid. 
26045 U.S.L.W., at 3354 (1977). 261Ibid. 
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262 to federal courts was extremely limited. Sorauf suggests 
that although in civil rights cases the appellants were 
received favorably in federal courts, the rule did not hold 
true in the case of church-state separation. He notes: 
The majority of attorneys and groups ... would 
appear to favor the federal courts. Especially for 
groups whose goal is constitutional precedent it is the 
surest and fastest route to the U. S. Supreme Court. . . . 
The choice of the federal forum also obviates the problem 
of the state court deciding on a state constitutional 
ground and thereby effectively cutting off access to the 
U. S. Supreme Court. And with most objectionable public 
policies being national—or at least common to a number 
of states—it is the single nationwide precedent that 
is sought.263 
There were situations, however, that called for 
state court action, where quick action is sometimes an advan­
tage, or the state constitution is more restrictive than the 
federal. Sorauf says of the choice: 
. . . the chief criteria are clear: sympathy of 
the judges, relationship of the relevant constitution 
to the goals of the litigation, and speed of access 
to both trial and appellate courts.264 
The following district court cases were all appealed 
to the United States Supreme Court: Roemer v. Board of Pub-
265 
lie Works of Maryland; Americans United for Separation of 
0 
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
n C O 
Sorauf, The Wall of Separation, p. 112. 
264_, . , , , _ 
Ibid., p. 113. 
265 
Roemer v. Board of Public Works of the State of 
Maryland. 426 U.S. 736 (1966); 96 S. Ct. 2344 (1976); 
387 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Md. 1974). 
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266 267 
v. Bubb; Americans United v. Dunn: and Smith v. Board 
-p ^ 268 of Governors. 
i ^269 Roemer v. Maryleind 
A tuition assistance plan was upheld, before a three-
judge federal district court, in Roemer. The decision was 
2-1, Judge Bryan dissenting. The case was appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court, where the decision was once again 
to uphold the Maryland plan of aid to church-related colleges. 
270 
Americans United v. Bubb 
Americans United v. Bubb was a case which was orig­
inally filed in the state district court in Topeka. The 
judge ruled that Americans United had no standing to sue; 
271 
that Flast v. Cohen did not apply in a state court. An 
appeal went to the Supreme Court, but was dropped. Ameri­
cans United than filed suit in the Federal District Court. 
When the suit was filed, the law involved nineteen 
church-related colleges. The plaintiffs argued that the 
266 
Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State v. Bubb, 379 F. Supp. 872 (D. Kan. 1974). 
267 
Americans United for the Separation of Church 
and State v. Dunn, 384 F. Supp. 714 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); 
prob. juris, noted, 95 S. Ct. 1114 (1975). 
26 8 
Michael Smith v. Board of Governors University 
of North Carolina, U.S.D.C. W.N.C. C-C-76-131 (1977). 
269 
Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U.S. 736. 
270 
Americans United v. Bubb, 379 F. Supp. 872 
(D. Kan. 197411 
2 7 1  
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
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First Amendment was jeopardized on the basis of establish­
ment of religion. The act provided aid for private colleges 
only. 
The Lemon-Tilton test was applied to the Kansas leg­
islation which included a secular purpose, primary effect, 
272 and excessive entanglement. Since the secular purpose was 
to save the state money and to allow student choice, that 
criterion was met. The primary effect was applied individ­
ually to each institution; five of nineteen failed to "pass 
273 
muster." Excessive entanglement and political discord 
were considered by the Court, but there were no violations 
cited. The Court suggested that those colleges which did 
not qualify could do so by divesting themselves of their par-
274 ticular sectarian identities. 
275 Americans United v. Dunn 
Americans United v. Dunn reached the United States 
Supreme Court in 1977. The District Court, however, ques­
tioned the constitutionality of using the device of student 
tuition grants to supply indirect aid to a religious institu­
tion. The Tennessee plan posed no restriction on the use of 
276 
the funds once received. Because there was no separation 
272 Americans United v. Bubb , 379 F. Supp. 872 
(D. Kan. 1974). 
273 274 
Ibid., at 139-93. Ibid. 
275 
Americans United v. Dunn, 384 F. Supp. 714, 719 
(M.D. Tenn. 1974). 
276Ibid., at 720. 
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of secular use from sectarian, the statute failed the test of 
277 entanglement. Thus, the three-judge federal court found 
278 the plan unconstitutional. A later appeal took it to the 
United States Supreme Court but the plan was modified to 
, 279 comply. 
2 80 
Smith v. Board of Governors 
Smith v. Board of Governors originated in the United 
States District Court of the Western District of North Caro­
lina. The suit (discussed supra) was taken to the U. S. 
Supreme Court, and on the basis of Roemer, the appellants 
lost a 6-3 decision. The effect of the decision in North 
Carolina is to perpetuate three contested plans of assistance 
to 38 church-related institutions. The controversy in the state 
continues, however, because with each legislature, the dollar 
demands of the private colleges tend to increase in size. 
STATE CASES 
281 Horace Mann v. Maryland 
Horace Mann v. Maryland challenged Maryland statutes, 
Chapter 66 of the Acts of the 1962 and Chapter 545 of the 
of 1963 as unconstitutional and invalid. The highest 
^^Americans United v. Dunn, at 720. 
278 , . , Ibxd. 
779 
Smith v. Board of Governors, 46 U.S.L.W. at 3162 
(1977) 
280Ibid. 
^^Horace Mann League v. Board of Public Works, 
242 Md. 645 op. dxs. and cert. don. , 385 U.S. 97 ("1966) . 
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court in Maryland/ the State Court of Appeals, heard the 
282 
case. The case was the first higher education case to use 
283 
all the classic church-state arguments. The plaintiffs 
presented a historic sketch of church-state relationships, 
and the defense was featured by the arguments from precedent, 
284 which were meant to justify aid to church-related colleges. 
The Horace-Mann League was backed by Americans United 
285 
and the American Jewish Congress. At issue was the ques­
tion of the constitutionality of legislation which provided 
grants to four church-related Maryland colleges. The col­
leges were Hood College, Western Maryland, Notre Dame Col-
2 86 
lege, and St. Joseph. All but one of the colleges (Hood 
287 
College) failed the test of constitutionality. 
The question foremost in the mind of the court was to 
determine whether the defendant colleges were religious or 
sectarian. Perhaps foreshadowing a later attempt to form 
criteria for judgment, the Appellate Court applied the 
following standards to the individual colleges: 
(1) the stated purposes of the college; 
(2) the college personnel . . . governing board . . . 
administrative officers ... faculty ... and 
student body (with considerable stress being laid 
282 Horace Mann League v. Board of Public Works, 242 Md. 
645 op. dis. and cert, don., 385 U.S. 97 (1966). 
283 284 
Ibid., pp. 2-8. Ibid., pp„ 17-20. 
28^Ibid., p. 1 286Ibid., pp. 9-17. 
287Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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on . . .) religious control over the governing board 
as a criterion of whether a college is sectarian; 
(3) the college's relationship with religious organiza­
tions and groups ... its sponsoring church; 
(4) the place of religion in the college's program, 
which includes the extent of religious manifesta­
tion ... required participation for any or all 
students ... place of religion in the curriculum 
and in extra-curricular programs; 
(5) the result or "outcome" of the college program . . . 
(6) the work and image of the college in the commun­
ity.288 
The United States Supreme Court declined to consider the Hor­
ace Mann case, leaving Horace Mann as the model until Lemon 
289 
and Tilton m 1971. Richard E. Morgan calls the stand 
taken by the Court of Appeals "a fairly tough separation-
ist line."^9® 
The roll call of cases which have had effect upon 
recent constitutional opinion is limited and includes those 
cases originating in the states that have eventually reached 
the Supreme Court. The narrative also is selective in its 
choice of cases considered significant to the question of 
the research question only. Cases currently moving through 
state courts are not considered to be within the scope of 
this study. 
In 1975 Leo Pfeffer characterized the Supreme Court 
as ready to find unconstitutional most elementary and 
2 88 
Horace Mann League v. Board of Public Works, 242 Md. 
645 op. dis. and cert, don., 385 U.S. 97 (1966). 
289 
Horace Mann League v. Board of Public Works of 
Maryland, 385 U.S. 97 (1966). 
290 . 
Richard E. Morgan, The Supreme Court and Religion, 
p. 108. 
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secondary parochial aid without very much data. Yet the same 
Court requires the burden of proof to rest upon a plaintiff 
291 who challenges college aid. Pfeffer says: 
The difference in treatment is based on the assump­
tion that there is not much difference between paro­
chial schools, but that church-related colleges and 
universities vary substantially among themselves and 
each must therefore be judged individually in deter­
mining whether it is sufficiently secular to qualify 
for governmental aid under the Establishment Clause.292 
293 
Minnesota C.L.U. v. Minnesota 
The Minnesota Civil Liberties Union successfully chal­
lenged legislation which provided tax exempt bonds for con-
294 struction of buildings at church-related colleges. But on 
an appeal to the State Supreme Court, the Court held that 
bonds could be issued "by a state agency to refinance the 
indebtedness of private religious affiliated colleges in the 
295 construction of secular educational facilities." The 
Court insisted that the plan violated neither the state con­
stitution (Art. 13, Sec. 2) nor the Establishment Clause of 
296 
the First Amendment. 
291 Pfeffer, God, Caesar and the Constitution, 
pp. 696f. 
292 T, . , Ibid. 
Minnesota CLU v. Minnesota, 224 N.W. 2d 344 (1974). 
294T, . , Ibad. 
295 Minnesota Higher Educational Facilities Authority 
v. Hawk. 232 N.W. 2d 106 (1973). 
296T ,  Ibid. 
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297 State ex. rel. Rogers v. Swanson 
Nebraska statutes which provided tuition grants to 
students of church-related colleges were declared unconsti­
tutional because benefits were directed to a specific 
group. The plan was held to violate both the state and 
298 
federal constitutions. The First Amendment Establishment 
Clause was jeopardized in the Federal Constitution; the spe­
cific article in the state constitution cited by the Court 
299 
was Article III, Sec. 18. 
300 
Almond v. Day 
Virginia's constitution has been persistently embat­
tled over the question of support for church-related higher 
301 
education. The statute included a provision for "debt 
forgiveness" which proved too similar to direct grants to be 
302 
acceptable constitutionally. The program was challenged 
303 successfully in Almond v. Day. The Virginia State Supreme 
Court identified the primary flaw in the plan in its "natural 
304 
and reasonable effect." The court maintained that Sec­
tion 141 of the state constitution, as well as the First 
297 State ex. rel. Rogers v. Swanson, 192 Neb. 125, 
219 N.W. 2d 726 (1974). 
298_.., 299_,., 
Ibid. Ibid. 
300Almond v. Day, S.E. 2d 851, 857 (1955). 
301T, . , 302T, . , 303T, . , Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 
304_, . , 
Ibid. 
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Amendment of the ederal Constitution were violated in terms 
305 
of the guarantees of religious freedom. 
In 1956 the State of Virginia amended its onstitu-
tion to accommodate the funding of sectarian schools. In 
1964 the United States Supreme Court ruled that state schools 
were segregationist in nature because public funds were pro­
hibited to private schools on an elementary and secondary 
306 
level. Another revision of the constitution was necessary 
in 1971 because by that time social change had brought about 
new legislation which legalized aid, on all levels, for non-
307 
sectarian schools. Another provision permitted non-
theological and schools not "pervasively sectarian" to receive 
308 state monies in the form of loans. It was this couplet of 
constitutional connivance which initiated the litigation 
309 
involved m Miller v. Ayers. 
In 1972, the Tuition Assistance Program was estab­
lished to provide loans which could be paid back in the form 
310 
of work of money. A suit was filed by the Comptroller to 
305 
J 3Almond v. Day, S.E. 851, 857 (1955). 
"^^Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 
(1964). 
307 Virginia,Constitution, Sec. 141, Art. VIII, Sec. 10. 
O  A O  
Ibid., Art. VIII, Sec. 11. 
309Miller v. Ayers, 191 S.E. 2d 261, 267 (1972). 
^10 
Ibid., 198 S.E. 2d 634, 639 (1973). 
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determine constitutionality of the plan. The Virginia Supreme 
Court concluded that most of the statute did not violate the 
state and federal constitutions, especially in the light of 
311 
the Lemon tripartite tests. However, a portion of the 
legislation which "forgave" the loans based on minimal re­
quirements appeared suspiciously close to outright grants. 
The term "normal" progress could not in any sense benefit the 
public, but would directly benefit sectarian colleges in vio-
312 
lation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
The result is that Virginia presently has an aid program 
within constitutional bounds, which provides aid to church-
313 
related colleges. 
Washington state's legislature has had limited suc­
cess in providing constitutionally permissible aid to higher 
314 
education. In 1958, the Tattersall case awarded Washington 
students an opportunity to participate in the Western Inter­
state Compact in Higher Education (WICHE). A taxpayer plain­
tiff objected to legislation on the issue of the state obli­
gating its credit in violation of Article VIII, Sec. 5 of the 
315 constitution. The court found that public purpose would 
316 
be served through WICHE as an agent of the state. 
845-846 (1958). 
•^11 
Miller v. Ayers, 198 S.E. 2d 634, 639 (1973). 
312T, . , 313T, Ibid. Ibid. 
314 
State ex rel. Tattersall v. Yelle, 329 P. 2d 841, 
315 , . , 316t, . , Ibid. Ibid. 
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The appropriation and allocation of state tax reve­
nues for the support of church-related colleges and univer­
sities was allowed, according to the Attorney General, 
317 
in 1958. The concept of need was the key to the opinion. 
However, no such monies could be used for the establishment 
of scholarships, loans, or free tuition and fees, but it 
would be permissible to provide grants or loans directly to 
needy students at such institutions.3"*"® 
In 1973, a legislative plan was devised which pro­
vided Washington state students attending church-related 
319 colleges with financial aid. The money was not paid 
directly to the student, but was credited to an individual's 
tuition account. The institution actually received the money 
from the state: the student saw evidence of the receipt on 
320 
paper. After a review the State Supreme Court found the 
program to be unconstitutional on the basis of "clear prohi-
321 bition" in Article IX, Sec. 4. The Court outlined a set 
of criteria which resemble the Maryland requirements for 
clear establishment of the secular purpose of an institution: 
(1) history and current facts: (2) stated purposes: (3) gov­
ernance: (4) faculty: (5) student body composition: 
i 
Washington, Attorney General Opinion, 57-58, 
No. 226, p. 104 (1958). 
317
» P-
318Ibid. 
319Weiss v. O'Brien, 509 P. 2d 973 (1973). 320Ibid. 
321Ibid. 
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(6) academic freedom; (7) property ownership: (8) prominence 
of religion in the institution; (9) affiliations; (10) curric-
322 
ulum; and (11) control. 
The criteria were applied to a sampling of church-
related institutions benefitting from the aid plan. The Court 
said: 
. . . in differing degrees, all of these institu­
tions were founded upon and continue to be dedicated to 
some elements of sectarian purpose and influence. ... 
Their efforts and principles should not be diluted by 
the temporary gain of money diverted from the public 
treasury, since an inevitable by-product of this effort 
would be a weakening of such devotion and dedication.323 
The Washington program was turned down by the Supreme 
Court because the "principal and primary effect enhanced 
sectarian interests," and the "possibility of excessive entan-
324 
glement was not ruled out." Furthermore, "no guarantees 
were written in the law which would prevent sectarian instruc-
325 tion," as had been provided in Tilton and Hunt. 
An authority established to market student loans was 
set up in 1973. But the Washington Supreme Court pointed out 
that state credit would be used impermissibly by individuals, 
326 and sectarian institutions would also be supported. Point­
ing to the Weiss precedent which prohibited indirect assis­
tance, the Justices said: 
Weiss v. O'Brien, 509 . 2d 973 (1973). 
323T, . , oon 324 325 Ibid., p. 990. Ibid. Ibid. 
326 Washington State Higher Education Assistance 
Authority v. Graham, 529 P. 2d 1051, 1054 (1974). 
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Part of the loaned funds will most certainly be used 
to pay tuition and the remainder will benefit the col­
lege in many ways by assisting the student to stay in 
school. In short, the form is different from Weiss, but 
the substance is in no way different.327 
Both the courts and the voters have consistently 
resisted further inroads into the constitutional prohibition 
328 of aid to religiously affiliated institutions. 
The child benefit theory, as well as public welfare, 
are not seen by the Court as receiving the primary adventage. 
Instead, Washington's Supreme Court interpretation has been: 
"that benefit accrues in an impermissible manner to church-
"329 
related colleges." 
The Massachusetts Constitution effectively provides 
the same safeguards as Washington, at least that is the posi-
330 
tion of the State Supreme Court Justices. Attempts to 
provide direct aid to church-related colleges have repeatedly 
failed in the legislature. In 1922, it was ruled by the 
Attorney General that public purpose cannot be served by 
331 aiding private colleges. 
In 1968, the Massachusetts Senate requested of the 
Supreme Court an opinion as to the constitutionality of a 
proposed statute: 
327 Washington State Higher Education Assistance 
Authority v. Graham, 529 I 2d 1051, 1054 (1974). 
328T, . -j 329_. . , Ibid. Ibid. 
330 Opinions of the Attorney General of Mass., VI, 
1921-22 (1922), pp. 648, 653-654. 
331t, . , Ibid. 
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. . .  w h i c h  w o u l d  c r e a t e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  a s s i s t  i n s t i ­
tution for higher learning in construction, financing, 
and re-financing of projects and which would provides 
[sic] that any borrowing by.authority shall not involve 
a pledge of credit of commonwealth would not violate 
prohibition against pledge of commonwealth's credit 
except upon vote of two thirds of each house of General 
Court.332 
The Court understood that most of the plan fulfilled 
secular legislative purpose, but the effect of the plan 
would be violative of both state and federal constitutions. 
333 
The Court was unanimous in its opinion. 
Alabama courts have successfully prevented inroads 
into the constitution. In 1971 and 1973, tuition grants 
programs were ruled unconstitutional by the opinion of the 
334 
justices. The Alabama House of Representatives requested 
a ruling on a tuition grants-in-aid program, which was 
directed toward resident, full-time students attending sec-
335 
tarian schools. The Supreme Court Justices insisted that 
state funds used either directly or indirectly to provide 
tuition grants to all students, including those attending 
church-related colleges, was unconstitutional: 
. . .  t h e  c u m u l a t i v e  i m p a c t  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between the State and Church related institutions which 
is provided for in H.B. 247 involves "an excessive 
•3 "3? 
Opinion of the Justices, 236 N.E. 2d 523 (1968). 
333Ibid., at 528. 
334 
Opinion of the Justices, 291 Ala. 301, 280 
So. 2d 547 (1973). * 
335 
Ibid. 
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entanglement" between the State and religion and would 
therefore be unconstitutional under the Religion clauses 
of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution, as 
well as its Alabama counterpart, Article 14, Section 
263.336 
337 
Hartness v. Patterson 
Hartness, referred to as a "friendly suit," was 
contrived in order to test the constitutionality of South 
Carolina's State Education Assistance Act. The program 
established a tuition grant program and a student loan pro-
338 
gram. Speaking to the question of such assistance, the 
South Carolina Supreme Court found: 
. . .  T h e  p r o p e r t y  o r  c r e d i t  o f  t h e  S t a t e  o f  S o u t h  
Carolina . . . shall not . . . be used directly or 
indirectly, in aid or maintenance of any college . . . 
which is . . . under the direction or control of any 
church or religious or sectarian denomination.33^ 
The fact that only a portion of the tuition costs 
are covered by the grants from the State affects the 
matter only in degree. If State funds can be used to 
provide a portion of the tuition costs for attendance 
at religious schools, all could just as legally be 
paid, resulting in the support of such institutions 
entirely with state funds.340 
Turning to the device used successfully in Hunt, 
the State Education Assistance Act established a student loan 
33^0pinion of the Justices, 291 Ala. 301, 280 
So. 2d 547 (1973). 
337 
Hartness v. Patterson, 179 S.E. 2d 907, 909 (1971). 
338,., 
Ibid. 
339S. C. Art. XI, Sec. 9. 
340 
Hartness v. Patterson, 179 S.E. 2d 907, 909 (1971). 
374 
fund, whose credit was backed by the issuance of bonds, 
payable solely from loan repayments, grants, and other non-
341 public sources. No state money or credit was involved* 
The policy passed constitutional muster in much the same way 
« 4- 342 as Hunt. 
Utilizing its extensive influence, the South Caro­
lina Foundation was instrumental in persuading citizens in 
343 1972 to amend the state constitution. The element replaced 
was a specific prohibition of "all direct and indirect" aids 
to religious institutions with a more general statement out-
344 lawing direct aid. The effect allowed leeway for a more 
elaborate and generous program of assistance which would not 
be affected "by further rulings such as was provided in Hart-
345 ness . 
Bob Jones University v. Johnson 
The most recent ruling in South Carolina litigation 
was Bob Jones v. Johnson, which only indirectly touched on 
financial aid. Bob Jones University is a conservative Prot­
estant college which accepts students who utilize veterans 
benefits. The federal courts ruled that the Veterans Admin­
istration program violates neither the Establishment nor the 
346 Free Exercxse Clauses of the First Amendment. 
^HarLness v. Patterson, 179 S.E. 2d 907, 909 (1971) 
Ibid. ^'^Sorauf, The Wall of Separation, p. 309. 
344 , . , 345 T, . , Ibid. Ibid. 
346 
Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 
(D.S.C. 1974). 
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347 lona College v. Nyquist 
In New York, the Bundy Plan of state assistance to 
education was challenged in three higher education cases. 
348 
The first, lona, entered court m order to claim the 
right to receive state subsidy. Guidelines drawn up by the 
state Commissioner of Education, effectively defined the 
349 school as sectarian, and ineligible for the money. Un­
willing to accept the conditions, which appeared to be arbi­
trary and discriminatory, the school filed suit. The New 
York State Supreme Court found the college not in compliance 
with the restrictions written in the legislation and refused 
to allow the funds to be funneled to the school. A compli­
cated questionnaire method of qualifying for aid overlapped 
into the post-Tilton period where similar criteria con­
tinued to determine the pervasive sectarianism of colleges. 
350 
Canisius College of Buffalo v. Nyquist 
Canisius College in New York, also a Catholic school, 
initiated legal action. Although initially the courts denied 
Canisius the privilege of state aid, by the utilization of 
347 
lona College v. Nyquist, 65 Misc. 2d. 329, 316, 
NYS 2d 139, 144 (1970). 
348ibid. 
349ibid. 
^9zanisius college of Buffalo v. Nyquist, 36 App. 
Div. 2d 340, 342, 320 N.Y.S. 2d 652, 654 (1971), 
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the Iona precedent, the Lemon emphasis upon secular pur-
351 pose became the dominant theme upon which this case hinged. 
Although the question was raised concerning "excessive entan­
glement," the New York State Supreme Court laid its emphasis 
upon the primary purpose of higher education as a delivery 
352 system for secular education. With that emphasis, any 
allusion to "entanglement" was lost in the positive pro-
353 visions of its secular mission. 
354 College of New Rochelle v. Nyquist 
In the third New York case, the question of sectar­
ian control became the central issue. Although the eligibil­
ity of the College of New Rochelle was denied by the Com­
missioner on the identical basis of the first two denials, 
the Supreme Court Justices could not establish that the 
educational process was necessarily exclusively Catholic in 
355 doctrine. Nor were the Ursuline Nuns necessarily "robots" 
356 acting under the control of any religious denomination. 
351 Cansius College of Buffalo v. Nyquist, 36 App. 
Div. 2d 340, 342, 320 N.Y.S. 2d 652, 654 (1971). 
352T, . , Ibid. 
353T, . , Ibid. 
354 College of New Rochelle v. Nyquist, 326 N.Y.S. 2d 
765, 771 (1971). 
355 , Ibid. 
356 , . , Ibid. 
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"Entanglement" was seen in this case as less a threat than 
357 
it had been xn Lemon and Dicenso. The State Supreme 
Court permitted the College of New Rochelle to receive the 
aid: 
. . . Although there are factors in Tilton which 
distinguish it from the present case (e.g., we do 
not here have a one-time, single purpose grant), there 
are fewer and less significant entanglements between 
religion and government present here than were present 
in Lemon and DiCenso.358 
359 State ex rel. Warren v. Reuter 
As was recounted in a previous chapter many states 
have circumvented provisions of state constitutions by uti­
lization of contracts for services. The practice was chal­
lenged in the Wisconsin State Supreme Court in 1969,^^ and 
361 
again in 1972. In question was a contractual provision 
whereby state assistance could be provided to the Marquette 
School of Medicine during and following transition from 
existence as a medical arm of church-related Marquette 
357 
College of New Rochelle v. Nyquist, 326 N.Y.S. 2d 
765, 771 (1971). 
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State ex rel. Warren v. Reuter, 170 N.W. 2d 790 
(1969). 
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362 University to independent status. A modification was made 
in the composition of the Board of Directors (trustees). 
In keeping with constitutional necessity, the recipient 
363 institution was severed from the university. The need 
for doctors and nurses was critical in the state and the leg­
islature moved to provide financial support through contracts 
for service. A list of five constitutionally- questionable 
364 practices was cited m Warren v. Reuter, all of which 
centered upon tax money accruing to the church-related uni-
365 
versity. The State Supreme Court, however, ruled that 
the primary effect was secular despite some advantage enjoyed 
by Marquette; the people of the state would benefit more. 
". . . The primary effect of the legislation is not the 
advancement of religion, but the advancement of the health 
366 
of Wisconsin residents." 
36 y 
Warren v. Nusbaum 
The Reuter case was closely followed by Warren v. 
Nusbaum, a case where the issue concerned a dental school 
368 
at Marquette. The dental school received aid through a 
(1969). 
State ex rel. Warren v. Reuter, 1170 N.W. 2d 790 
363_, . , 364 365_, . , , Qno Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., at 802. 
366x, . , Ibid. 
^^Warren v. Nusbaum, 198 N.W. 2d 650 (1972). 
368 , . , 
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system of contractual agreements. Wisconsin Higher Education 
Aids Board paid a specific stipend for each student enrolled. 
The constitutional question occurred over the inability of 
the plan to limit application of the funds to the dental 
school. The funds could be applied to the general opera­
tional budget of the university. The specific provision of 
the state constitution appeared to be in violation: 
. . .  T h e  r i g h t  o f  e v e r y  m a n  t o  w o r s h i p  A l m i g h t y  
God according to the dictates of his own conscience 
shall never be infringed . . . nor shall any money be 
drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious 
societies, or religious theological seminaries.371 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the plan did 
stand as to "purpose" as it could find no "Catholic way to 
372 
pull a tooth." Entanglement was not found to be a prob­
lem, but free exercise was affected, and the money was not 
373 374 limited to the dental school. The plan was struck down. 
375 
Clayton v. Kerrick 
A New Jersey statute created a state authority which 
was authorized to sell bonds in a manner similar to the Hunt 
371 . . . 
Wisconsin, Constitution. Art. I, Sec. 18. 
372 
State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 55 Wise. 2d 316, 
320; 198 N.W. 2d 650, 654 (1972). 
373Ibid., at 322; 198 N. W. 2d at 656. 
374_., . , 
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375 
Clayton v. Kerrick, 59 N.J. 583, 589, 285 A2d 11, 
17 (1971). 
380 
376 plan. The New Jersey State Supreme Court upheld the plan 
initially, following Tilton. An appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court resulted in the plan being returned for 
377 
reconsideration. 
The result was similar to that in Hunt. There were 
no grants involved as had been true of Tilton, and the 
revolving feature of the loans eliminated the use of state 
378 tax money. 
The ruling allowed both public and private church-
related colleges to participate. However, as in Tilton, none 
of the facilities could ever be used for religious pur-
379 poses. 
Neither religious purpose nor excessive entanglement 
380 was proven and the plan was held constitutional. 
381 Americans United v. Rogers 
The issue of the Missouri case revolved about the 
constitutionality of a grant program which allowed church-
382 related colleges to benefit indirectly from student aid. 
The state grant program provided for tuition grants to be 
17 (1971). 
<5 H/* 
N. J. Statutes Annotated. Sec. 18A: 72A-1 (1968). 
377 
Clayton v. Kerrick, 59 N.J. 583, 589, 285.A 2d 11, 
378 , . , 379 , 380_, . , 
Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 
381 
Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S.W. 2d 711 (1977). 
382 
Ibid. 
381 
supplied to students who attend both public and private col­
leges and utilized a scheme of payments directly to the stu­
dents, who endorsed the check over to the institution in pay-
383 
ment of their tuition. 
Concern was expressed that the plan had a primary 
effect of advancement of religion and would cause excessive 
entanglement of religion. 
Circuit Judge Robert G. J. Hoester declared the 
385 
Missouri financial assistance program unconstitutional. 
The state Coordinating Board for Higher Education and a number 
of independent colleges and universities appealed the decision 
to the Missouri State Supreme Court. 
The Lemon tests were applied to the scheme: 
In order for grant of state aid to be upheld against 
First Amendment separation of church and state challenge, 
the state aid must have a secular legislative purpose, 
it must have a primary effect other than the advancement 
of religion, and it must have no tendency to entangle 
the state excessively in church a f f a i r s . 3 8 7  
The majority of the court did not find the statutes violative 
of the First Amendment and reversed Judge Hoester's deci-
388 
sxon. 
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Missouri Rev. Statutes, Sees. 173.200 to 173.235, 
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The Chief Justice, Seiler, filed a dissenting opinion 
which questioned the majority's findings that there was no 
violation of Article IX, Sec. 8 of the state constitution, 
"on the basis that the aid is to the student, not the 
389 
school." Justice Seller said further: 
I do not see how the granting of $900 of public 
funds to a student can be treated a grant to the people 
of the state so as to avoid being a grant to a private 
person and also at the same be treated as a direct grant 
to the student so as to avoid being an appropriation in 
aid of any religious creed, church, or sectarian purpose 
of a private college.39° 
The Chief Justice noted that in Roemer there had been 
a "meticulous" effort to see to it that "state funds would 
391 
not be used for sectarian purposes." According to testi­
mony by the colleges, of the fifteen colleges in question 
"eight of which have ... a close relationship with various 
Protestant denominations and seven with the Catholic 
392 
Church." 
Chief Justice Seller's final concern was the "effect" 
393 of the grant program: 
[I]t is not even arguable that giving a grant to a 
student is not a form of public aid to the college. 
Beyond question, the student is going to use the grant 
to help pay his college expenses, including tuition. . . . 
Tuition is the lifeblood of a private college and any­
thing that helps the student pay tuition helps the 
389 Americans United v. Rogers, at 723. 
390_, . , . 391_, . , 392-,.-. 
Ibid., at 724. Ibid. Ibid. 
393Ibid., at 725-726. 
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college to that extent. ... In the case before us, 
the student is merely the conduit of the grant through 
whom the state aid is transmitted to the school. . . 
[Emphasis the writer's! As we have often held . . . 
our constitution prohibits aid, either directly or 
indirectly. ... [Emphasis, added! There is no such 
provision in the First Amendment.394 
Another dissenter, Justice Donnelly, added his voice 
of concern to the "indirect" argument by describing the plan 
as "a classic example of indirect aid to denominations of 
395 
religion." 
The Missouri Supreme Court, however, reversed the 
decision of the lower court on the basis that the plan did 
not violate the state or federal constitutions. The court 
held also, in its effect, the plan served a public purpose, 
did not establish religion, and there was no basis for find-
^ 396 mg excessive entanglement. 
The majority opinion written by Judge Morgan ended 
with a comment on church-state separation. He said: 
[W]e should comment on the subtle suggestion that 
approval here will open the gates to further efforts 
to breach the constitutional "wall" between the state 
and the church. Although finding the "wall" is perplex­
ing, it is not for the courts to shy so far from the 
same as to do disservice to those whose interests fall 
on one side or the other.397 
394 Americans United v. Rogers, at 726. 
395 396 
Ibid., at 727. JyDIbid., at 713-723. 
397 
Ibid., at 722. 
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California Educational Facilities Authority v. Priest 
In California v. Priest, the state treasurer, Ivey 
Baker Priest, refused on the question of constitutionality 
to issue bonds for the California Educational Facilities 
399 Authority. The Authority took the issue to the California 
State Supreme Court, on the grounds that the established 
the "Authority" as "a public instrumentality" performing 
"an essential public function. 
The bonds were for the purpose of: 
. . . [p] roviding private institutions of higher 
education within the state with an additional means 
by which to expand, enlarge, and establish dormitory, 
academic and related facilities, to finance such 
facilities, and to refinance existing facilities. 
(Sec. 30301) [Education Code] 401 
The state treasurer argued that the institutions 
involved which were "affiliated with, or governed by, a 
religious organization impermissibly advances religion. 
The State Supreme Court held with the statute and 
403 
concluded: "The Act here challenged is constitutional." 
The treasurer was ordered to issue the bonds as a "ministerial 
4. .1404 act." 
At this writing, the federal and state court deci­
sions have approved plans which include direct payments of 
398 
California v. Priest, 12 Cal. 3d 593, 526 P. 2d 
513, 116 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974). 
399—t. , , 40 0-, 401 , , n/- n Ibid., at 362. Ibid. Ibid., at 363. 
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aid to students at colleges, indirect aid, bond issue plans, 
contracts for services, for educational services, and student 
loan plans. The two preceding chapters have provided an 
outline of how these plans relate to the constitutional pro­
visions within the respective states, and how the plans have 
been interpreted by three levels of court opinion. 
386 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
The stream of history does not flow gently as the 
isolation of the historian's ivory tower might sometimes 
suggest. The tracing of religious and educational institu­
tions is also the presentation of events in the lives of 
men. It is from these lives that the achievements and ideas 
emerged, possibly synthesized from great conflicts between 
institutions, but certainly emergent from the fertile loam 
of the interchange of minds. Out of conflict and inter­
change of ideas, the democratic experiment has emerged. Like 
a frail canoe shooting the rapids in the river of history, 
it has charted the course for those who would follow. The 
Constitution is not a map but has been provided from the 
mistakes of the past, a collection of those experiences in 
an attempt to prevent their needless repetition. 
One of those concerns is the dual concept, religious 
establishment, and religious freedom. The Pounding Fathers 
went to great lengths to insure this duality in the First 
Amendment to the Constitution. Perpetuation of the Estab­
lishment Clause in its highest purpose has inspired this 
research. The first chapter has provided an account of 
events which may serve as a primer on the question of church 
and state throughout history from the beginning to the 
387 
present day. It has been purposefully selective. Compre­
hensive coverage is not within the scope of this work. In 
the later chapters the account is narrowed to the controversy 
over church and state in American education. The research 
is finally applied even more narrowly to the controversy over 
state support of church-related colleges in the fifty states. 
State aid and programs which the states have instituted to 
attempt to circumvent the states 1 own constitutions, in many 
cases consist of such devices as grants, scholarships, loans, 
contracts for student spaces, for training in medical-related 
fields, devices for providing for facilities loans and bond 
programs, and other uncategorized programs of assistance. 
In addition to the states, the federal government 
has led the way in providing a program that now involves 
$15 billion in financial aid of all kinds. Educational aid 
is a major budget item v/hich presently requires a great deal 
of attention of lawmakers on all levels of government. It 
is the concern of a great many people that such funds are 
rapidly causing higher education to lose its traditional 
autonomy. 
The church-state controversy has played a large part 
in all this new growth. Fears have been advanced that church-
related institutions benefiting from such aid are willingly 
accepting tax money in order to advance the cause of their 
particular sect. In all this states have•in the majority 
of cases constitutions which forbid the utilization of tax 
388 
monies for the furtherance of sects, individuals, or educa­
tional instit. ;ions sponsored and controlled by sects. 
When the state goes against its own constitution, it becomes 
open to challenge from taxpayers who have been ready to enter 
suit. 
Within the realm of higher education, the courts 
have been reluctant to declare state plans unconstitutional. 
The few suits that have been brought to the Supreme Court 
with higher education programs as the issue have seemed to 
further the cause of those who seek possible ways to use 
tax money to lend stability to their own institutional lives. 
The same has held true with most federal district courts and 
most state supreme courts. 
In the seventies, the Lemon and Tilton cases provided 
the landmarks where federal and state programs took their 
comfort,, Hunt provided a possible means for church-related 
colleges to finance construction without risk to their own 
credit. Direct, subsidy has long been the dream of the aid 
advocate, who has visions of a never-ending stream of federal 
and state money, with few strings attached,flowing into the 
coffers of the institutions, allowing for new and unusual 
programs, better faculty, and an end to fears of institu­
tional demise. 
Since Tilton there have been other cases that involve 
attempts to provide aid to church colleges. What generally 
has occurred is a compromise by the colleges in question, 
389 
toward their original and historic mission. Some of these 
have come about by the natural, and gradual shift toward 
secularization. However, in other cases there are changes 
that appear suspiciously like opportunism. Some have modi­
fied their programs in order to appear less sectarian, and 
have begun to place greater emphasis upon their secular 
instrumental!ty. 
However, much of this has been duly noted by the 
courts and individual lawsuits have been moving through the 
courts, testing these programs all the way to the United 
States Supreme Court. The controversy does not end with the 
justices, for even there opinion is sharply divided. In 
almost every case, the majority opinion has proceeded to pro­
vide controversial reasons for its position. The dissenting 
justices constantly reiterate the warning that grave dangers 
lie ahead for the future of the church college and possibly 
for church-state relations. 
Conclusions 
1. The historical record reveals that during the 
period from 325 to 1517, attempts to keep church and state 
merged resulted in difficulties and bloodshed throughout 
Western Europe. 
2. The founders of the United States Constitution, 
aware of the lessons of history, sought to prevent church 
and state from being united as provided for in the First 
Amendment of the Constitution. 
390 
3. All fifty states originally provided for some 
measure of exclusion from state support of religion. 
4. Forty-two states have provided for direct or 
indirect financial aid to private church-related colleges 
v/hich circumvent the onstitutional prohibitions. 
5. The study answered the question: What issues 
divide educators with respect to the public support of 
church-related colleges and universities? It was concluded 
that educators are divided over: 
(a) whether increased aid affects institutional 
autonomy, so that excessive entanglement of govern­
ment in religion is the result; 
(b) whether colleges have the technology and 
disposition to refrain from use of tax-derived money 
for sectarian purposes at church-related institutions; 
(c) whether there is an actual threat to edu­
cational diversity because of a financial crisis in 
higher education or whether there is a threat of 
institutional demise? 
(d) whether direct or indirect state and federal 
aid to church-related colleges is constitutional; and 
(e) whether state aid to students constitutes 
constitutionally permissive aid to the institution. 
6. Who are the participants? The participants in 
the controversy are: 
(a) state and federal governmental agencies; 
391 
(b) private church-related colleges and groups 
to which they belong; 
(c) concerned constitutionalist groups such as 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 
the American Jewish Congress, and the American Civil 
Liberties Union; and 
(d) concerned individual taxpayers who have insti­
tuted court action. 
7. The respective positions are best revealed in 
the issues raised through litigation which has emerged from 
the controversy. 
8. State aid legislation within the states has been 
encouraged and facilitated through a number of significant 
Supreme Court decisions. 
9. The United States Supreme Court drew from a num­
ber of lower court education decisions in order to devise a 
set of criteria for determining the constitutionality of 
higher education aid plans. The criteria were called the 
"Tripartite Test," which was used in Lemon v. Kurtzman and 
Tilton v. Richardson. The criteria require that in order 
for a law to be ruled constitutional it must: 
(a) reflect a secular legislative purpose; 
(b) neither advance nor retard religion; and 
(c) not create an excessive entanglement with 
religion. 
10. In Tilton v. Richardson, the United States Supreme 
Court decided that aid to religious higher education contains 
392 
an essential, difference from the question of aid to parochial 
education. The Court concluded that since religious indoc­
trination is not the primary purpose of church colleges, state 
aid to such institutions must be viewed in a less restrictive 
sense. State aid to building construction on church, college 
campuses must not assist the building of structures to be 
used for sectarian purposes. 
11. In Hunt v. McNair, the United States Supreme 
Court concluded that indirect aid in the form of bonds may 
be rendered to a church-related college by a state if the 
resulting building is not used for sectarian purposes. 
12. In Roemer v. Maryland, the Supreme Court con­
cluded that a state may provide aid to a church-related col­
lege, so long as the institution meets the Tripartite Test 
of Lemon, and if the funds are identifiably not applied to 
sectarian use. 
13. In Smith v. Board of Governors, the United States 
Supreme Court decided that students who attend sectarian 
colleges, which provide primarily secular education, may 
constitutionally be allowed to be beneficiaries of state 
tuition aid. 
14. The trend of state and federal court decisions 
suggests that an increase in the number and magnitude of 
state aid programs is probable in the near future. 
15. A growing number of church-related colleges have 
modified their high religious profile in order to qualify 
393 
for state and federal money. Some have abandoned their relig­
ious ties altogether and continue as a quasi-public insti­
tution. 
Recommendations 
1. It is this researcher's recommendation that fur­
ther research be made into the distinction that has been 
made, since the Tilton case, concerning a difference in sus­
ceptibility of secondary and primary students to religious 
pressures, as distinct from that of more sophisticated 
college students. It is recommended that further investi­
gation be made into the position of the Supreme Court that 
there is a difference between pre-college and college-age 
students' susceptibility to religious influence. 
2. Another question lingers regarding the criteria 
for judging whether a college is "pervasively sectarian." 
It might be helpful to college administrators, judges, and 
those contemplating suits to be able to compile precisely 
the measurement utilized by the courts to determine this 
very ambiguous term concerning church-state relationships 
on the college campus. 
3. As was expressed by the Carnegie Commission, once 
money begins to flow from government, there is likely to 
follow a loss in institutional autonomy and subsequently 
academic freedom. The question persists, has this been the 
case? With the increased requirements of accountability and 
reporting, has the presence of government auditing and the 
394 
requirement for increased reporting become a problem to the 
cTrurch-related institution? Have changes on the church-
related campus become so thorough-going that such. coLleges 
are becoming indistinguishable from secular institutions? 
If so, where will higher education loolc for its historic 
plurality and diversity? 
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
It is assumed the reader has reasonable access to state 
and federal constitutions and revised statutes of the fifty 
states. Relevant portions of the documents were provided 
in the body of the paper since inclusion of the references 
in their entirety would have proved redundant and unwieldy. 
